Iceland applied for membership in the European Union in 2009, at the height of the financial crisis. However, accession negotiations were suspended after a center-right government came to power in 2013, although the request was never formally withdrawn. However, since December 2024, the pro-European parties within the coalition government have reactivated this issue, and the referendum on the continuation of negotiations is scheduled for August 29, 2026. Will Iceland become the 28th member of the EU or the 29th, if Montenegro joins earlier?
We talk about this, as well as the relations between the USA and Europe, and the issues of Kosovo, Russia and Greenland, with Valur Ingimundarsson, professor of modern history at the University of Iceland. He recently participated in a conference on the rise of civilized states in Belgrade, organized by the Center for British Studies of the Faculty of Political Sciences and LSE IDEAS.
"WEATHER" According to the latest public opinion surveys, 54 percent of Icelanders are against joining the EU, while 46 percent are in favor. The opposition is unanimously against. Why?
VALUR INGIMUNDARSON: Many do not see a clear reason for joining as Iceland already has close structural ties to the EU. It is part of Schengen and the European Economic Area, which gives it access to the single European market. However, it retains full control over its fisheries - the traditional backbone of its economy - as it is not part of the EU's common fisheries policy. In addition, Iceland would be a net contributor to the EU budget, since it ranks among the top European economies in terms of wealth per capita and overall standard of living.
Supporters of EU membership, by contrast, argue that Iceland's inflation tends to be higher and that interest rates remain high because the country is not part of the eurozone. They also point out that there is not enough discipline in economic policy. However, Iceland has traditionally preferred to tolerate higher inflation rather than risk high unemployment. Currently, unemployment is around 5–6 percent, but this disproportionately affects immigrants, while native Icelanders are almost entirely employed.
Of course, there is also the issue of sovereignty. Some fear that Iceland would have to give up some of its control over fisheries and highly protectionist agriculture if it were to join the EU. However, the EU has so far clearly indicated that it is ready to discuss certain exceptions. The Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Torgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir, has already stated that Iceland would not join the EU if it meant giving up control over marine natural resources to the European Union.
Geopolitics plays a key role in the Icelandic government's decision to call a referendum this year, although it has so far not played a prominent role in the EU accession debate.
It seems that unlike the rest of Europe, there is no sense of security threat in Iceland?
There are no direct public safety fears. This is mainly because Iceland is geographically isolated and has no land borders. For this reason, governments have always been careful not to create panic or a false sense of alarm, while at the same time trying to send the message that "we need to be more aware of what is happening around us."
As for the Trump administration's threats to annex Greenland, Eurosceptics have tended to downplay them, but those who support EU accession have sought to highlight their significance. However, the government's hands are tied because Iceland has a defense agreement with the United States based on the North Atlantic Treaty. Although the Americans closed their base in 2006, they renewed their military presence in Iceland after the annexation of Crimea. Given the historically close relations with the US, the government does not want to turn exclusively to the European Union.
Do you think Iceland will eventually become a member of the EU?? And should it happen?
I'd say the odds are half-and-half. The EU has many problems - it is a divided organization where 27 countries have to align, and the big states often dictate the agenda. However, in the current situation there is clearly an advantage in building closer relations with Europe, because Washington is largely no longer seen as reliable as before. What is important in this regard is the EU's commitment to the rule of law and human rights.
Some parts of Iceland are less than 500 kilometers from Greenland, which is Iceland's closest neighbor. American officials often mention the possibility of buying or even annexing Greenland. What is Iceland's position on this??
Reactions were overwhelmingly negative, with full government and public support for Greenland. A certain nervousness was introduced by several rather bizarre incidents. In his speech in Davos at the beginning of this year, when he expressed his desire to acquire that territory, Donald Trump mistakenly said "Iceland" instead of "Greenland" four times. It was later explained that the president made a slip. Then the future US ambassador to Iceland, in a conversation with US congressmen, suggested that perhaps Iceland should become the 52nd US state. The Icelanders were caught off guard again. He quickly apologized, explaining his remarks as a joke.
If the US tried to militarily annex Greenland, it would cause a radical reaction in Iceland. I am convinced that there would be a discussion about the termination of our defense agreement. This would also affect the EU membership application itself. Simply put, it would be a turning point in the relationship. The issue of Greenland is very sensitive. If you look at EU statements about Greenland, they always read: "We support the right of Greenlanders to self-determination and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark..." Technically speaking, a large part of Greenlanders ultimately want independence. But secession from Denmark has so far not had majority support - as 50 percent of Greenland's budget comes from Denmark. And the Danes have always been clear: you have the right to secede - of course, there are procedures - but then the subsidies will be cut off and you will be left to fend for yourself. Now, however, the Danes and Greenlanders have become much closer due to American pressure.
Another interesting thing: trying to alleviate the crisis, the Danes and the Americans, with the participation of the Greenlanders, entered into negotiations. The Danes have stated that the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark is a red line, but that they are ready to consider an increased US military presence in Greenland. So far, not much has come out of these negotiations, or at least it has not been disclosed, but it has been announced that the Americans now want to open three more military bases in Greenland.
Did they exist during the Cold War??
