Why is the electoral roll important to the SNS, but it does not want to change it

Last week, the members of the former Working Group for the Improvement of the Electoral Process received an invitation from the parliamentary service to provide comments on the draft amendments to the Law on the Unified Voter List submitted by SNS MP Uglješa Mrdić. This invitation comes after the seventh draft of the aforementioned MP and two cycles of public hearings. I will not respond to the email, instead of an answer I want to inform the public about our views on the revision of the voter list offered by SNS, hoping for the blessing of ODIHR and the European Union. This text will apparently be very long, but the topic is complex and so far only superficially presented in the media. 

Since January of this year, my colleague Marina Mijatović and I have not participated in the Parliamentary Working Group for the Improvement of the Electoral Process, as have other MPs from the opposition parties, nor representatives of civil society. Then it became clear that the drafts given by SNS and the draft Lines (which we also supported), they cannot agree so that they get the required two-thirds majority in the working group. Since then, the working group has not been able to function, because the decision on its establishment stipulates that the sessions should be chaired by a member from the ranks of civil society. Although the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly provide that the president of the Parliamentary Committee for Constitutional Affairs and Legislation can call a meeting of the working group, this does not revive the group, but only makes its non-functioning even more visible.

Why did we even participate when the effect is like this? Could we have known in advance that the process would not result in a law enabling a fundamental revision of the voter list? There are also those who believe that the opposition in the parliament serves no purpose and that everything should be abandoned, i.e. left. 

In my opinion, withdrawing from institutions only makes sense if we know what its goal is. Let's avoid imagined and assumed effects for which in reality there are only arguments against - the simple non-participation of the opposition in the parliament will not harm the regime (let's remember the convocation from 2020 to 2022, for the mandate of which the Constitution was amended). Our actions should be thought out and designed. Leaving the Working Group for the Improvement of Electoral Conditions made sense, because it made it impossible for SNS to present to ODIHR and the international public that one of the key recommendations was fulfilled - that the law enabling the revision of the voter list be drafted in a process in which both the opposition and civil society participate. And that is very clearly stated in the last one ODIHR's opinion.

The public began to learn about the extent of abuse of the voter list practically from the 2023 election, because that election day was marked by an accident Arena which were discovered by the opposition members of the RIK (thanks to a tip from our councilor Vladimir Tijanić), although it was thought earlier that the SNS was bringing voters from Republika Srpska. However, preliminary findings Lines published five days after the election, showed that the problem is much bigger and that it includes serious manipulations and criminal acts organized by state authorities, at the expense of SNS. This does not mean that the SNS did not steal elections in this way before, but probably that earlier ratings and other forms of theft (primarily vote buying) could not produce sufficient results, so voter migration had to be used on a larger scale, which made the whole operation more visible. This is supported by data on the number of votes won by opposition parties in parliamentary elections in the last few years, which is constantly increasing.

Photo: Marija Janković

From the moment that action was revealed in the Arena, the voter list became a key point of discussion about election conditions. Especially since it cannot be influenced from outside; it is controlled by those who hold it in their hands: the Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-Government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under the full control of SNS and satellites. These events and their further analysis by political actors certainly deterred a number of voters from going to the polls, and part of the political actors decided not to go to the local elections in Belgrade in 2024. The position of the ZLF then was, and it is now, that the criminal octopus of the SNS will not commit suicide and that it will not improve the conditions for the elections on its own so that someone else will win them. You simply have to go to the elections and fight for every vote, because only participation in the elections provides some kind of mechanisms for that fight. Unfortunately, in most of the 2024 election campaign, we were forced to answer questions in the media about why we are going to the elections, instead of what kind of program we offer for Belgrade and other municipalities and cities. A year later, here we are at the beginning - we are looking for elections and under election conditions that may have become worse in the meantime.

The findings of the ODIHR do not have the character of a verdict, but point to irregularities and recommend, in accordance with the best international practice, what should be fixed. That's why they sound like that, mildly and without direct identification of the culprits and condemnation. That is the job of domestic institutions - which the ZLF, as well as other actors, addressed in all available ways - criminal charges, legal remedies in the election process, complaints to the inspection, and finally to the Constitutional Court (both in connection with the 2023 and 2024 elections). I will remind you only of some situations in connection with which we filed criminal charges - SNS call center revealed before the 2023 elections; falsification of the Official Gazette with the results of the Belgrade elections; additional redactions of the voter list in 2024; and they did that too Second. All these cases are in the prosecutor's office, some actions have been taken, just to avoid saying that they are in a drawer. The fact that the criminal charges we filed were not rejected shows that there is enough information in them for a well-founded suspicion that SNS officials, as well as public servants who work on their behalf, have committed criminal acts.

