Political incompatibility as an obstacle for the eventual reintegration of Kosovo

The belief that Kosovo undeniably belongs to us and that the prospects for its reintegration have not been wiped out is still massively represented in our population and politics despite its half-century of systematic alienation. It is easily forgotten and to a large extent it has already been forgotten that it is Kosovo ripped off from Serbia in June 1999, after the unfortunate end of a war in which we got involved unwisely and which we definitely and obviously lost. What is capitulation, an agreement according to which all the Serbian army and police are completely withdrawn from the battlefield, as it were, everything that carried any weapons for any reason, and on top of all that, a large number of supporting bodies and organizations?

That's it in general the withdrawal left behind - when it comes to the Serbian side - a real institutional wasteland. In our politically divided country, sharp and bitter debates about who and how lost Kosovo have been raging for decades. And at least there is a short, clear and convincing answer to that question: it was lost by the political authority that managed the country at the time of leaving Kosovo and was in possession of all relevant management prerogatives. It is worth mentioning that the continuity of that government - according to some unfortunately, according to others fortunately - was maintained until
to this day, with the perspective of continuing to rule until a rather distant, albeit undeterminable future: the number two man in today's government is the same one who held that position at the time of the late President Milosevic, and today's number one was at the top of the government and in only partially forgotten Milošević's time.

The impossibility of the reintegration of Kosovo in the foreseeable future - and according to some not very naive arguments, in the indefinite future, i.e. forever - it is not difficult to prove. Namely, it is easy to enumerate a multitude of reasons that seriously stand in the way of that reintegration and, one would say, make it literally impossible. The most important reason could be the fact that Kosovo is too tough and too heavy a bite, which Serbia does not have the capacity to absorb and digest as it is today. Can anyone imagine the normal functioning of the Assembly in which maybe one quarter would be Albanians from Kosovo?

SYSTEM INCOMPATIBILITY

Socio-psychological factors are equally prohibitive: for decades, a policy of digging deeper and deeper trenches between the Serbian and Albanian communities has been pursued, and the amount of mistrust - and even resentment, not to mention hatred - is so great that it seems as if life in a state union would literally disabled. There are limits up to which one state community can bear the disunity and resulting conflict of the corresponding society, and there is no doubt that those limits, when it comes to the relationship between the Albanian and Serbian communities, have been crossed a long time ago.

Serbia's spine is breaking under the burden of its poor - one only has to remember the abandoned, aged people who wander without faith and hope in remote, practically abandoned, desolate villages. How could Serbia bear the additional burden of taking over the even more hopeless and angry poor of Kosovo? It is not difficult to imagine the performances of young Albanian intellectuals, probably some neo-Marxists, who would quickly formulate theories with a loud message that the poor of Kosovo are the result of heartless exploitation directed by the Serbian government and the state. Kosovo has entered a demographic transition, but God knows how far it has progressed: the demographic growth there is much faster than in the rest of Serbia, and some demographers fear that in a much longer perspective we could face the danger of becoming a minority in our own country. A late friend of mine - a mathematician by profession, and an excellent one at that - said back at the time of the Kosovo movements in the SFRY, when the Republic of Kosovo was being sought, that those demands should not only be met, but that much more should be done. They should, he said, be made independent into a completely separate state, and then build a high, high wall between Kosovo and the rest of the Republic, such that "not even a single tick can fly over it"!

Unfortunately, there are no indications that we have approached the level that the venerable Patriarch Pavle had in mind: we would preserve Kosovo if we were worthy of it. Instead, we have a minister in the government who has been rotating through various ministerial positions for a long time, and who mentions Albanians in public appearances only as Shiptara. I believe that, like many insufficiently cultured Serbs, he would tell me that there should not be any problems in this regard because they call themselves Shiptars. I also believe that he would not accept or understand my proof that his "argument" is not correct or even relevant.

Therefore, Serbia is overcrowded with politicians and other public officials who sow mistrust and antagonism towards other nations, and Kosovo is their immediate target, and act as a kind of scarecrow for all constructive efforts to restore trust and finally establish cooperation on a number of important and useful areas. But, on top of that and partly independently of that, there is and is persistently reproduced a form of systemic incompatibility which, along with other destructive tendencies, systematically distances Kosovo from Serbia, and makes the idea of ​​reintegration, which is unattainable due to a number of other reasons, an empty and pointless chimera . Serbia is a principality that is undisputedly - and for a long time - governed by one man. He brightens and dresses, glows and lights, and holds a saucer and a ladle. This form of princely creations is common in the modern world and can hardly find any fans in a democratic climate. Adherents are found and created only in countries like Belarus and North Korea, which are tightly squeezed by the knobs of such regimes.

