Acclamation of the Serbian people: Shouting Karavučić

The day before the celebration of Statehood Day, the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, announced from Banja Luka that the main content of the program of this ceremony will be the adoption Declarations on Vojvodina, i to by acclamation. Identifying himself with all the Serbian people, he announced that he would an epoch-making event took place in Sremska Mitrovica: "We will adopt it (Declaration on Vojvodina) by popular acclamation, and then we will negotiate with our coalition partners from the Union of Vojvodina Hungarians and go before the National Assembly."

The message was clear: although only a few tens of thousands of people will gather in Sremska Mitrovica, it will be considered that he met there the entire Serbian people da by acclamation adopt a document that is of the greatest historical importance, and which refers to constitutional position of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.

Identification with Karađorđe

And indeed, on February 15 in Sremska Mitrovica, the Statehood Day of the Republic of Serbia was celebrated without the slightest connection to what Sretenje should be remembered for: the uprising against the dahi (after the so-called Cutting of the Princes) in 1804 and the first attempt to curb the autocracy of a local dahi through constitutionalism. Nevertheless, the acclamation itself clearly refers to the custom of exclaiming the war leader, which was also applied during the election of Karađorđe as leader in 1804 and which best shows us how Aleksandar Vučić self-identifies himself today.

By celebrating the Statehood Day of the Republic of Serbia in this way, Vučić undoubtedly paved the way out of the political crisis caused by the well-founded suspicion that he spiritus movens of the entire corrupt system that is devastating Serbia politically, economically, and above all morally. As far as could be understood from his speech at the meeting in Sremska Mitrovica, the Declaration on Vojvodina should be the first in a series of programmatic acts around which the members of the new Movement will gather - counterparts to the elders who in 1804 called Karađorđe the leader.

Dodik for Vučić as Seselj for Milošević

Not only the explicitly mentioned Union of Vojvodina Hungarians (whose enthusiasm for the idea could be fueled by a friend and ideological like-minded from the neighborhood, Viktor Orbán), but also the Union of Independent Social Democrats from Republika Srpska, which secured a huge part of the audience and whose leader, Milorad Dodik, Vučić apparently assigned the same role as a spokesman for hatred, which his former boss, Vojislav Šešelj, was once assigned by Slobodan Slobodan Milosevic.

Vučić designed the movement itself primarily as a place svg new political transformation. After the entire SNS or at least one part of it is sacrificed on the altar of the fight against corruption (what is waiting for the SPS?), the radical in his soul will find a new ban from which he will miraculously wonder what all his old party comrades and coalition partners have been doing behind his back. The idea is, in all probability, that the newly founded Movement will come out clean and free from the mortgage of corruption at the next parliamentary elections and to enable Vučić to continue his rule in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 2006.

At the same time, it will no longer matter who will be in which state position, since all important decisions will be made by the acclamation of the Serbian people, and the National Assembly (and, of course, the Government) will only receive them for information, according to the model of the "flow boiler", which will be inaugurated with the entry into force of the Declaration on Vojvodina.

Replacing the fight for (lost) Kosovo with the fight for Vojvodina

But what is the political meaning of the Declaration on Vojvodina, adopted by acclamation of the Serbian people in Sremska Mitrovica?

In order to understand it, it is necessary to take into account what is written in the Declaration and what was avoided to be written.

At the very beginning of the text, the task of all the patriotic forces gathered around Aleksandar Vučić (who, of course, will remain with them in the newly founded Movement) is highlighted to protect the "territorial integrity and completeness of the Serbian state".

Furthermore, the Declaration contains a mixture of historical allegations and propaganda messages, which are well known to older citizens of Serbia from the not-so-distant past - when the territorial integrity and wholeness of the Serbian state was also protected. but in Kosovo.

What is aggressively avoided in the Declaration on Vojvodina is precisely the mention of how and with what result the territorial integrity and completeness of the Serbian state in Kosovo was protected. The reason for this avoidance is simple: today, Aleksandar Vučić needs only the renewal of the national trauma from the nineties of the last century (after the so-called "yogurt revolution" in 1988, Vojvodina was put i de jure under complete control of Belgrade) with the help of recycled pearls of Milošević's patriotic propaganda and with the tacit replacement of the fight for Kosovo with the fight for Vojvodina.

Of course, in his speech delivered before the Serbian people, gathered in Sremska Mitrovica, Vučić could not resist without mentioning Kosovo. At one point, celebrating the victory over the "colored revolution" (the modern counterpart of the hated dahi), he explained that this victory is manifested in the fact that Serbia still "experiences" Kosovo as part of its territory, because it is economically (still) strong and because it made the Declaration on Vojvodina.

