Cowardly hiding behind victims

In cases of military aircraft crashes in Serbia or the former SFRY, it was usual to blame the human factor for the accident only after careful investigation. However, during the crash of the Mi-17 helicopter on March 13, 2015, near the Belgrade airport, when seven lives were lost, the two commissions quickly completed the work and blamed the crew.

"The crew most likely experienced spatial disorientation as a result of fatigue, emotional overstrain and compromised attention function, as a result of which they fail to determine the position of the aircraft in space using the instruments." The presence of alcohol in the crew leader and flight technician intensifies the previous manifestations", is the conclusion of the commission for the basic investigation; all those familiar with the rules and regulations in aviation consider it shameful.

Anyone who knew the pilot of this helicopter, Omer Mehić - a test and pilot of the first category, trained to fly both day and night, including complex meteorological conditions (SMU) - knows that he did not consume alcohol.

That the human factor is the culprit is indisputable, but not the pilot and the crew, but those who ordered the flight, in violation of the legal procedure and in conditions when flights are not performed. After all, the commander of the MUP helicopter unit, Colonel Slobodan Glavičić, refused the order of the Minister of the Interior to fly on the mission, with the explanation that the regulations do not allow a flight in weather and visibility below any minimum.

And that "mission" was requested by the Minister of Health Zlatibor Lončar. Evil tongues say that he did it in order for him to stand out in the media, because the main news that day was that the Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr. Nebojša Stefanović, personally participated in solving the case of a kidnapped child from Belgrade. Whether it was due to a "competition in exploits" between the ministers or something else, on March 13, 2015, the editors of certain media outlets were informed by Lončar's office that the rescue of a baby who was on his way from Novi Pazar to Kraljevo had begun, but the ambulance was stopped by a landslide on the road near Raška, so the helicopter is going. In the coordination of Lončar and the then Minister of Defense Bratislava Gašić...

The helicopter took off from Belgrade, in complex meteorological conditions, the pilot managed to land at the stadium of the barracks in Raška due to poor visibility, only three medical rotations and a military police rotation were his landmarks, he loaded the child and the medical team and left. Where - to Belgrade. Why go there when he could have gone to Kraljevo or Kragujevac, where there are good conditions for landing (it can be seen from the meteorological reports), and Kragujevac also has a Clinical Center with a neonatology department? However, the child had to be brought to Belgrade by someone's decision so that the minister could meet him personally. The arrival of Lončar with his entourage was already announced at the VMA heliport, so when the decision was made to go to the "Nikola Tesla" Airport, such a letter was sent to the border police administration. When it was heard that the conditions for filming were not adequate, the RTS and Tanjuga crews were redirected to the Mother and Child Institute in New Belgrade, where Lončar also arrived.

Once again: the human factor is to blame for the helicopter tragedy, but not pilot Omer Mehić, co-pilot Milovan Đukarić and flight technicians ensigns Nebojša Drajić and Ivan Miladinović, but the factor of Ministers Lončar and Gašić, the cabinet of the Minister of Defense, the operational centers of the Air Force and Defense Forces and the defense system and finally, the key man for breaching procedures, the then commander of the 204th Aviation Brigade, who broke several rules that airmen hold sacred, because are "written in the blood" of their fallen colleagues.

BELOW ANY MINIMUM

One of those who defended the fallen colleagues is the retired colonel Srećko Prentović, a helicopter pilot with all the highest professional knowledge and titles in that field. Prentović was the immediate superior commander of Mehić for a long time.

"I believe that, considering the participants in the event and the place of the tragedy itself, and especially the consequences - the death of seven people - the Commission for the investigation of the accident had to be formed at a higher level, which would have the authority to cover all the participants and examine their eventual responsibility in the event." For example, the Commission of the Directorate for Civil Aviation or even the European Commission, given that the accident happened at an international airport," Prentović was decisive.

He states that if he had been a member of the commission - given that the accident was investigated as it was investigated, and based on all the available data available from the report - his opinion would certainly have been separate and "diametrically opposed to their conclusions regarding the cause and responsibility for the occurrence of the accident".

"The main cause of the accident is the situation below the meteorological minimum at the place designated for the helicopter landing. What the commissions stated in their report as the root cause of the accident - "the human factor reflected in the inadequate control of the aircraft in complex meteorological conditions at night during the landing approach" - is a consequence, not a cause. The situation was not "complex" but unfavorable, and both commissions state that in their reports! There is no flying in an unfavorable meteorological situation!", says Prentović.

When it comes to responsibility, he is categorical - it is borne by all those who, by their decisions, actions and inactions, brought the helicopter and the crew into an unfavorable meteorological situation for flying, and primarily General Bandić, who made an assessment and made a decision on the execution of the task, so then all the others in turn who did not suspend that decision.

