The Helicopter Case – The Political Anatomy of a Tragedy

We got it all - well, come on, since all - from the Army's just-released reports on the helicopter crash of March 13, when seven lives were lost. However, we did not find out the most important thing: how and why the Mi 17 helicopter crashed near Surčin that fateful night; what specifically happened at the time of the fall. In aviation, accidents happen for various and many reasons, statistically inevitably: due to the error of the flight crew or flight control; due to the suicidal drive of the co-pilot, as we have seen recently; due to technical failure or poor maintenance; due to a fuel filling error; due to a terrorist attack or a missile from the ground or from a fighter jet; due to - finally - extremely unfavorable and extremely unexpected weather circumstances.

In our case, the only thing that is certain is that the weather conditions were below any minimum for a safe landing at the given place, in the area of ​​the Nikola Tesla airport near Surčin. It was, therefore, foggy with rain, visibility below any permissible minimum. Instrument landing for helicopters is ruled out, because airport systems (ILS) are intended for airplanes, but the climatic conditions of that night rule out that approach as well. The planes were diverted that night to Timisoara. There are interpretations that they were diverted due to the need for this particular helicopter to somehow land on the runway, but that has yet to be established. Namely, the helicopter cannot land if the pilot cannot see the ground below him; maybe some rich countries have helicopters that can do it without any visibility; we don't have them. Then: the idea of ​​taxiing down an invisible runway was not the best. Taxiing is a common and preferred way of taking off large wheeled helicopters; thus saving time from hovering to translational flight, i.e. to speed (airspeed) in which the helicopter flies, not hovers. And it's safer. The helicopter lands from the hovering state, when the speed relative to the air decreases to zero.

SURCHIN, 22:31: The condition found on the spot is interesting. This helicopter hit the ground at high speed - not only vertically, but also horizontally, so we won't go into the technical details now. In short: at the moment of impact, the helicopter was flying forward and descending. The wreckage was thoroughly damaged, the tail fell off, the crew and passengers were ejected in the capsize caused by the brittle rotor wing in full swing on the ground and the bodies were found at various distances from the wreckage; rotor pieces at even greater distances. A trail of about a hundred meters remained on the ground - from the first point of contact to the wreckage. From the Army's report it was hinted that the close control of the flight (close approach) of "Nikola Tesla" Airport was not able to accurately determine the position of the helicopter during landing attempts, and there were three of them, the last of which ended like this. That's not strange: close flight control deals with airplanes; The helicopters that land on Surčin, the police helicopters, therefore, have their own helipad on the opposite side of the runway and the platform (apron), behind those hangars. In addition, Surčin Airport has never received military helicopters, especially not under these conditions. The Air Force flies from Batajnica, both airplanes and helicopters.

Air traffic control lost contact with this helicopter at 22:31 that night; radio link and radar reflection. This happened while pilot Mehić was trying for the third time to land - allegedly - on the runway, but, as we can see, he was at least a kilometer away, on the side, from it. General Bandić stated the next day that somehow at that time he was in a GSM telephone connection with the crew and that was the last contact. The last words of pilot Mehić were that he could not see the runway. Well, now: helicopter pilots, when they fly into a cloud or fog, have only one way out: to climb up until they are above the cloud or fog, and then to see where they are or ask the flight control if it sees them on the radar and where . Then they look for an alternative place to land, keeping in mind the available fuel, of course. Pilot Mehić also said that he was taking off, but then something happened: he did not take off, as can be seen from the marks at the point of impact with the ground. Maybe so, but something happened; we don't know what, and neither do the military commissions. Afterwards, some commentators in civilian clothes speculated about "disorientation", because that happened to the pilots of jet planes during acrobatics over the sea, so they did not understand what was up and what was down. Helicopter pilots do not engage in acrobatics, especially not on such tasks and under such climatic conditions. In a helicopter, it is always quite clear what is up and what is down, and there is no "disorientation" - unless the visibility is at zero, and then only in terms of the perception of geographic position and height; what is up and what is down is always clear.

Therefore, in horizontal flight and losing height, the helicopter crashed into a field near the Radio Far settlement, north of the Surčin Airport runway, towards the highway, somewhere behind those car dealerships. When it became clear what had happened, the usual fuss ensued: searching for the helicopter through mud, night, fog and rain, with flashlights; police, army, airport security, firefighters, everyone. The deputy public prosecutor on duty was woken up by the military police around 02:30 a.m. to come to the scene, so she also kicked mud until the morning and the end of the first investigation. On this occasion, we apologize to her and the readers for the claim from the last issue of "Vremena" that the prosecution was not present. It was like that.