The ODIHR report on the parliamentary and part of the local elections in December 2023 contains a number of serious recommendations, among which is the need to return trust citizens in accuracy of the voter's list, by making it possible access to data from the electoral roll (which is the part that is often overlooked), that is, enable implementation meaningful electoral roll revisions (and not significant as translated, so I recommend reading the original report on English). In addition, the recommendation states that the audit should be carried out with the participation of all relevant actors, including political parties i civil society.

Aware that our participation in this process is part of the recommendations of the ODIHR, together with other parliamentary groups that emerged from the coalition Serbia against violence, we demanded in April 2024 that such a working body be established. We participated in the educated working group as long as it made sense, that is, as long as what we supported and proposed as concrete solutions was on the agenda. The position of the ZLF was that other legal changes cannot be discussed until the issue of the law that ensures a meaningful revision of the voter list is resolved, and we prevented the attempt to put other issues on the working group's agenda together with our colleagues from other opposition parliamentary groups. The reason for this attitude of ours is the practice of SNS to manipulate the recommendations of international organizations, including ODIHR. Let's remember how it was in October 2023. Ana Brnabić counted the ostensibly fulfilled recommendations. There are so many recommendations, and the level of their influence on the election result is so different, that the adoption of only some of them gives the SNS the opportunity to present it as its own success, without fundamentally improving the conditions.

It is the same now: faced with the exit of representatives of the opposition and civil society from the working group, SNS begins to fabricate drafts which it then sends to ODIHR for an opinion (since March 2025, three such opinions have been drawn up, the last one on July 10). Of course, the drafts are not written by MP Mrdić, but by experienced Parliament officials, who are ready to make themselves available to SNS, but that is a completely different topic. Also, two cycles of public hearings were held (the first was about both drafts on which the working group expressed their opinion - SNS's and Crtina's, and the second was about one of Mrdić's drafts). ZLF's position on those hearings was succinctly described by my colleague Rastislav Dinić, at an event on June 19 in Nis.

SNS is not doing it just because of ODIHR. They are not even concerned with democratization and human rights (which are the letters D, H and R in the acronym), but the recommendations are outlined in obligations that need to be fulfilled in order to receive funds from EU funds. Now, when all the money is drawn for the EXPO, the budget must be replenished somehow.

After each ODIHR opinion, Mrdić corrects a new draft in which he accepts part of the ODIHR's recommendations (he ignores the part), and then introduces new changes, which the ODIHR did not even comment on previously. It is so in one, e.g. in the fifth draft, the idea emerged that the revision of the voter list should be done by the REC, which surprised the ODIHR as well. In the latter, under the pretext of respecting ODIHR's opinion, there are new ways to ensure control over all segments of the electoral roll revision commission. 

At the public hearing held in Belgrade last Friday, it could be heard that SNS accepted all the proposals of the Line, so it is not clear what we are protesting at all. And when you read all those drafts, the truth is, they are similar, and some solutions are almost identical. However, the small differences that existed between the drafts in December, and were additionally upgraded by July, make Mrdić's writings unacceptable for the simple reason that they give the SNS just what is needed to maintain control over the voter list.

For the ZLF, these are the key flaws in the draft being pushed by the SNS.

Exposing parts of the voter list to the public. There was almost no talk among the public about the fact that the amendments to the law that should be passed have two aspects - in addition to the revision of the voter list, the public availability of a wider range of data from the voter list should also be ensured. Just as you can now see the names and surnames of voters for each polling station on the MDULS website after closing the voter list, now it should be more data. SNS included in the draft all the data proposed by Crta (name, surname and parents' names, sorted by polling stations, as data on the number of voters per household, i.e. address and apartment number), although not in a machine-readable format that would allow for easier analysis. In addition, municipalities should publish every seven days the number of changes in the part of the list that is kept for their area. What is problematic is that these provisions would begin to be applied only one year after the law comes into force, and the Ministry of Interior is given six months to pass by-laws and transfer the data needed for publication. Plenty of time to cover your tracks, right? Also, in the case of relatively recent elections, the public remains deprived of this additional data from the voter list.