UNCERTAINTY HARD TO BEAR

Serbia had the misfortune of being, with rare and short intervals, in the clutches of authoritarian systems which, according to a number of authoritative analysts, were an important factor in the disintegration of the still unrepentant SFRY. There are well-argued opinions according to which the disintegration of the SFRY itself was largely the result of the Serbian authoritarian syndrome. Some separated from Serbia with the disintegration of the SFRY, and there were also those who separated from Serbia itself, that is, directly. And that, of course, without Serbian consent, not to speak of any kind of blessing. Above all, it is important to note that among those who separated from Serbia in one way or another, not one has yet repented. And there are no signs that such remorse, even in barely recognizable traces, could appear even in the distant future.

Authoritarianism does not attract anyone, and repels almost everyone. The reason is simple, although not universally applicable. In authoritarian regimes, there is no rule of law, but the rule of personality is more and more deeply rooted and firmly established, and that according to a rule that tolerates no exceptions. one person. The rule of personality creates an extremely unfavorable environment for life and work. Unlike the law, which is written down where it should be and in principle known to everyone and, in the case of consistent application, forms the basis of stability and business and any other certainty, the rule of personality is capricious, hazardous and unpredictable and generates a living environment shaped as a sign of hard-tolerable uncertainty.

The decisions of a princely located individual are inherently unpredictable; it is important to note that he himself does not and cannot predict these decisions. If anything is the sworn enemy of life activism, systematic planning and deliberate action to improve efficiency and well-being, it is precisely uncertainty. And the real victims of the unbearable burden of uncertainty are communities under the management command of one man, even if he is a great leader. No one longs for a life full of risks and structurally shaped in such a way that it makes impossible even the creation - not to mention the realization - of life and business plans. Those individual idiosyncrasies in the political process stumble into a kind of general social revulsion, which in Kosovo has created a strong aversion among the majority of the population towards the very idea of ​​the eventual return of Kosovo to some kind of state unity with Serbia.

INDICATOR OF DEMOCRACY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The big difference in the political system and actions between Serbia and its neighbors is noticeable even with the naked eye. In Croatia, during the last decade, there was a peaceful change of ruling groups. In the not so long ago election for the President of the Republic, the outcome was literally unpredictable until the election results were officially announced. With all the strikes and fierce turbulence, several changes at the top of the government took place in Macedonia in the same interval, which can also be said for neighboring Bulgaria. Visible changes took place even in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the level of important cities even in the Republika Srpska. Montenegro could also rejoice at the significant change of the executive power, with all the indisputable longevity of its president. From our perspective, Slovenia seems like a paradigmatic example of democratic changes in ruling parties. And Kosovo itself went through changes of government and thus gave clear indications of its at least partially democratic character. Political life in Kosovo takes place, by the way, in a sign of virulent political competition, which puts it in stark contrast to the - some believe - incurably monopolistic government in Serbia.

It will be one of the best indicators of the democracy of the political system and life mentioned above predictability of elections for the highest state officials. With a few exceptions - one of which is, quite significantly, Republika Srpska - those elections are truly unpredictable. Unpredictability is a consequence of active political competition in which no actor has decisive supremacy and, on that basis, an insurmountable advantage. In Serbia, however, one does not have to be some kind of political analyst to reliably predict the outcome of the elections before they are announced. In the democratization of political life, Kosovo is significantly ahead of Serbia, and the lack of democracy is a serious obstacle for the eventual reintegration of the southern province. Those who have accumulated great political power and entrenched themselves firmly in their authoritarian fortresses are not aware of how far they are moving Kosovo away from Serbia, even when they thunder loudly in their patriotic (not patriotic and not patriotic) chests.

The purpose of this text is to identify a hitherto unobserved, completely unconsidered factor that, quite independently of a considerable number of other insurmountable obstacles, makes the reintegration of Kosovo into the state entity of Serbia virtually impossible. With its hopeless sinking into the abyss of an authoritarian regime, Serbia has made itself incompatible with Kosovo, where democracy is, of course, far from ideal, but where the process of democratization, at least in relation to Serbia, is quite advanced. From this important fact of political contrast, other, by no means benign, obstacles to reintegration arise, which, in order to save space, may be discussed in a future text.