The devil always gets his way: no matter how much Serbia wants to forget Srebrenica, it seems that Srebrenica does not forget Serbia at all. The dormant spirits were first awakened by the Novokanon Faculty of Law student association, with a scandalous forum where the defenders of Serbia on duty tried not only to challenge but also to celebrate the bloodiest crime in the Yugoslav wars; it was even demanded that Muslims move their graves from Serbian territory so as not to occupy fertile land. As a kind of countermeasure, a group of non-governmental organizations proposed to the Parliament of Serbia the text of the Declaration on the Protection of War Crime Victims, by which the state undertakes to "expose and punish any ideological justification of the crime", "not to allow the acceptance of the consequences of the crime, by presenting the justification of genocide as legitimate political position" and "that they will respect the verdicts that clearly defined the legal character of the crime of genocide committed in Srebrenica". Then a foreign factor intervened: the Minister for Human and Minority Rights, Rasim Ljajić, informed the public, after a several-day visit to Washington, that a resolution on Srebrenica was being prepared in the American Congress, in which the role of the Republic of Serbia in the massacre of at least 8000 Muslims in July was "very harshly" described. 1995. At the same time, the International Helsinki Federation publicly invited the authorities in Belgrade to take part in the commemoration that will be held in Srebrenica on July 11, and to publicly apologize to the victims.
Soldier of Republika Srpska
The authorities (with the exception of Ljajić) reacted to these calls and initiatives with a dignified silence, just as they mostly kept silent about the shameless Novokanon forum. Public opinion shares this indifference: according to recent surveys, almost half of those surveyed do not know that something significant happened in Srebrenica, and of those who think they know, most do not believe that what happened was a crime. It shouldn't be: the Srebrenica massacre is one of the most thoroughly studied war crimes in history, the subject of countless books, films and academic studies, many of which are available to the domestic public. On top of that, Srebrenica is the only war crime in Europe in the last sixty years that was declared genocide by a final court decision (at the trial of General Radoslav Krstić before the Hague Tribunal). Srebrenica, then, was the key justification for the engagement of NATO forces in Bosnia in the preparation of maps ahead of the Dayton Agreement. Considering the significance that this event had, and may still have, for the past and future of Serbia, as well as the degree of blissful ignorance of the political elite and the public, that story would have to be told once more.
PROLOGUE: Srebrenica is a small town in eastern Bosnia, hidden in a deep valley not far from the Drina, built around a silver mine that was known since ancient times. According to the 1990 census, about 35.000 people lived in the municipality, and only 6000 in the town itself. The people of Srebrenica, who often had blue eyes and hair, were said to be the descendants of miners from Saxony, who settled there God knows when ; however, according to the census, about three quarters of the population, both in the municipality and in the city, declared themselves as Muslims, and the rest were Serbs and Yugoslavs. When, in the spring of 1992, all major cities in eastern Bosnia fell into Serbian hands, even Srebrenica was not spared: on April 18, 1992, members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard led by Želko Ražnatović Arkan managed, after a brief shootout, to occupy the center of Srebrenica. They soon realized, however, that they were in the wild, under fire from the surrounding hills, where most of the able-bodied men had taken refuge before the city fell. It turned out that Srebrenica was easy to conquer, but difficult to hold, and besides, there was nothing to loot, which was an important factor for the SDG. Three days after entering, Arkan's men retreated after a successful counterattack by Srebrenica organized by former Serbian MUP officer Naser Orić, the man who was among the police officers who arrested Vuk Drašković on March 9. Thus, twenty-five-year-old Orić became the commander of the Territorial Defense and master of life and death in Srebrenica. Today he is on trial at the Hague Tribunal.
During the following months, Serbian territorials from the neighboring municipalities of Bratunac and Zvornik repeatedly tried to recapture the city, and each time they failed: in one such attack, Goran Zekić, one of the officials of the Bratunac branch of the Serbian Democratic Party and a former judge, was killed. . Then the last Serbs from Srebrenica left the city, and the people of Bratun took their revenge by killing a large number of Muslim prisoners at the local football stadium, which would later be the scene of a new massacre.
Throughout the winter, the front line around Srebrenica remained relatively stable, although the enclave represented a thorn in the side of Republika Srpska. Faced with scarcity and an increasing number of hungry refugees pouring into Srebrenica from surrounding villages and towns, Orić organized raids on Serbian villages that were within his reach. During one such campaign, in the village of Kravica on Orthodox Christmas in 1993, more than a hundred Serbs were killed. At the same time, Orić occasionally managed to cut off the corridor that connected Zvornik with the Serbian wartime capital of Palam, which was of vital importance to Karadžić because it represented the shortest connection with Serbia. During that time, members of the BiH Army tried on several occasions to open the corridor between Srebrenica and Tuzla, but they succeeded only occasionally, and with heavy human losses. Srebrenica remained surrounded, although in connection with two smaller enclaves, Cersko and Konjević Polje.