Yes, two of those three bases were operational during part of the Cold War, but the US abandoned them. The US military has actually been present in Greenland since World War II. The Greenland Defense Treaty between Denmark and the US was concluded in 1951. That treaty is flawed because it does not contain a termination clause. That effectively means the Americans can stay there as long as they want, as both sides have to agree for the deal to end. It states that the agreement will remain in force as long as the North Atlantic Treaty is in force.
You mentioned that an American attack or annexation of Greenland would represent a turning point in international relations. How do you think that would affect US-EU relations?
This would create a severe crisis within NATO. The European members of NATO would become much closer. The next question would be whether, given that the majority of NATO members are in the European Union, the EU should take over the security role traditionally held by NATO.
You wrote about how Russia uses the case of Kosovo to legitimize its military interventions and territorial expansion. Can you explain that??
As we know, Russia supported Serbia regarding Kosovo, but after the conflict in Georgia in 2008, it changed its position and recognized both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Moreover, it accepted the Western arguments used in the case of Kosovo - that it was a humanitarian intervention. Even when people drew their attention: "Wait, you can't use absolutely the same argument in this situation", they answered - "No, the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia was much worse." But if that was the case, why didn't Russia intervene much earlier? It already effectively controlled those territories, given its presence there since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then they applied the exact same pattern in Ukraine, starting with Crimea (2014) and then invading Ukraine in 2022. The argumentation was used so that independence was first declared in Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk, followed by referendums on joining the Russian Federation.
There, they went a step further compared to the Kosovo precedent. As we remember, Kosovo's institutions were expressly and strictly prohibited from joining another state, specifically Albania. Then in other regions - Zaporozhye and Kherson - they acted somewhat differently. They did not first declare independence, as they did in Crimea, but used the referendums as an excuse for both independence and annexation to Russia.
To what extent do you think there really is a parallel there??
When it comes to Ukraine specifically, I don't think there are any parallels. When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its advisory opinion on Kosovo in 2010, it stated that the declaration of independence was not illegal, relying heavily on Resolution 1244. The failure to reach a negotiated solution on the future status of Kosovo, which the resolution required, paved the way for a unilateral decision on independence. This was not the case in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia's formal appeal to the ICJ's opinion on the unilateral declaration of independence - in order to justify the rights of the people of "Donbass and southern Ukraine" to self-determination and annexation to Russia after the referendum in Kherson and Zaporozhye - only weakened its legal argumentation. Referendums, which were organized under military administration, with carefully selected international observers and with the exclusion of international organizations, were deprived of all credibility and legitimacy. An occupation carried out by a foreign power, even if it is legally camouflaged as an "invitation", does not give the right to permanent sovereignty over that territory. On the other hand, when you look at South Ossetia and Abkhazia, these were similar cases, because the Soviet and Yugoslav systems of governance were essentially similar. Valid arguments for drawing parallels can be found there. The West insists on the argument that Kosovo is sui generis (unique) case, incomparable to any other. That argument was apparently a way to avoid creating new problems around the world. And this has always been the "Achilles heel" of Western argumentation - not that there were no serious violations of human rights in Kosovo, but that artificial insistence that this is something completely unique and incomparable to anything else. That was a rather problematic interpretation of the situation.
Do you consider Kosovo a finished story??
The story is not over, given that Serbia does not recognize Kosovo, and that relationship is inextricably linked to the European perspectives of both entities. We have yet to see how and when it will be resolved. I have the impression that there are currently no creative solutions on the table that could change the static dynamics of this conflict. More than 100 countries have recognized Kosovo, but that doesn't mean it will get a seat in the United Nations as long as China and Russia oppose it. That is why this question is so alive.
You just spoke about civilizational states at a conference at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. Can you explain what civilizational states are and how that narrative affects international relations?
It is an idea that is increasingly promoted primarily by countries such as China and Russia, and to a certain extent by India. This implies that they possess a rich civilization that goes back hundreds or thousands of years and that this history makes them a separate civilization, from which it follows that they should not be subject to any universal Western norms. In other words, they claim: we should not follow the Western paths, and the world should be organized around certain poles of civilization - one Western, one Chinese, one Russian and so on.
This is where we encounter contradictions. To achieve this, they try to control national and state narratives, reconciling numerous inconsistencies. For example, in China, the government is trying to merge Confucianism with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. These are very different systems, with completely different values, although they are presented as a single entity. At the same time, China values many of the international institutions created after World War II under the leadership of the West, because it benefits from them.
In Russia, the emphasis is on the imperial period - combined with the founding myth of Kievan Rus. Nevertheless, the Soviet period, with its internationalist communist ideology, hardly fits into the construction of a unique Russian national civilization.
Narratives about civilization states serve to defend state policies in China and Russia against Western universalism, the idea that everyone should follow the prescribed path of democracy, human rights, and the like. They say, "No, it doesn't oblige us. We do things differently."
It involves merging the future and the past in a retrograde way – looking backwards instead of forwards. At the same time, it has an internal function: it is a tool for maintaining control "at home", a tool that strengthens illiberal and authoritarian structures within these states. The United States of America, under Donald Trump, began to adopt the mechanisms of this "civilizational rhetoric". They imitate the Chinese and Russian discourse by telling Europe: "We want to revive the West, and you can be with us or not." It fits perfectly with America's new disdain for international institutions, such as the United Nations. However, that argument contradicts the logic of legitimacy of the EU itself, whose authority is tied to institutional forms based on international law and democratic procedure.