"The responsibility of the 'helicopter crew leader' (Mehić), whom the reports treat as the main person responsible for the accident, is that he held the controls in his hands and tried to do the impossible! Forced, not voluntary," claims Prentović.

Even the commission itself concluded that "at the time of the scheduled landing, at 22.00:17 p.m., the cloud base at 'Nikola Tesla' and Batajnica airports was below the prescribed meteorological minimum for the Mi-XNUMX helicopter and the first category pilot." And in the categorization of pilots, there is no higher title than pilot of the first category and test pilot, as Mehić was.

WHERE WERE LONČAR AND GAŠIĆ

When it comes to responsibility, Prentović recalls that the prime minister at the time, and today's president of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, "while all of Serbia was in shock and disbelief and while no one had even guessed the possible cause of the accident, quickly declared: 'Gašić and Lončar I will not give!' And then no one even asked for them. And that sentence was not clear to anyone at that moment. But he didn't say it for nothing."

When asked what really happened on March 13, 2015, Pantović replied that everyone would like to know: "And why is it not known? In particular, the details, actions and daily activities of those whom he said he "will not give" and other people outside the structures of the Army, whose actions and activities did start the tragedy and who are its creators and initiators, are being hidden. They remained hidden in the fog, and the focus shifted to the victims. Cowardly move, cowardly them. Two reports and two commissions, both military, and not one of them, considering the participants and the place of events, really competent to objectively examine and shed light on this tragedy, they are not mentioned anywhere, or they are mentioned only in passing, by function. Nowhere are their statements, hearings, transcripts of their conversations. And the Army was dissected in detail, the victims as well, right down to the autopsy and the alleged alcohol in the urine. Why? Is it because he 'won't give them'? What were his wards doing on that fateful day that he won't tell? Has anyone asked them that? Does anyone care? Is he interested and why is he not interested? Because he knows and because he is aware that because of all that he knows, he has to give them.

When and where will we find out what Minister Gašić was doing that day? In detail and with transcripts of the conversations he conducted. Until he arrived "in Kruševac" with a mobile phone in his pocket, the phone box of which, miraculously, has the mobile phone numbers of the brigade commanders. Does he have the numbers of all the brigade commanders, or only some of them, or only General Bandić? And if there is, what will it do to him? Minister? Does he even know his ministerial responsibilities and scope of work? Your powers? Does he know that he is an administrative, not a commanding 'organ'? Does he know who has the right to command the Army or any part of it or any unit? Who authorized him, on what basis and when, to command the Army, its parts or a unit? On the basis of which completed school, on the basis of which acquired or innate, and in practice demonstrated knowledge, proven paranormal abilities for command or anything else? Is there a phone number for the Chief of the General Staff and the General Staff Operations Center? Does he even know what the operation centers in the Army are for, who is constantly on duty in them and why," Prentović enumerates.

He also asked if, if the minister does not know, there is one of his associates who knows that there is a standard operating procedure for the engagement of a duty search and rescue team (TIS), which clearly stipulates that the engagement of that team is carried out by the Operations Center of the General Staff, which issues order to the operational duty team of the RV and Air Defense Forces:

"Why did he do the complete opposite, why did he dial the mobile phone number of General Bandić, the brigade commander, instead of the telephone number of the Chief of the General Staff, or the Operations Center of the General Staff?" When and where will we find out when, how and from whom Minister Gašić found out about the five-day-old baby who is fighting for his life in an ambulance, stopped by a landslide? Who informed him about it and why him? By name, with transcripts of conversations. And the Minister of Health Lončar, Dr. Zlatibor? How did he find out, when and from whom? And do they report to him daily, as the Minister of Health, about every baby in Serbia who has problems and is fighting for life? Did they inform him about the health condition of little Shahin and what he did in the previous days to help the baby and save her? On what basis did he change the final destination of Sahin's road, which the doctors traced to Kragujevac? And why exactly Belgrade? Who did he call for help first, before he 'remembered' the Army and its helicopter? Did he call anyone and if so, why didn't that someone come to help? With transcripts of conversations. And let him freely explain his movements that day. From whom, when and which journalists received the information about this baby and its rescue?" Prentović continues.

PROCEDURES AND VIOLATIONS

The interlocutor of "Vremena" also pointed to a fact that did not appear in public, and which "conjures up" the state of aviation - the deceased Mehić, in addition to being a pilot on duty, a crew leader for TIS, was also a squadron commander because the formation commander was officially was absent, so as acting as his deputy, in addition to his formation work, he also had to perform the tasks of the squadron commander.

