Three months have passed since the electoral defeat of Fidesz. This decline was followed with special attention in Serbia - both because of the various connections between the two regimes, and because of the similarities in the way of ruling Aleksandar Vučić and Viktor Orban.
What have the new Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magjar and the Tisza coalition managed to do so far? How difficult is it to dismantle a regime that has penetrated like an octopus into every sphere of society, and above all into the economy? What does that "day after" look like, which inevitably awaits Serbia at some point?
The interlocutor of "Vremena" is Italian-Hungarian historian Stefano Bottoni, associate professor at the University of Florence. Professor Botoni is currently finishing work on a book about Orban (The Orbán Enigma: How a Former Liberal Turned Hungary Into a Global Illiberal Laboratory). While the publisher is waiting for the manuscript, we ask him what Tisa was most successful in these three months.
STEFANO BOTONI: The biggest success - which was not so surprising, although the speed of the development of events impressed me - was the foreign policy and the re-alignment with the European Union. Restoring European support to Hungary was crucial because we were on the verge of becoming another Belarus or, sorry to say, Serbia. In addition, they are well on their way to recover 10 to 12 billion euros of European funds that were practically lost. The entire Hungarian diplomacy and government apparatus have made this an absolute priority considering that this money is critical for the state budget and economic prospects in the coming year.
When it comes to domestic politics, a state of creative chaos is at work. Orbán was beaten to the bone in the elections, but since it was not a normal government but a regime, defeating that regime at the polls does not automatically mean defeating its structures and substructures. You can't fire all the people in that machinery overnight. Until the judiciary is taken over and purged of Orbán's cadres, major corruption cases cannot be prosecuted. Because, if the position of public prosecutor is still held by a man appointed by Orbán - precisely with the aim of covering up such cases - he will, of course, not do that job. And there are thousands of such examples.
"WEATHER" Is public opinion impatient and how does it color the entire atmosphere in society?
It is extremely impatient. Tensions are high given that Tisa has managed to gather unprecedented support and is incredibly diverse. When I say that, I mean the fact that, if we exclude the extreme left, which does not exist in Hungary, literally everyone is under their umbrella. But between the left (which in Western Europe would probably be called almost right) to the moderate right, there are huge differences of opinion. Tisa currently enjoys 65 to 70 percent support, which is on par with North Korea. They are officially overpowered, but fundamentally they are very diverse. Within one body you have three or four different parties, and all those people who voted for them expect everything and expect it immediately.
When that doesn't happen, people get pretty pissed off. One hears comments such as: "They are all the same" or "However, he comes from Fidesz", which is a typical remark about Peter Magyar. He was a Fidesz man and he shared that political culture, so then they say: "Well, he has that old Fidesz reflex".
Second, the economy is not doing well. Not because of Tisa, but because, as you well know in Serbia, we have a clientelistic, captive economy. You can't just push a button and solve a problem. In a whole range of sectors - real estate, tourism, construction - everyone is waiting for something to happen, and nothing is happening. Many investments have been stopped in some way. Of course, they were part of the gray or corrupt economy, but you don't currently have a clean market economy to step in to replace the old one. If this continues for months or a year or two, dissatisfaction will grow due to higher unemployment and lower investments. That's part of the political game: how to effect a complete transformation without a complete shake-up. While the masses expect radical changes, you actually have to keep the state machine going, and while you're doing that, you can't just throw all the cogs out of it.
Are you worried that this potential dissatisfaction could affect the return of the old forces?
I don't want to use classical definitions from political science like "autocracy" or "hybrid regime", because I think they are missed. "Mafia state" is by far the most accurate definition of what Hungary was. In such a system, the people in Fidesz functioned exclusively alongside the mafia boss. When the mob boss - which Orbán absolutely is - is finished, they have no replacement.
That's why I'm not worried about the return of Orbán or Fidesz, but something much more dangerous: democratic disillusionment. Once in a lifetime, tens of thousands of Hungarians did something for the public good. Two years ago, a joke was circulating in Hungary: in Serbia, you have the people, but you don't have politicians; in Hungary we have many politicians, but we have no people. People did not take to the streets, the masses could not mobilize. On the other hand, in Serbia you have a mass of people and students on the streets, but without political forces that would articulate that energy. And then in Hungary, for one brief, historic moment, everything came together - the huge support of the citizens for a political project enabled the convincing defeat of Orbán.
However, the coming months will be critical as the honeymoon phase ends. Next comes the confrontation with reality, which implies the necessary balance between radical changes and compromises with the past. That is a critical point.
In what sense exactly do you think it is critical? Which is the best?, and what is the worst possible scenario?
