A witty post that is being shared on social networks these days, in which the President of Montenegro, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament are "launching an initiative" to replace the citizens of Montenegro with the explanation that "politicians deserve better citizens", perhaps best illustrates the absurdity of what is happening. is happening on the Montenegrin political scene.
Namely, there are four initiatives in the parliamentary procedure that call into question the credibility of the survival of almost all key levers of the Montenegrin government, including the legislative body itself. Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapić launched an initiative to replace the vice-president Dritan Abazović, Abazović with part of the opposition is demanding the removal of the prime minister and offers, if the initiative is adopted, the concept of a "minority government" without DPS and the Democratic Front. After that, the prime minister launched a second initiative that calls for "shortening the mandate" of the parliament, and the opposition finally demanded the removal of Aleksa Bečić from the position of the President of the Parliament of Montenegro. All that is missing is more initiatives to replace President Milo Djukanovic.
These initiatives almost immediately caused "street pressure" in which, perhaps for the first time in the history of these areas, in addition to the modest number of defenders of the "electoral will of the people" gathered on the sidewalks of several cities, some ministers, representatives of the Government itself were also present. That strange circle of political manipulations, so characteristic of the last few decades of the Balkans, ended this time with a truly unique mechanism, that a political institution defends itself with an extra-institutional "political tool". However, the repetition of "people's events" and/or "lithia" this time seems to have no effect.
IRRATIONAL SUM OF MONOLOGUES
"Political corruption that betrays the will of the people". This propaganda phrase summarizes in itself an almost ideal condemnation of a political opponent and unquestionably revives the famous Radmilović crocs from King Ibi - "Oh, my people! We are up, you are down..." This playing with citizens who permanently group them into some kind of demagogic term "the people", completely emptied of any content, is actually a dangerous game in which conflict, political circus and political profiteering are the only ultimate goal.
The irrational collection of monologues on the political scene of Montenegro hinders any kind of communication and leads to "prolonged conflict", essentially defines politics as a stage-oratorical performance in which self-proclaimed leaders smugly enjoy their own political nonsense. In such a context, indeed, in the end, everything turns into a conflict of leaders on the way to the political throne, which brings a series of benefits and the final panel of the comic with the famous sentence: caliph instead of caliph.
Of course, such a paradigm is also recognized in the appearance of ministers on the street. The expert government, which refers to the "defense of the will of the people", puts itself in the absurd situation of destroying the foundations of the concept on which it was created. Because, after the election, a consistent, albeit somewhat banal, interpretation of the electoral will would result in an artificial collection of political leaders in the executive power, whose positions would be determined by the percentages from the polls, and not by relatively anonymous experts at the will of the prime minister.
The expert government, which the opposition called the "apostolic government", has, as it seems now, the most influence on its creator. Namely, the prime minister increasingly sees himself in the role of a messiah, an absolute authority who, obviously, suffers from a serious anomaly of authoritarianism. He derives his political legitimacy from the first position on the "For the Future of Montenegro" list, which was dominated by the Democratic Front. Precisely those political groups that will later dispute him as their representative, just like the validity of his signature on the post-election agreement, behind which, along with Krivokapić, Bečić and Abazović stood, thus determining the strategic course of action of the new parliamentary majority.
THE GOVERNMENT DESTROYES THE PARLIAMENT
The Prime Minister's statement at the Conference on the Importance of Media Freedom for Chapter 27 and European Integration, that a coup d'état is in progress, is only a repeated claim he made after the events in Cetinje that followed the enthronement of Montenegrin Metropolitan Ioaniki. And it could be said that the Prime Minister almost believes in the thesis that any challenge to the Government or its policies is actually some kind of coup d'état.