Maintaining autocracy

Leaving aside the celebratory mood - which aimed to convey a political message to all those who did not come to Sremska Mitrovica that he has no intention of letting go of self-government - here is a clear connection between the "experience" of Kosovo and the Declaration on Vojvodina. What is most important in this context is the connection itself - the economic strength of Serbia. With it, the political message becomes complete: Vučić has no intention of abandoning autocracy, and he will accuse "colored revolutionaries" (who allegedly manipulate students all the time from the eclipse) for the weakening of Serbia's economic strength (which will certainly occur due to the undoubted deepening of the political crisis in the coming period).

Judging by the fact that the new Karađorđe has redesigned himself into a new leader who will tear Serbia from the yoke of the occupying power, it could be expected that the European Union itself will soon be on the dock, to which the regime media persistently points the finger as the main culprit for all the political problems that Serbia is facing in the last three months.

Experiencing Kosova

When the connection between Kosovo and Vojvodina is taken into account, it becomes clear why Aleksandar Vučić chose Sremska Mitrovica to celebrate the Statehood Day of the Republic of Serbia. Because if Vučić cared about historical symbolism, he would have gone to Kragujevac; if he had opted for state symbolism, he would have stayed in Belgrade; and if he really wanted to emphasize some symbolism concerning Vojvodina, he would not have deviated from the original intention to hold the ceremonial meeting in Novi Sad.

Instead of all that, Vučić chose constitutional symbolism and opted for Mitrovica - unfortunately not the right one, the only ideologically important one Kosovo, but its reserve, Sremska.

As a reminder, in 2006 Vučić voted for the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia with 244 other members of the National Assembly, one could almost say by acclamation, given that only 5 members did not vote for him and that the referendum was a mere formality (an illegal two-day procedure was applied to enable manipulation of voter lists).

The goal of that Constitution, it should be repeated again and again, was not at all the demarcation or, God forbid, the limitation of power - which is the meaning of the tradition of constitutionalism and which was the basic idea of ​​the Sretenji Constitution - but exclusively defense of Kosovo. The arrival of Tomislav Nikolić, a radical redesigned into a progressive, as president of the Republic of Serbia in 2012, would have been unthinkable if the political elite of Serbia, led by Vojislav Koštunica and Zoran Đinđić (later also Boris Tadić), had not pushed the Kosovo issue and at the same time demonstrated a complete inability to solve it, thus deepening the national trauma.

Nikolić, who before that stood out only because, during his short stay as president of the National Assembly, he demanded the introduction of a state of emergency in Serbia so that the Kosovo issue could be resolved in an adequate way (what else but war?!), proved to be only a temporary solution as president of the Republic of Serbia. That place was waiting for a real prodigy in the fight for Kosovo, Aleksandar Vučić.

But, alas, during the time of Aleksandar Vučić, Kosovo gained independence even faster, even to the extent that today no one serious in Serbia expects a miraculous rebuke in the direction of protecting the territorial integrity and wholeness of the Serbian state. Even Vučić himself admitted that the Serbs have nothing else left until Kosovo experience as part of his state (he remained silent: exclusively through regime-controlled media).

It seems as if Vučić himself, overwhelmed by the problems at construction sites in Serbia and their financial implications, forgot how and why the progressives came to power in 2012, now far away, and that only the protests that spread like wildfire across Serbia reminded him of what his he says task in accordance with I'm making the Constitution of Serbia. In the unenviable situation in which he found himself, he came up with the salutary idea of ​​celebrating the Statehood Day in some Mitrovica, even Sremska.

What would undoubtedly strengthen and strengthen the position of the President of the Republic of Serbia today would be the celebration of the Statehood Day in Kosovska Mitrovica - whether it is included in the Republic of Serbia with the whole or at least northern Kosovo. If he had been able to do that, Aleksandar Vučić would have surpassed the popularity that Slobodan Milošević gained with the rally in Gazimestan on June 28, 1989, on the occasion of commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. But, since Vučić has done absolutely nothing to protect the territorial integrity and wholeness of the Serbian state in Kosovo, on which he must not even set foot (he only has to "experience" it as part of the territory of Serbia), had to settle for Sremska Mitrovica.

The height of acclamatory absurdity

Apart from the name, the two cities are connected by the fact that they are located in two - in accordance with the letter of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia - autonomous provinces. Given that one has already seceded, it is "logical" that the other should too he must want to to break away. That way of thinking led Vučić to the conclusion that what is really should have done the past twelve years in Kosovo, now really should start doing so in Vojvodina. The question of whether there really is separatism in Vojvodina is not important at all. There must be separatism by definition, because without it, the ideology on which the Constitution rests loses its meaning, and the shaky government, which pretends to be in accordance with the Constitution, loses its legitimacy.

Although the selection of Sremska Mitrovica as the place of adoption of the Declaration on Vojvodina, as a way to mark Statehood Day in accordance with the Constitution, is already absurd enough in itself, the height of absurdity, without any doubt, lies in the acclamation itself.