"Due to circumstances, on the same day he was assigned to the duty team for search and rescue, as its leader." All this was Mehic that day. Three in one. According to the report, the duties of the squadron commander prevented him from attending the shift of the duty team for search and rescue, thus the morning medical examination, which determines the health capacity for the duty he receives, and therefore the prescribed preparation for the duty he receives. "A mistake, a big mistake, for which Mehić is not responsible," reminds Prentović.

Prentović continues to explain the procedures of the TIS team, which were violated in the case of the Mi-17 helicopter, registration number 12551, fatal for the crew, anesthesiologist Dževad Ljajić, medical technician Miroslav Veselinović and baby Šahin Ademović: "The initial signal for the engagement of the duty team, logically, starts from Air Traffic Control and goes to the Operations Center of the General Staff, which approves the engagement and issues the order to the Operational Duty Team of the Air Defense and Air Defense Command for the preparation and management of the search and rescue operation. Due to the speed of response, I appreciate that everything takes place by means of communication, ie. with phones that are continuously recorded, and that the necessary written documents are prepared later. The crew should receive a 'ready-made' assignment containing: a wider search area or the exact location of the crash site, if known, and a description of the 'object' they are searching for. Upon receipt of the task, the crew remains to check the meteorological situation once more for the execution of the task, perform the flight announcement, perform the necessary additional navigational calculations and the selection of the search method, perform the pre-flight inspection of the helicopter, launch it and fly to the task. The degree of urgency for the crew to take off to perform the task must in no case be defined as 'immediately' but only as 'as soon as possible', where the limiting factor is precisely the time required for additional, complete, immediate preparation of the crew, which must not be terminated by any urgency. And of course, all the time we are talking about the task of search and rescue, for which the duty team was put on duty, and not about the task of medical transport, to which the crew was directed that fateful evening, and which is a completely different story," says Prentović.

As a former senior officer, he stated that Mehić was not only an experienced pilot, but also a crew leader and a responsible officer, who, faced with three obligations at the same time, and knowing that he could not satisfy them at the same time, logically set priorities, and he pushed the other two into the background, appreciating that he would not cause them any harm.

"The reports do not give answers as to what activities Mehić was engaged in that day, but they clearly indicate that his duty in the duty team for search and rescue was secondary to him and that he did not attach adequate importance to that activity, missing the prescribed actions and procedures." He relied, I appreciate, on his training and experience, and probably also on the objective fact that the meteorological situation, which prevailed over Belgrade that day, did not give great chances to any flying activity, not even the engagement - the flight of the duty crew on a possible task. It is to him, an experienced pilot, I appreciate, I said, a look at the sky, without the need to consult with meteorologists. His pilot's instinct, to conclude, told him that there was nothing to fly that day. The reports do not say whether he even met with the meteorologist, weather maps, or heard the weather forecast that day, but they claim that immediately after receiving the assignment, and before taking off, he certainly did not. The reports also say that Mehić was resting, among other things, that day in the period from 17.00:19.45 p.m. to XNUMX:XNUMX p.m. he was not even at the airport, but they do not state when and who established this and where Mehić was at that time, on what basis and by what means. on the occasion, which only opens up the possibility of speculation about the reason for his absence from the airport, and therefore from duty. I personally, for example, can speculate that the resting Major Mehić, aware of the meteorological situation at the airport, and aware of the fact that it becomes even more complicated with the fall of darkness, to the point of being unfavorable for any kind of take-off and carrying out the task, made the decision on his own initiative to leave the airport and go, say, to lunch. Did he manage to eat at all that day due to the obligations that were pressing him? Why don't the reports say where he was at the time and what he was doing, if they already claim he wasn't at the airport? They don't know or they won't? If they don't know, why don't they know, and if they do, why don't they say? With that fact, and since no explanation of it is offered, anyone can speculate as he wants and as he likes, up to the claim that he spent that time in a tavern enjoying alcohol," said Prentović.

MI 17 HAS FALLEN

Mehić managed to land in Raška, the recorded conversation with flight control shows that everything was fine on the way back, as long as there was no mention of the place of landing. On the way back, Mehić wants to land on Banjički vis, but flight control tells him that he can't, visibility is low. The pilot then asks to go to Batajnica for ILS (a system that allows landing by instruments, without visual visibility, and the Batajnica airport is equipped with it, plus Mehić knows every bush and treetop at that airport), but the control does not approve him and asks to goes to Surčin. Mehić again insists on Batajnica according to ILS and again gets the answer that he has to go to "Nikola Tesla".