The first factor is Peter the Hungarian himself. He undoubtedly has a gift, magic, but at the same time he is perhaps too strong of a personality. I will give you the most recent example: he tried to find a new president of the Republic. That's how he met Judit Polgar, a former world chess champion, they talked for a while and he immediately proposed her for the position. However, it turned out that she has dual citizenship - Hungarian and Israeli. What does that mean in a country like Hungary? The domestic extreme right rushed to say: "That's who the Hungarians are electing for us." On the other hand, reasonable people began to wonder: has she ever been involved in politics? Has she ever made a political statement? No, absolutely never. We don't have the slightest idea what she thinks about the world, about the situation in Hungary, about anything. And thirdly, most importantly, when Judit Polgar understood what it was about, she told him a very firm, but polite "no".
The point is this: if Peter the Hungarian is not able to transform himself into a real statesman, he will have a problem. That same week, he was walking down the street with the Minister of Transport, without any security, and a passer-by spat on him. Hungary is not Norway! As prime minister, he must be protected by the anti-terrorist unit, which will be the case now, but he insisted on the image of a man of the people who does not need it. He must learn to behave like a professional politician. A lot depends on him personally because, unfortunately, the core of the Hungarian political climate today is charismatic politics. Politics is increasingly reduced to the personal cult and endurance of leaders instead of building institutions and shared values.
Which is not exclusively a Hungarian problem.
Yes, it is a global phenomenon. The Tisza model is the quintessential image of that, so trying to restore democracy by relying solely on one man's personal endurance is a very dangerous game. Institutions by definition must be impersonal, and here we are slaves to the idea of the Savior, the "man of providence".
I was born in Italy, so I remember well how Berlusconi called himself a "man of providence" back in 1994. Italy practically invented this kind of plebiscite, charismatic politics. Last year I listened to Francis Fukuyama who noted that Trump, and in a way Obama, and now of course Peter Magyar, are actually Silvio Berlusconi's illegitimate sons. Berlusconi was the first mainstream charismatic politician to patent this genre. He had no idea how to rule the country, but he knew perfectly well how to stimulate passions, confrontations and conflicts. Peter the Hungarian is a byproduct of this historical moment, but Hungarian democracy can only survive in the long run if it rebuilds its institutions.
What does history say?, how long does the transformation of a political culture take provided everything goes well?
When we talk about the democratic transformation of the former fascist and Nazi regimes after the Second World War, history shows that it takes between 25 and 30 years to establish stable democracies, capable of absorbing various social shocks. And it was the best possible scenario, at the most favorable historical moment, because it was an era when the idea of democracy was on the rise globally. Today, on the contrary, democracy is in decline at the global level.
Another problem for Hungary is the confusion about what we are actually rebuilding. This sounds like a theoretical debate, but it is by no means. The problem is that we have no examples of good democratic practice in our past. We never even had them. And when you don't have a rooted democratic tradition, you have to explain to people again and again what a republic is.
Orban has completely drained and emptied the concept of the republic. Maybe that's why Peter Magjar was looking for a new president through a process that resembled a shameful casting. That's the right word - casting. In Italy, whose political institutions have been collapsing from within for decades, one figure survives whose prestige is untouchable. This is the president of the Republic, the guarantor of national unity and democratic order, a sitting, deeply respected gentleman in the eighties and nineties. And we in Hungary behave like a democratic startup. We are still in the basement and we are looking for a president for that basement.
I have the impression that most Hungarians still imagine government as a monarchy, only without a kingdom and without a king. If you really want to restore democracy, you have to answer a crucial question: what does a republic look like in a country without any meaningful republican tradition? You in Serbia can at least go back to Yugoslavia, no matter how problematic that legacy is today.
Finally, we have to clarify in Hungary - exactly what kind of democracy do we want? Do we want a plebiscite democracy with a "good leader" sent to us by God himself to dictate what is right and what is wrong? In that case, Peter Magyar would only replace Viktor Orbán. He would be a more decent version, of course, but we would basically keep the same culture of a leader we must not criticize. If we don't want that, we have to accept the fact that Peter the Hungarian is not untouchable. He can be wrong. He can say nonsense. He can make the wrong moves. We will have to fight against him, sometimes internally, so Tisa will have to become a self-critical, pluralist party that suffers from internal friction. And Hungarians don't really like that kind of internal political struggles.
How do you see the situation in Serbia and what are the key similarities and differences between our two countries in this context?
First of all, you must know that Serbia and your student movements were a huge inspiration to many in Hungary. After the accident in Novi Sad, in Hungary you could often hear: "Look at the Serbs, why are we unable to go out into the streets and really fight?" It had a serious psychological effect.