The custom of shouting out a warrior leader is widespread in unstated societies, and its application was quite logical in Serbia in 1804, when an uprising against the dahi had to be raised. Under the title acclamation we find it in ancient Rome, where it entered political life and gained popularity in parallel with the collapse of republican institutions, so that eventually, in the era of the Principate, a specific type of communication between the emperor and the gathered people was created. With volleys of panegyrics and blind flattery to the emperor, the gathered people used the rare opportunities when they were in direct contact with him to "incidentally" point out his weaknesses, mistakes or even abuse of power, which is why some acclamations ended in bloodshed.

Charismatic leader

In later European history, acclamation was sought by the holders of monarchical power who wanted to rule not only by the grace of God, but also by the (class-divided) people, but also by later holders of republican power who aimed to build "democratic despotism" (in the terminology of Alexis de Tocqueville, which Aljos Mimic once adopted with great success and applied to the rule of Slobodan Milošević). And in order to achieve this, the bearers of republican power - just like the shouted warrior leaders in unstated societies - had to have charisma.

The functioning of charisma was best described by the German sociologist Max Weber, the author of Vučić's favorite book Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism (which he once recommended as mandatory reading for everyone who wants to successfully reform Serbia - probably with the gnashing of teeth of dignitaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church). According to Weber, charisma is a special gift for superhuman achievements that causes unquestioning obedience and willingness to sacrifice in ordinary mortals. That is why democratic despots were always tempted to prove their charisma in public spaces, and when they succumbed to that temptation, they did it in front of the people who had already excelled in blind worship and who did not think of causing them the inconveniences that the Roman emperors occasionally faced.

Slobodan Milošević used to follow this recipe in Serbia, and Aleksandar Vučić does it today.

But does Aleksandar Vučić even have charisma?

Creating the appearance of charisma by controlled media

The Serbian people, who for Vučić's performance in Sremska Mitrovica were gathered by members of the ruling parties in Serbia and Republika Srpska (which is gradually growing into the main voting base of the president of the Republic of Serbia), belong to the already traditional scenario of giving popular support to leaders in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Such celebrations only testify to the fact that their organizers always strive to prove their charisma.

History, however, shows that only a few of them succeeded in this. The reason why today even such an empty bureaucratic type like Aleksandar Vučić is looking for it, wanting to present himself as a charismatic, lies in the terrifying traditionalism whose roots are in the (communist) Second Yugoslavia. At that time, from Belgrade, all South Slavic peoples (except Bulgarian and with the addition of Albanian) were really ruled by one true charismatic - Josip Broz - whom no one inherited, nor could inherit him, considering that charisma is always the product of a set of special circumstances, related to personality, political culture, international relations, etc.

However, in the meantime, in Serbia, we had the most average and impersonal rulers who were appearance of charisma created by controlling the media, systematically destroying institutions and nurturing the tradition that the government must be held by a charismatic person because that is the only way to save the country. We saw how he did it, starting in 1988, the announcer of great battles from Gazimestan, just as he stopped doing it on October 5, 2000.

Today, a quarter of a century later, we are watching a great victory being celebrated by the one who first declared that only a "complete idiot" could have ordered the demolitions in Sava-Mala, and then proudly admitted that it was he himself. Victory, however, is a long shot and the path leading to it is thorny: first, candidates for arrest for corruption must be determined (an eternal dilemma: who should be sacrificed without harm to those spared?), then the members of the newly founded Movement must be provided with all the levers of power in the state so that Vučić can peacefully appropriate them, and then they must face the coming economic problems that the political crisis inevitably entails and, last but not least, one should ensure the loyalty of all those in the army and police who might disobey if survival in power depended solely on them.

The larger picture of the post-communist transition

How does Vučić's celebration of the Statehood Day of the Republic of Serbia fit into the wider picture of the post-communist transition (from bad to worse)?

The disintegration of the Second Yugoslavia produced a national trauma in a large part of the Serbs, which, on the one hand, predestined them for the role of victims of nationalist demagogues, but, on the other hand, made them active allies in all kinds of destruction of the achievements of the democratic constitutional state for the sake of supposedly higher national goals. The fall of Milosevic did not actually change anything.

Zoran Đinđić's threat to the international community that, if Serbia does not annex Northern Kosovo, he will begin the "destabilization of Dayton" (i.e. the annexation of the Republika Srpska to the Republic of Serbia) is becoming a reality today (just like his rule of law and candidacy for membership in the European Union without Europeanization, after all).

What we had the opportunity to see on February 15, 2025 in Sremska Mitrovica was a Serbia in which the Republic of Serbia and the Republika Srpska have already united, which no longer cares about any state institutions and which has forgotten Kosovo, but has not healed the national trauma (the maintenance of which will be the responsibility of Vojvodina from now on), and therefore must shout (acclaim) the new Karađorđe to lead it to victories against the new dahi. And none other than the current self-proclaimed leader will ensure that the dahi is always on the go.

The author is a full professor at the University of Belgrade