The expert commission investigating the cause of the helicopter crash determined that in the last two minutes of the flight there were mistakes and misunderstandings, which were crucial, between the pilot and the flight controller, who "do not have the same way of thinking and are not used to working together."

The crew reports an altitude of 140 meters, meaning altitude above the runway, to which the flight controller does not respond because he expects the pilot to be talking about altitude, which is standard procedure for civilian aircraft. Since he does not know that the pilot is talking about the actual altitude, the flight controller does not warn him that he cannot see the runway from that altitude, due to the lower cloud base. Therefore, the controller recommends that the aircraft hover over the runway, which is impossible for this type of helicopter without external visibility.

"Nikola Tesla" airport is located at 102 meters above sea level, so the controller thought that the helicopter was 38 meters above the runway, but in reality it was 140 meters. Observing the radar reflection from radars that are not intended for precision guidance, the controller informs the crew that he is right on the threshold of the runway. However, at that moment the helicopter is high and sideways away from the runway. The crew is likely shifting their attention outside the helicopter cabin, looking for the runway directly below and in front of the helicopter and creating the conditions to bring the helicopter into an incorrect position, the report said. In the meteorological report submitted to the Commission by the Air Traffic Control Agency of Serbia and Montenegro (SMATSA), the lower cloud layer was 22 meters above the ground at 30:35 p.m., immediately before the helicopter crash, at 22.40:20 p.m. it was XNUMX meters, and after dropped to zero.

Colonel Srećko Prentović, pilot

One call changes everything

"The reports define the first identified call as a call from Gašić to General Bandić," says Prentović. "General Predrag Bandić's cell phone rang in his apartment, reports say at 19.26:XNUMX p.m. Therefore, the Minister of Defense bypasses the Chief of the General Staff, the Operations Center of the General Staff, the Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces and the Operational Duty Team of the Air Force and Air Defense Command and addresses the brigade commander personally. For what reason did General Bandić not immediately remember that he was on vacation and politely apologized to the minister, directing him to the right phone number to dial - the reports do not state. General Bandić accepts the invitation and receives 'a verbal request to consider the possibility of emergency medical transport of a child in danger from the Ušće region'. A mistake that will cause a series of others and result in tragedy. Generally, General Bandić starts to 'consider the possibility', communicates by mobile phone from his apartment, on the fifth day of annual leave... This is not how one commands in an organized and high-risk system such as RV and PVO and in such a complex activity as flying. What information does General Bandić have at that moment? No reliable data relevant and necessary for a proper assessment of the situation, and making a correct decision on the eventual engagement of a helicopter. But he still engages in that process. Why? This should not happen to an officer and commander of his caliber. But it happens.

And now, instead of being a good commander, when he had already unreasonably accepted and agreed to act contrary to all the rules, interrupt his vacation and go to the airport where he can collect all the reliable data necessary to make a valid and correct decision, General Bandić stays at home with mobile phone as the only means of data collection and source of information. And there is a lot of information that needs to be gathered in order to 'consider the possibility', assess the situation correctly and make the right decision. A lot. A lot for one man and one cell phone.

An apparently confused series of phone calls by General Bandić in pursuit of information ensues. We don't know the order in which the calls were made, how long the conversations lasted and what their content was, but the general claims that he called the doctors on the ground (several times), the duty operative of the 204th brigade, the leader of the duty search and rescue team , Minister of Defense, Commander of the Air Force... And all that in a very short time".

According to Prentović, Mehić was taken aback by the invitation, and even more so by the fact that he was being called for the sake of flying, and he had no choice or time to calculate and think rationally:

"He trusts in his experience, his knowledge and his skills, he trusts in the helicopter's capabilities, but he completely ignores the fact that the meteorological situation that reigns over Belgrade is stronger than all of that, and that, as it really is, neither experience nor helicopter knowledge and equipment. He completely ignores her, forgets about her and does not pay her any attention. And not only him, but also General Bandić, who makes decisions. From whom and how General Bandić was informed and acquainted with the actual state of the weather and the forecast of the development of the weather situation is completely unclear, because there were no calls from him to the meteorologists, they are not in the transcripts of the report, nor are those of Mehić, nor the other pilot-member of the crew. Both reports and both Commissions are decisive and unequivocal in their conclusions that the meteorological situation was unfavorable for the execution of the task and below the prescribed meteorological minimum. Mehic could have made a mistake in assessing the weather situation, he could not have been aware of it at all, he could have wrongly suggested and proposed the execution of the task, but he is not the one who makes the final decision. The one who makes the final decision must not make a mistake. His is the last one. Ultimately, that's probably why there are commanders and that's why they're given the right to make decisions."