Second, of course, there is a fundamental geopolitical difference. From the first minute to the last, Orbán's system was integrated into the Euro-Atlantic political and security framework, including NATO. This means greater freedom of action on paper, but in practice very clear limitations. His regime has always been on a short leash in this regard. I'll give you a plastic example: In 2025, Orbán had the "brilliant" idea of sending 70 special officers of the Hungarian anti-terrorist unit (TEK) to Bosnia in order to extract Milorad Dodik in case he had to flee the country. As expected, this was not well received in Sarajevo. A huge dust-up arose, and it was all cut short by a phone call from Marco Rubio to Peter Sijart. On that occasion, Sijarto practically heard a word that even Sergey Lavrov would never have given him. Rubio told him very clearly: "What the hell are you doing? Tie them up and get those people out of there immediately." And they obeyed immediately.
So, when Washington shouts or when the European Union introduces sanctions, as was the case in 2022/2023, Orban was fundamentally hurt. He didn't care about the rule of law paragraphs, he cared about the money. That European money, unfortunately, literally fed his system. The equation is clear: no EU funds, no party. That is why the position of the Vučić and Orbán regimes has always been drastically different from that point of view.
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You spoke about the challenges facing Hungary. What would be the biggest challenge for Serbia??
The real challenge for Serbia, at least as far as I can assess it from the outside, is the question of whether you really fundamentally want Euro-Atlantic integration. Especially today, when those integrations do not bring the same generous economic and political package that was offered to Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic two decades ago. That package is much more modest today, although it still has its weight.
However, it comes with a clear price tag. I come from the country of Trianon trauma and I understand perfectly well the depth of national crises, but for you it means recognizing Kosovo as a state. And the acceptance that Bosnia and Herzegovina is also an independent country that will have to decide its own destiny one day, while Serbia is, simply, Serbia. It took Hungarians decades, almost a century, to mentally digest the fact: we are what we are, no less, no more.
And once such a geopolitical choice is made, it becomes irreversible and binding. It was this election that sealed the fate of Orbán's regime in 2026. I did not believe that in my lifetime I would again hear tens of thousands of Hungarians on the streets chanting: "Ruszkik, haza!" ("Russians, go home!"). But Orbán tried to present those elections as a fateful collision between the "rotting and dying" West and sovereign, happy Hungary. The response of the citizens was: "You and your sovereign Hungary cope. We want to remain part of the European semi-periphery because that's what we are; we prefer that to participation in dangerous geopolitical adventures without any future."
Currently, there are three nations in Europe with a deeply unresolved vision of their own imperial past - Russians, Serbs and Hungarians. We share that unclear vision of who we are and how we got to where we are in the first place, what exactly went wrong. For Hungary, it is nostalgia for the period before Trianon, i.e. the famous Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and for Serbia the period after the collapse of Tito's Yugoslavia and Milošević.
Are you saying that with the collapse of Orbán's regime, the type of Hungarian nationalism is also possibly changing, and then perhaps the attitude towards the Hungarian minority in the neighboring countries?
Provided that it survives, one of the most important things is the emergence of a political party for the 21st century, like Tisza, which seems really resistant to the old, nostalgic Hungarian nationalism. They honestly observe the Hungarian nation through a modern prism: you have Hungarian citizens in Berlin, Stuttgart, Budapest or Novi Sad. But in such a political construction there is no longer a privileged role for ethnic minorities outside the borders of the state that shape the politics of the motherland.
To be brutally explicit: the new government in Budapest is extremely angry with the political elites of the Hungarian minority in neighboring countries. The message sent to Istvan Pastor and Kelemen Hunor in Romania was clear: "Now you will shut up and obey orders. It will not be pleasant for you. You will receive significantly less money under incomparably harsher conditions, because from the first minute you have been loyal, enthusiastic accomplices of Orban and who knows what other local dictators in the region. Now is the time to pay that bill."
It's not a political revenge, but a principled message: "We will not fund you unconditionally just because you are Trianon's victims. You haven't been that for a long time, circumstances have changed. Yes, you are ethnic Hungarians, you all have citizenship, you got Schengen passports and a bunch of benefits. Keep the benefits, but don't imagine that you will manage our internal political life forever."
I think this is a colossal shift. I know that the elites in Transylvania mourn the loss of the "great leader" and consider that the new set in Budapest has no national legitimacy to rule over them. And the answer of that new set is simple: "We don't want to rule over you." They just don't care that way anymore.
A completely new balance is established. In today's framework, the voice of the Hungarian diaspora in Berlin will probably carry more political weight for Budapest than the voice of the Hungarians in Subotica. It is politically tricky, but it is the idea of a national identity finally anchored in the 21st century - consciously divorced from the toxic past that has poisoned our society for decades. It seems that we have finally put an end not only to that fruitless transition of 1989, but also to a very dangerous idea from the 20th century.
