If the events in Serbia were observed exclusively through the columns of the pro-regime media, the reality would certainly be different. Belgrade, for example, would be Casablanca. A city where, in a turbulent international order, the interests of numerous foreign services and their branches intertwine, which, like Stanković's Estoril teeming with agents and some local informants. Only today it is not the Allies and the Germans that collide, but the West and the East - mostly Russian.
However, as the regime's reality is a little different from our reality, one should ask whether this Casablanca atmosphere really reflects the real situation or is just another of the populist narratives of the government. Is Belgrade really that interesting to foreign services, or are some media just skillfully used to implement a milder variant of the strategy of creating tensions for the sake of discrediting political and ideological opponents?
ESTABLISHED PROPAGANDA
Narratives about interference by foreign services are mostly constructed to be irrefutable - not because they are supported by hard evidence, but quite the opposite - because they are shrouded in a veil of "secrecy" and cannot even be verified. They are based on strong constructions such as "operational knowledge" about foreign services standing behind the protests (of course, without a single document or concrete action), citing foreign power centers, warning of "hybrid action", announcements of significant events (which do not happen) or evidence that allegedly exists but is secret.
These constructions have enough weight that when they are used massively and continuously, they produce the desired political effect - certain actors and social situations are viewed by a part of the public in the way that suits the regime. Therefore, the protests will not be experienced as a wave of discontent, but as a project of foreign services or a "colored revolution". From the real problems, first of all the responsibility of the authorities, the focus is shifted to the "endangerment of the state" where the survival of the regime is necessary, and increased repression is acceptable. In this phase of propaganda about the influence of foreign services, the aim is not only to mobilize supporters of the regime, but also those who are undecided or neutral.
However, "foreign services" by themselves are often not a strong enough argument if they are not paired with local employees. That is why it is necessary to create internal enemies.
In all populist and non-democratic regimes, the propaganda machinery as a rule targets those who are critical of the regime as collaborators. These are journalists, independent media, non-governmental organizations, universities, the opposition or trade unions. Thus, the protests become a "colored revolution" that is coordinated from Western embassies, the media and journalists are "foreign mercenaries" or "agents", and NGOs are fronts for the influx of money that serves to destabilize the country.
The president of the international advisory board of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCBP), Srđan Cvijić, explains to "Vreme" that when talking about propaganda narratives about the interference of foreign services, two narratives should be distinguished. The first is about "positive propaganda related to Russian services". As he says, when Russia is mentioned, SNS addresses its electorate, but also the citizens of Serbia who have positive feelings towards Moscow.
When it comes to the second narrative, it is about negative propaganda in which the "hateful West" is accused of "robbery" against the authorities in Serbia in cooperation with domestic forces. "When the government does not have an answer to the problems, it offers conspiracy theories, and the West is a convenient enemy", concludes the interlocutor.
Although there is a wide range of services that are often used in these propaganda scenarios, their naming is often avoided in order to avoid a possible negative, and unpleasant for the regime, political reaction of the state whose service is mentioned. It is safest to stick to general places.
Srđan Cvijić agrees with the last statement that "the regime often hesitates to directly point the finger at specific Western services, not wanting to directly confront them in that way." As he explains, "the regime chooses safe targets" and that is why services from smaller, weaker, often neighboring states are directly branded in public without hesitation and used for internal political purposes.
HOW IT ALL BEGAN
This type of propaganda narrative is not new, it has been used for decades in many non-democratic regimes, especially where there is pronounced control over the media. Cvijić adds that the propaganda mechanism only adapts to each government and its needs.
Even during the regime of Slobodan Milošević (especially in his late period) there was a ubiquitous narrative about the interference and influence of foreign services and Western power centers on events in Serbia. Journalists, opposition politicians and activists were targeted and criminalized as they are today. The cult about "internal enemies working for the Western services" is real. The difference is that the consequences for some of the targeted victims back then were much more brutal than today.