Expulsion of Muslim women and children
FIRST CRISIS: The first winter of the war was terrible for the people of Srebrenica, and at the beginning of spring, the real famine had already begun. The number of inhabitants rose to almost 40.000 angry, frostbitten and starving people, and Orić struggled, often with brutal force, to maintain some kind of order. Enraged by the losses inflicted on them by Orić's men, and even more so after the massacre in Kravica, the Serbs did not allow the passage of UNHCR trucks with food and medicine. The government in Sarajevo, overwhelmed by its problems, could not and did not even try to help, except for using Srebrenica for propaganda purposes, which, after all, it still does today. In the spring of 1993, from March to June, the American "Hercules" dropped crates with food and medicine on Srebrenica and the surrounding hills, but often the wind carried the parachutes into Serbian territory or into inaccessible hills. Finally, the Serbs got tired of the cat-and-mouse game with Orić's men, and in March they started a new offensive, this time more thoroughly prepared than before.
The first to be hit was Cerska, which immediately fell, and Mladić's soldiers were additionally delighted by the American packages that the pilots, unaware of the change in the situation on the ground, continued to throw straight into their hands. New thousands of refugees poured into Srebrenica, and the Serbian army followed in their footsteps, irresistibly advancing towards the city. Alarm began in New York and Washington: the fall of Srebrenica, and the carnage that could be safely expected to be inflicted on the souls of the United Nations and the Clinton administration, seemed inevitable.
The situation was saved, more or less single-handedly, by General Philippe Morillon, the French commander of UNPROFOR, displaying an enviable degree of diplomatic skill. Morijon first went to Cerska and there, in order to please the Serbs, he publicly denied the Sarajevo government's information that the Serbs had committed terrible crimes there. "I didn't smell death," he told reporters at the time. It worked: on March 11, Morijon received permission from the Serbian authorities to cross the front line near Bratunac and enter Srebrenica. At that moment, the city was already under artillery fire from Mladić's forces, but as soon as Morijon entered, the shelling stopped. The people of Srebrenica quickly understood the message and, when Morijon tried to return after the meeting with Orić, they did not let him go. A large group of civilians, mostly women and children, surrounded his vehicle, and Morion was forced to stay in the town longer than he had planned. He did not leave until seven days later, but in the meantime a diplomatic solution was found and Srebrenica was saved, at least for a while.
Mass graves of murdered Srebrenica residents
PROTECTED ZONA: The diplomatic solution included the agreement of the leaders of the RS to stop the offensive on Srebrenica and in return, the member of the Presidency Ejup Ganić accepted the obligation to disarm Orić's forces and to no longer attack the Serbs and threaten the corridor. It was a promise that did not cost Ganić anything and did not bind Orić; he had not expected anything from Sarajevo for a long time anyway. In addition, UNHCR took it upon itself to evacuate fifteen thousand refugees from Srebrenica, including the wounded, women and children. This move saved many lives, but the world organization accused the Sarajevo government of aiding ethnic cleansing. The credibility of the UN, but also of the Western countries whose troops as part of UNPROFOR watched this performance helplessly, was seriously threatened. It was clear that a more permanent solution had to be found.
It was found in the establishment of so-called protected zones, based on UN Security Council Resolution No. 819, which was adopted on April 16, 1993. With this resolution, one of the most unfortunate in the history of the UN, Srebrenica was placed under the symbolic protection of the UN. and the UN, for its part, took it upon itself to disarm the dark population. It turned out, and very quickly, that he was neither able to defend them nor to pacify them.
This became clear as soon as we moved on to the implementation of the Resolution, that is, the deployment of troops that were supposed to protect Srebrenica, because the countries in turn refused to send a sufficient number of troops. According to some analyses, the number of soldiers necessary for the effective defense of the protected zone would be at least ten thousand. Instead, the UN sent 143 Canadians to Srebrenica, whose heaviest weapons were 12.7 mm machine guns. Orić's men gave them some unusable weapons, including two broken Serbian tanks, and the Kobayags disarmed.
More than 8000 dead
Meanwhile, the ill-fated Resolution 819 was supplemented by the equally ill-fated Resolution 936, dated June 4, 1993. The new resolution established new protected zones (Sarajevo, Goražde and Bihać, among others), but again it was not possible to find enough troops to implement. Apart from that, it turned out that no one will replace the Canadians in Srebrenica. In the end, the Netherlands agreed to give up one lightly armed battalion (about 450 soldiers). The stage was set for tragedy. And then maps were introduced into the game.