If we place the Prime Minister's Cabinet, which aspires to assume the role of interpreter of the Constitution of Montenegro itself, in this context, things become much clearer. Namely, Krivokapić's cabinet announced that "the Constitution of Montenegro, as the highest legal act, leaves no room for the President of Montenegro to nominate a representative for the composition of the Government twice in one mandate of the Assembly...". Referring to Article 103 of the Constitution of Montenegro, tendentially interpreting that it "clearly defines that the President of Montenegro only after parliamentary elections, and never more, has the right to propose to the Assembly a representative for composition of the Government", the Cabinet promotes the claim that the existing Government can only be reconstructed with the existing Prime Minister and that his change is possible only after new parliamentary elections. Of course, this interpretation has a clear political dimension and a simple propaganda goal. In translation, this means that the absolute security of the executive power is guaranteed by the highest legal act, that is, if you want to change the government, you must also change the parliament. It is an interpretation that irresistibly resembles classic political spin.
DEMOCRATIC FRONT FROM THE SECOND PLAN
The Democratic Front, which in the past year was essentially the political entity that kept Krivokapić under constant pressure, blocked the work of the Parliament of Montenegro and generated tensions that basically had a nationalist subtext, has retreated into the background in the current situation, pretending to placed in the position of a factor of reconciliation and establishment of dialogue. This political tactic can first of all be seen as creating a good position in case of new elections. DF, despite the fact that it may be the main generator of the current crisis, by removing it from the public's focus skillfully avoids the role of the culprit not only for the overthrow of the Government, but also for the possible calling of new elections and shifts it to its partners in the current parliamentary majority.
For example, Milan Knežević, the president of the Democratic People's Party, announced that he will not attend the session of the National Security Council, because he does not want to give legitimacy to Krivokapić and Abazović in the fight for seats. And along the way he stated that "the government of Zdravko Krivokapić is dead". The latter is not surprising, because it is a constant when it comes to the relationship of the list "For the future of Montenegro" with Krivokapić, the man who was its holder.
A more careful analysis of the content on the political scene of Montenegro, especially those that followed the escalation of the conflict between the URA and the Democrats, points to the rightward turn of Aleksa Bečić's party. Approaching the church structures, which was intended to take away the power of the Democratic Front, distanced this party from the position of a solid center that guaranteed the stability of the parliamentary majority. Because of his closeness to clerical circles, Bečić became, for the most part, the culprit for establishing imbalance and insecurity, while, as the eventual elections will certainly show, he did not increase the rating of his party.
In such a situation, Abazović's initiative to replace Krivokapić's government was a completely expected move. Firstly, due to his good results, primarily in the seizure of cocaine, his reputation in the public has improved considerably; secondly, he presented the conflict with the Democrats as a matter of principle in the fight to unblock the prosecution and the judiciary, which is again directly related to the effects of the fight against crime and corruption, which is both functionally and programmatically linked to his name. But what remains as a doubt is: why does Dritan Abazović see the resolution of this crisis through the formation of a "minority government" and gives it priority in relation to extraordinary parliamentary elections? The only logical answer is the assessment that in this political context, which will again be dominated by church-national-identity issues, his position in the elections will weaken, just as the concept of the civil state will once again find itself at the back of the electoral columns.
WHAT AFTER THE ELECTION?
What will happen if the mandate of the Parliament of Montenegro is shortened and new elections are called? Unless the electoral legislation is changed, essentially little. The cohesive factor that was embodied in the need to replace Milo Đukanović's regime is losing its power. Electoral lists will not look the way they did, pre-election coalitions will not be so skillfully profiled to prevent significant wastage of votes. This will compensate for the obvious drop in support experienced by Đukanović's Democratic Party of Socialists, which was confirmed in the local elections held in the meantime. The announced establishment of the Prime Minister's Christian Democratic Party will only lead to a redistribution of votes within the current parliamentary majority, and thus further reduce the chance that anyone will stand out as a sufficient guarantor of a stable majority and, of course, a stable Government.
Perhaps the most realistic assessment is that, at the beginning of this year, Montenegro entered a new phase. That phase could, in short, be described as a state of permanent political crisis in which, even after possible new elections, it will not be possible to establish a stable parliamentary majority that would guarantee a peaceful path to European integration. On the contrary, it will be a phase of constant distancing of Podgorica from the EU. Until some new political subjects appear, unencumbered by nationalist narratives and partocratic manners.