However, Milošević's propaganda about foreign agencies and their internal helpers had its forerunner on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The first Croatian private media - "Slobodni tjednik" (ST) developed this propaganda skill to infamous perfection and paved the way for today's tabloids. It was additionally supported by the fact that it was printed in the early nineties, during the wartime when there were no moral and legal restrictions on what could be said in the media.
Well, just as the pro-regime tabloids today "reveal" conspiracies of Western services, ST once invented evidence about alleged KOS agents by falsifying lists of Serbs and ineligible Croats. In the same way, ST journalists (many of whom were fictional) released "exclusive" operational information, removed responsibility from the local authorities and blamed the remnants of the Yugoslav counter-intelligence service for everything.
The relative novelty is positive propaganda about direct cooperation with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), according to the interlocutor Cvijić. He adds that this narrative was started at the time when Aleksandar Vulin was the director of the BIA and the Minister of the Interior. Then the so-called The working group for the fight against color revolutions, which consists of members of the Russian and Serbian security apparatus. This narrative intensified after the fall of the canopy.
FEAR AND RULE
Narratives about foreign services allegedly working to destabilize the state can be connected, not only in Serbia, to a milder, more moderate version of the tension strategy. The authorities deliberately increase the perception of threats in order to justify repression and consolidate power, but without turning to open violence. The original term strategy of tensions was created in the seventies in Italy when the security structures there carried out a series of terrorist attacks in cooperation with right-wing extremists. Their goal was to create an atmosphere of fear and legitimize stronger state control and repression of political opponents - mainly communists and left-wing organizations.
In today's context, the tension strategy is implemented through propaganda campaigns instead of direct incidents. Accusations of interference by foreign services heighten internal tensions, perpetuate social divisions and legitimize the regime's use of a tight fist.
When asked why such narratives are needed, Srđan Cvijić says that they serve to hide the responsibility of those in power. However, he adds that they also have a deeper function "to strengthen the anti-democratic, authoritarian and almost totalitarian political culture in society even more", because, as he explains, the constant feeling of siege stifles democratic culture. Finally, the interlocutor adds that all kinds of conspiracy theories are being fed in this way, all with the intention of making the citizens of Serbia "completely delusional, disorienting and preventing them from forming their political views independently based on the evidence".
WHO IS THAT? (NE) WORKING IN SERBIA
It seems that the general term "Western services" is occasionally abandoned, and in special situations it is specified by mentioning the American CIA, the British MI6, and occasionally the German BND. While the CIA is mostly accused of being behind "foreign mercenaries" and socio-political actors who are opponents of the regime, especially in the context of protests, the BND is portrayed as a German tool for economic and political pressure, especially regarding Kosovo. Apart from the alleged destabilization of the country and the region, the propaganda narratives use MI6 for more concrete things. Thus, some pro-regime media accused this service a few years ago of spying on high-ranking government officials. The mechanism is mostly the same - first a text appears in one of the media that refers to unnamed sources, operational knowledge or secret documents. Then some of the supposed experts or former security guards from the roster are called, who fuel the allegations, so that everything ends with a lesson about how foreign services are constantly prowling Serbia.
Since the outbreak of student protests, the Croatian Security Intelligence Agency (SOA), which is regularly used to undermine students, occupies a special place in propaganda narratives. As it is a safe target for targeting, and the relations between Serbia and Croatia are certainly not at an enviable level, this service serves as a perfect tool for discrediting opponents of the regime - with the aim of mobilizing the public against alleged Greater Croatia claims in the region.
However, Srđan Cvijić explains that a distinction should be made between the regime's discourse on foreign services (primarily Western) and the fact that, when it comes to Russian services, it is no longer just about propaganda because their presence is real. "The SNS regime directly allowed the Russian service to spy on its territory with impunity and collect data on its citizens, organizations and critically oriented media", explains Cvijić.
As for the Casablanca atmosphere in Serbia, apart from the increased presence of Russian services in the last few years, it remains only in the domain of regime propaganda from anonymous sources, conspiracy theories and without concrete evidence and
traces.
