How Knin fell: Rasulo before the "Storm"

The military leadership of the past Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) the works of Carl von Clausewitz were read, as it can now be ascertained from this time distance, only optionally, as part of a course at the Military Academy. On the other hand, the creators of the Croatian action "Storm" put those "recommendations" into practice in the summer of 1995.

Clausewitz's "center of gravity" is the basis of US military doctrine, whose retired generals trained the Croatian army. "The main battle on the battlefield is the impact of center of gravity on center of gravity. Consequently, identifying, dissecting, operationalizing, and exploiting an adversary's center of gravity is one of the most complex war efforts. To distinguish these centers of gravity in the enemy's army, to know their capabilities, is the main act of strategic assessment", specifically wrote Clausewitz.

Knin was the political, military and every other seat of the RSK. The fall of Knin, according to Clausewitz's strategy, was the basis for disintegration not only in the army, but also in the political leadership.

Therefore, since November 1994, when the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) surrendered Kupreška vrata, which in military doctrine was designated as one of the key geostrategic points in the Balkans, without a fight, the Croatian army set out to conquer Knin, and thus the entire RSK.

Experienced poker player, president of the RS Radovan Karadzic, who practiced gambling in the 49s in Belgrade's "Mažestik" while he was a psychiatrist of FK Crvena Zvezda, knew that one should not gamble but play it safe, because Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be divided in the ratio of 51:XNUMX percent. And what good are the mountains without inhabitants in the Bosnian Krajina, it's better if they serve as "pocket money". Then there is "cohabitation" around military operations - who cares about some Livanjsko or Grahovsko polje. And the Croats used that to break through to Dinar, from where they had the Knin Krajina in the palm of their hand.

Knin on the palm

One of the high-ranking officers of the then Serbian Army of the Krajina (SVK) told the author of this text how he called General Dušan Kukobat, then Chief of Staff of the Second Krajina Corps of the VRS, to exchange information and agree on joint actions on the Dinara, to which the Croats are part of the action "Winter 1994" penetrated, and to obtain information from the reconnaissance and sabotage detachment "Orlovi Grmeča", which was led by Mile Šušljik. This information was never provided to him. All cooperation was absent, as if they were not two "brotherly" armies. When the Croats occupied the strategically important Šator mountain, a special unit of the Knin SUP (Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac) went to defend the positions, and the VRS retreated on someone's order.

Croats took control of Dinar during the spring of 1995, and SVK, instead of sending additional forces, sent letters of protest to UNPROFOR. It is sad that even UNPROFOR admits that Croatian forces are shooting at their soldiers, including in one case the commander of the "South" sector and his entourage, and the Serbian side "condemns it in the strongest terms".

It doesn't matter for the readers, but the moment the Croatian army captured Antić's head, the downfall of the SVK and the fall of the RSK began. After Bravac dolac and similar toponyms, mostly, Knin has been in the palm of their hand since April 1995.

Disintegration of the Serbian Army of Krajina

And what does SVK do - nothing! The North Dalmatian Corps of the SVK had two motorized brigades and four light infantry brigades, on paper about 14.000 men, in reality about 10.000. It covered the area from Velebit above Obrovac to Dinara to Bosanski Grahov. Of those 10.000 men, the 75th Knin and 92nd Benkovac motorized brigades each had about 3.000 men, these light infantry from 1.000 to 2.500, and that was certainly not enough to defend the front line, bearing in mind that there were always half the people on vacation, at home or on sick leave, plus those who deserted before the "Storm".

The testimonies of the officers of those units are interesting, and they actually talk about the situation in the SVK and explain the quick defeat and collapse of the 7th Corps of the SVK. "I was the battalion commander, captain, and the only active officer in my unit, all the others were reservists, 'trained'. At the beginning, my brigade commander was a reserve captain, promoted to major. No officer of a lower rank than mine, especially not a non-commissioned officer. That was terrible, how to take the army to Dinar without anyone to command them, to point out the basic things. How can a corporal from the JNA, who was watching how to arrange beds under a thread, explain digging shelter in a rockery", says one of those officers.

The former high-ranking officer of the SVK points out that there were reservists everywhere in the units, the Krajišniks from Belgrade did not want to come, they always "excused" themselves due to health problems. "You have two brigades in the 7th Corps, in which the commanders are reserve officer-captains. I'm not saying they did a bad job, but that's not how it works. You have a brigade in which the commander is the only officer. It refers to these four light infantry brigades. In the 72nd (Benkovac) Motorized and 75th (Knin) at least you had officers in the command, non-commissioned officers were always lacking, but at least you had professional people who could organize something. Those brigades had 3.000 men each. And then you have, for example, the 1st Light (Vrlička) Brigade, which held a position on Dinara, 2.500 men on paper, in reality much less, and the 'hole' gaping towards the enemy is huge. They send parts of other units to help them, and by the time they manage, their 'shift' is already over. "Someone deliberately 'sacrificed' that direction," said the retired officer.

His colleague, also a pensioner, also points to another fact - that before the fall of Knin, about 4.000 of that North Dalmatian Corps, 14.000 of them were on "sick leave", 3.000 were on leave, and after the fall of Bosanski Grahov under Croatian control, another 2.000 literally deserted. .

Cannon fodder

The author of this text was in Knin in those days, but in order not to arouse emotions, and there are some, he relies only on facts.

There was a general mobilization in Knin at that time, everything that was male and moved was mobilized and sent to Dinar, which was more of a minus than a plus, people were sent as "cannon fodder".