Powers of the electoral roll audit commission. An expert commission elected by the National Assembly would be in charge of revising the voter list. It was mentioned here and there that the commission must have "executive powers" (which sounds like a translation of an English term), but without explaining what that means. For the ZLF, the matter is quite clear, the commission must have the authority to carry out all necessary checks in the voter list itself, and not just initiate them - otherwise the voter list will remain in the hands of those against whom we filed criminal charges. This thing is most obvious when it comes to the so-called field control (which should be used to check whether people are really at the addresses listed in the voter list). SNS proposes that the commission only initiate field control, and that it be carried out by the MUP, while the draft of the Outline states that the commission initiates, coordinates and supervises that control.

Composition of the Commission and decision-making majority. All drafts of the SNS envisage ten members, namely 5+3+2 (five proposed by the government, three by the opposition and two by qualified civil society organizations). The proposal we voted for envisaged nine members with equal representation of three groups (3+3+3). There are arguments for both solutions, but we should also look at the way in which SNS proposes to reach those members, because the potential dynamics within the commission is much more important than a simple analysis of the composition of the commission. In the SNS version, the commission makes decisions by a majority of seven votes, but at least one member from each of the groups must vote for the decision. Apparently, if representatives of the opposition or civil society oppose something, the decision cannot be made, and the SNS needs at least two more to secure a majority. A more detailed look at these provisions and consideration of several scenarios indicates that SNS is trying to secure a foothold in all three groups that nominate members by all means, and anticipating the potential attitude of other actors towards this process.

Let's look at all three groups. First, the five government parliamentary groups (that is, those that voted for the election of the government in the parliament), by size, propose their candidates, but according to the latest version, they do not do so individually, but make a joint proposal. This may indicate the desire of SNS to control this group, that is, that it does not have complete trust in its coalition partners? - but that's their problem. As for the parliamentary groups that voted against the election of the government, they propose three candidates, in order of size. If one refuses to propose, that right is given to the next one, etc. The question is what the schedule of parliamentary groups will look like until the time of the election of the committee, but one can imagine a scenario in which the members of the committee are eventually appointed by some of the smallest parliamentary groups, as well as those formed by deputies who were previously part of some larger groups. Finally, in order for civil society organizations to be able to qualify for a place in the Commission, they must be associations that were accredited by the REC for the observation of parliamentary elections in the last three cycles, and that they published reports on this. At first glance, it's CRTA and CeSID (correct me if I'm wrong), and in case one of them refuses to participate in the commission's work, according to the latest draft, the other gets the right to appoint two members.

Commission report. From the beginning, the ZLF objected to the SNS' proposals that they did not envisage that the report of the commission on the revision of the voter list be discussed in the parliamentary plenum, which is followed by several citizens, but that it remains at the level of the parliamentary committees. However, what is an even bigger problem and what ODIHR openly criticizes in its opinion is the fact that the boards finally decide on the commission's recommendations. They can also reject the findings of the expert commission - for which, unlike voting in the commission, a simple majority in the board, which SNS already has, would be sufficient. Therefore, the entire process of revising the voter list is once again placed in the hands of the simple SNS parliamentary majority. It reminds a lot of the selection process of REM members, doesn't it?

In today's situation, in which a large number of actors demand parliamentary elections, perhaps the issue of the voter list should be a topic only to show that the process offered by SNS is false and serves to further maintain power. Especially when we take into account that the nomination and election of members of the audit committee and the audit itself, the adoption of the report, and its implementation cannot last less than a year. Perhaps we should say more loudly that we, who participated in this process, concluded that the revision of the voter list is not possible while the SNS is in power. And that's okay. Even now, there were inventive ideas on how to "clean up" the voter list - how the students will do it, how the assemblies will deal with it, when the opposition and civil society could not. I hope that it is now clearer that we should direct our forces, and even our ideas, elsewhere - on the field campaign and control of elections at the polling station. 

If we go back to the beginning and take into account that the further decline in the SNS rating leads to further thefts, we may not have seen its greatest proportions yet. This was shown by the examples of Kosjerić and Zaječar, where, in my opinion, vote buying was primarily at work, although latest findings indicate that there was also falsification of the voter list. Of course, theft also has its limits, because you cannot buy an unlimited number of votes, but theft must not be ignored, but included in the calculation - what and how much exactly is needed to defeat the criminals in power in the elections?