The Helicopter Case – The Political Anatomy of a Tragedy

ARTILLERY PREPARATION: Now let's go back to the beginning of the event, as described by the Army's reports. The crew of the Mi 17 helicopter of aircraft commander Omer Mehić was on duty that night; their duty lasts three days and during that time they sleep at Batajnica Airport. They had two helicopters at their disposal: Mi 8 and Mi 17. The Army report shows that Mehić and Ensign Drajić were absent from the base for about two hours that evening; that they went to buy some meat in Stara Pazova, which is very close. Given the fog, the rain and the time of day, they can't be blamed: no one would expect an extraordinary and important task. Where exactly the two were, what they were doing, can be easily established by the investigation of the police and the VBA. It is known that pilot Mehić received a phone call from his superior upon returning to the base, announcing an urgent assignment. He practically ran out of the car to change clothes, then into the helicopter. He chose the Mi 17, quite logically: the aircraft is stronger and better equipped. He flew to Raška and returned to the Surčina zone; it lasted about two hours. During the autopsy - the findings of which we have not seen, but are mentioned in the reports - it was established that Mehić and Drajić had alcohol in their bodies; per thousand for which a driver's license is revoked. The difference between the level of alcohol in Mehić's blood and urine indicates that the absorption process was advanced. Good: they went flying, not really drunk, but tipsy, Dostoevsky would say. It's like it's the first time in aviation; we know of worse cases. It used to be done with a bottle of oxygen that is inhaled for a while, with a bar of chocolate that is eaten and - the pilot is sober. The way they are - and Mehić is the only important one here - they flew to Raška and back without any problems. The pilots we talked to say that even the most sober crew could suffer the same fate in these circumstances. So the element of "alcoholism", which plainclothes commentators are so horrified about these days, hardly matters in this story. But it's convenient to be overpowered: that's why it appeared in the report, that's how "our heroes" are humiliated; families will be shaken; etc. It all seems hypocritical, like an artillery preparation for finally placing the blame on the crew, so peaceful Bačka. However, something else is avoided, which emerges from the report without any doubt, and that is the political angle.

The reports say, and the prosecutor's office will make an effort to do so, that the procedures were not fully respected. The army does not turn out to be the most orderly institution, whatever the public thinks about it in the polls. Here, we see, everything can and can't really be done, if it's important. So then one general calls another with the news that a certain minister, and maybe another (he doesn't know yet), would like to meet a helicopter with a baby from Novi Pazar. Witnesses who, because of a sick child, were at the Institute for Mother and Child in New Belgrade that night, say that some TV crews were on duty there for some reason. We do not know if there were TV crews at Nikola Tesla Airport; nobody says anything. We would rather not speculate about what would have happened the next day if, by some luck, the helicopter had landed successfully, as some reported ahead of time, knowing the actors of the game. It is clear that some were happy about the opportunity to stand out and take pictures, but - well - it didn't happen.

Now we come to the political exploitation of the tragedy. Strikingly and hysterically nervous, Prime Minister Vučić immediately began to preemptively defend himself against unspoken objections. It goes like this: the prime minister knows that they would have blamed him terribly if the Army had not sent a helicopter to save the baby, because the baby was of a "different religion". No one would - and did not - blame him or the Army for rescuing children. Then - again suspecting what they might blame him for - he shouted that he "doesn't give" his ministers (Gašić and Lončar), and no one has even asked him for them yet; that would only happen later, when we all agreed that what was being done, and he knew from the beginning. That's how it happens when it's well planned public relations the operation fails. In a normal country, this event would have been greeted with normal sympathy for the victims and their families, they would have waited for this report from the competent bodies and acted on it, instead of raising a fuss, arguing with journalists and the public, and in general, it gives the impression of washing an unclean conscience even before someone has asked important questions. And now, from these reports, and from the future proceedings of the prosecution, important questions will be asked - God willing. In politics, it's not smart to scratch where it doesn't itch, and Vučić does it all the time. He shouted at the top of his voice that "our heroes" were killed, and now an atmosphere is being created that it was actually "our drunkards". Well, it's not like that: people did their work as best they knew how. If they had been listened to, they would not have been forced to land where they nicely said that it could not be landed. And they forced them, obviously. They could have landed in Nis and Batajnica, when VMA was not (if not, we don't know) available. It was obvious that the crew was under some kind of pressure to land right there and not somewhere safer.

If there was any mistake on the part of the crew, more precisely on the part of the commander of the aircraft, Mehić, that mistake was that he did not use his sovereign authority to fly and land where he considers it safe, even in Subotica, and let the ministers return home to bed. In aviation, only the worst and the best pilots are known to fall; bad because they are bad, and the best because they are too confident and think they can do anything. Omer Mehić was, everyone says, a very good pilot.