SIMPLIFYING MAP: The establishment of protected zones meant respite for Srebrenica, but not for international diplomats, who were scrambling to find some way to end the war in Bosnia. Plans were made and fell, from Cuitillier's, through Vance-Owen's to Owen-Stoltenberg's, always at one point: on the maps. Each plan represented a new variant of the partition of Bosnia, and each was based on the situation on the ground. Each time, the warring parties relatively quickly reached an agreement in principle about ninety percent of the territories, but the plans regularly collapsed on the remaining ten. Srebrenica, along with Goražde and Brčko, has always been an important part of that ten percent. The government in Sarajevo was, in principle, willing to get rid of it, but it could not announce it publicly, especially not to Orić and the citizens of Srebrenica. The Serbs, for their part, could not tolerate the existence of this enclave in the heart of ethnically cleansed eastern Bosnia, even so close to important communications. In the end, a Solomonic solution was found for Goražde and Brčko in Dayton, but Srebrenica was a hopeless case, a subject of constant dispute and a source of constant frustration for international observers.
From 1993 to 1995, there were no major frontline shifts in Bosnia, but during that time, the military position of Mladić's forces continued to deteriorate. It became obvious that they had taken more territory than they could defend: the front line (including Krajina) was more than 1200 kilometers long, which would have been a problem for a much larger army. In addition, the VRS crumbled due to a general decline in morale, desertions, massive corruption, and constant bickering among politicians. Even mother Serbia did not help as much as before, especially since Karadžić fell out of favor with Milošević. During that time, the Croatian Army and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina were rapidly arming themselves with shipments that arrived from America via Iran and were getting stronger day by day. As a professional soldier, it must have been clear to Mladić at the end of 1994 that sooner or later he would have to lose a good part of the territory. He also had to know that he could not save Knin and the Bosnian Krajina, should the Croats go on the offensive. His attempt to conquer Goražde, in April 1994, ended ingloriously. In the spring of 1995, there was only one place where he could count on a sure victory, the last in his career: Srebrenica.
Preparations for the offensive could begin.
During the whole of April and May 1995, UNPROFOR officers from the field sent reports about the large movements of Serbian troops, which were flowing towards Srebrenica, and all of this, after all, was clearly visible from the satellite. Despite this, those reports were dismissed as irrelevant in the higher commands and capitals of major countries, as were the increasingly frequent incidents between the Dutch and Serbian soldiers who were "testing the terrain" before the battle. At the same time, there was a fruitless polemic about the possibility of using the air force against the Bosnian Serbs and the "double key" held by Jasuša Akashi.
In April, a week before the start of the offensive, Naser Orić and a group of his closest collaborators were ordered to urgently travel to Sarajevo for some kind of military course. Since there was no land connection with Sarajevo, they flew in helicopters. An interesting and insufficiently studied circumstance is that permission for the overflight of those helicopters over Serbian territory was given by the State Security of Serbia. The beginning of June found the defense of Srebrenica without command, and the Dutch under increasing pressure from the Serbs, without reinforcements and hope for air support. Preparations for the finale were nearing completion.
BLOODY A GIFT: The offensive on Srebrenica began on July 6, 1995, with an attack on Dutch observation posts and lasted until July 11, when Mladić, in front of television cameras, announced that he was "dedicating this victory to the Serbian people in honor of Vidovdan". From July 11 to 16, the slaughter of men from Srebrenica, at least 8000 of them, took place after they were separated from their wives and children. The massacre, as we learned from the trial of General Krstić and the testimony of Miroslav Deronjić, the first man of the Bratunac SDS, was carefully prepared. Buses for "packages" (a code name for future victims) were secured in advance, as were the places of execution: schools, centers of culture, warehouses and factory halls; the soccer field in Bratunac was once again soaked in blood. Places for mass graves and "technique": excavators, backhoes and trucks for transporting corpses were also prepared in advance. Knowing the situation in the VRS at that time, it must be admitted that the whole operation was carried out with surprising efficiency and discretion: journalists, except for the vetted cadres, could not even come close. It took months for information about the scale of the crime to emerge, and years for all the details to come together.
In this text, the most terrible details of the Srebrenica story are deliberately bypassed: the confessions of the survivors, the afflicted, and those who were forced to speak out by their conscience. In the end, dry statistics, locations of mass graves and execution grounds, forensic findings and other evidence procedure apparatus are also missing. All of this can be found on the Internet or in any major bookstore, but the essence of the story is irrefutable, and no amount of silencing, relativization or contestation will erase or change it.
Admittedly, some pieces have not yet fallen into place. When the trial of General Momcilo Perišić, Jovica Stanišić and (let's hope) Mladić begins, more will be known about the role that units of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian MUP played in this drama. About how much the so-called The international community knew about Mladić's plans, and whether she could have thwarted them, will be debated for a long time, as well as the hypocritical attitude of Izetbegović's government. The main burden of guilt, however, remains on those who conceived and carried out the crime, and there should be no dilemma, especially not here and now.
There remains, of course, the question of the responsibility of those who were so happy with Mladic's bloody gift that even after ten years they don't stop mocking the fugitive general's icon. Unfortunately, human justice does not help much here, and another court is competent for their souls - if there is one, and if they have souls.