At that time, by the way, there was a popular saying in the RSK that "the people of Knin do not fight". The people of Knin are the same as they were on the battlefields, as evidenced by the fact that, looking at the statistics of the number of dead and wounded, Knin is, unfortunately, at the top. The problem, for those who say this, is that Knin was the administrative seat of the RSK, and various ministers came there, brought their associates - drivers, secretaries, heads of cabinet... so it was created the impression that there were deserters in Knin.

A few days before the "Storm", those people disappeared, and the few citizens of Knin who worked in government services were mostly mobilized and sent, without a day's preparation, to some Bravčev dolac on the Dinar, just below Antić's head. These were people who, since 1991, performed professional tasks without which the RSK administration system could not function, but at that time no one thought about it, it was important to fill the units.

One of the commanders on that "Dinaric direction" told the author of this text how, just before the "Storm", 300-400 people were brought to him from the so-called Special Units Corps, forcibly mobilized in Serbia. And the mobilization in the spring was in style: a policeman stops you on the street, asks for your identity card, sees that you were born in Croatia, they immediately put you in the "marica", then in the police station, then in the bus and in the direction of the training ground in Slunj, where you become a member of the Corps of Special Units of the RSK. "I look at those unfortunates, I see that they are lost in space and time, and I say to the officer who brought them, my friend and experienced warrior: 'Bring them back, they will die in a day or two, don't carry them on my soul any more.' And he returned them."

Proclamation of Franjo Tuđman

It's August 4th, 1995, 5 am. Croatian Radio, which was heard throughout the RSK, broadcast Franjo Tuđman's proclamation: "In the name of the democratic government, I call on the members of the Serbian paramilitary units, who have been voluntarily or forcibly mobilized into the Serbian paramilitary units, to hand over their weapons to the Croatian authorities with the guarantee that they will be given to them." amnesty according to current Croatian laws. I call on the initiators of the rebellion to realize the futility of their endeavor and its harm to the Serbian community in Croatia if they persist in the rebellion, to surrender to the Croatian authorities and accept forgiveness or a fair trial for their crimes. I call on Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality who did not actively participate in the rebellion to stay in their homes and welcome the Croatian authorities without fear for their lives and property, with the guarantee that they will be given all civil rights and will be able to hold elections for local self-government according to the Croatian Constitution and Constitutional Law with the presence of international observers. We are determined to end the suffering and uncertainty of Croatian exiles from the occupied territories, and to guarantee the human and ethnic rights of Croatian Serbs in the constitutional and legal order of democratic Croatia." Most of those who believed in Tuđman's proclamation had their sufferings really ended - they were liquidated.

That morning, volleys of shells from artillery pieces or multi-barreled rocket launchers fell on Knin. The targets were targeted selectively and indiscriminately: selectively military objects, and indiscriminately to frighten the population, part of Clausewitz's theory.

In the Main Staff of the SVK, there is a mess, as well as in the MUP; as someone who saw it with his own eyes, I still can't believe it today. A few journalists, six of us, I later found out, out of 56 people who had special passes of the so-called State Information Pool, gather at the Army House, which also housed the State Press Center, and we follow the devastation live, avoiding shrapnel from the shells that littered the building along the way. The command of the garrison, during breaks in the bombing, helped to put out the fire on the neighboring house, otherwise owned by a Croatian family, "collateral damage".

Politicians, of course, carefree because not only did they leave on time, but they also evacuated their families days before. The only exception was the mayor of Knin and Minister of Information Drago Kovačević (unfortunately, deceased). And the president of RSK, Milan Martić.

Chaos

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Chaos arose where it was no longer known who was drinking and who was paying, officers, udbas, policemen, journalists - colleagues were mixed up.

Around midnight, the Main Headquarters of the SVK announces a fire alarm, the telephone connections are disconnected.

Until then, cars and tractors with refugees from the village pass through the main street of Knin for hours towards the Sibenik battlefield. And after them the soldiers. Goodbye, Krajina!

What was later proven, and what was also confirmed by the members of the Croatian Army, although they had Knin in the palm of their hand, their tanks, arriving via Dinara and the former military training ground "Crvena Zemlja", were ordered not to act until the 75th Motorized Brigade withdrew from the position towards Šibenik. She was very strong and capable of fighting and they knew she would fight back. It was headed by lieutenant colonel Vladimir Davidović, an officer convicted of "treason" in the trial against the general Vladimir Trifunović. And then, as before, Davidović was respected by all his colleagues because of his skill.

Promotion of Slobodan Kovačević

The commander of the North Dalmatian Corps, Slobodan Kovačević, appointed to this position just a few days before the "Storm", sends his chief of staff, then lieutenant colonel Milorad Radić, to coordinate the actions on Dinara, when the Croats practically "walk" into the "gate of Dalmatia", as they called Knin . The newly appointed commander was not interested in the fact that at least three more brigades were needed to close that direction. Neither is the fact that the forcibly mobilized are sent to defend the RSK against at least three times stronger members of the HV professional guard brigades. In return, Kovčević was given the rank of general in Serbia and the post of chief of armored and mechanized units of the Yugoslav Army. General Milorad Stupar was rewarded even more swiftly, he became the head of the Infantry Directorate.

Suicide of lieutenant colonel Bojanić

Making jumps between cyclic volleys of shells, arriving at the Command building, I see a body being carried out in a black (dead) bag. I ask who it is, and the crime technicians tell me: Lieutenant Colonel Bojanic. Radomir Bojanić, lieutenant colonel, who, while other officers were running away from going to SVK, came there at his own request in 1994. He was on duty operative for RV and air defense in the SVK Command in Knin, he ordered the airlift from Udbina, and then his colleagues told him to open the envelope with the orders and read them. The man opened it, didn't say anything, just took out Zastava's Magnum 357 and killed himself. There were also such honorable officers.

"Time" number 1648, 04 August 2022.

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