Turkish FPV "kamikaze" drones arrived in Pristina in October, before the agreed deadline and just before the elections in Kosovo, just at the time when Ankara is taking command of KFOR. With that scene, a domestic myth about foreign policy ceases to be valid and loses its importance. It has been shown that power is not measured by compliments and "brotherly" addresses, but by real moves, and that a friendly tone does not change strategic interests.
The structure in which Aleksandar Vučić builds Serbia's foreign policy as a network of personal relationships on "thousand pillars" - from Putin and Xi Jinping to Trump and Erdogan - broke the moment personal interests prevailed over common ones. The drones in Prishtina clearly show the limits of such a model: it lasts only until it collides with real strategic priorities.
STRATEGIC DEPTH AND EXPANSION OF TURKISH INFLUENCE
Turkish mediation in the Balkans should not be surprising. The "strategic depth" of Ahmet Davutoglu, a diplomat and former prime minister, translated neo-Ottoman ambitions into soft power and forms the basis of Erdogan's foreign policy: returning to the region through mediation and investment, not force. In practice, this meant the trilateral Turkey-Serbia-BiH, the expansion of trade, investments in infrastructure and banking, as well as the opening of cultural centers throughout the region. Ankara's goal was to be connected with the Muslim population in the Balkans while at the same time maintaining pragmatic and functional relations with Belgrade.
Since 2014, those relationships have been given a personal touch. Vučić and Erdogan established a relationship that was described as "sincere" and "open", and was served to the public through messages of closeness, frequent visits and statements by officials. However, beneath that camaraderie were economic interests. Trade exchange grew, Turkish factories were opened all over Serbia, Halkbanka also expanded. For Belgrade, this meant jobs and the argument that Serbia is not isolated and that it nurtures relations with the most diverse actors. For Ankara, it was about its position on the local market, political influence and the opportunity to show breadth and pragmatism through cooperation with Serbia. We should not forget that Turkey was among the first countries to recognize Kosovo's independence on February 18, 2008, just one day after Costa Rica. It was this early decision that determined skepticism in Belgrade for a long time, but it will later be suppressed by investments and attempts at political rapprochement.
As economic influence expanded, Turkey's defense industry matured on the battlefields of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, through Libya and Ukraine, and gradually moved into wider exports. In the Balkans, a space for Pristina naturally opened up. During 2023, Kosovo publicly announces the acquisition of the TB2 drone, marking the entry into the "heavy" category of drones that requires serious training. An alarm went off in Belgrade, but the official tone remained calm: "We can talk about everything with Erdogan."
TURKEY, FPV AND KFOR DRONES
The contract for the Skydagger was signed by the Kosovo Ministry of Defense with the Turkish company Bajkar at the end of 2024, with a delivery deadline of early 2026. At the beginning of October 2025, Turkey takes over command of KFOR, and just a few days later, Skydagger FPV "kamikaze" drones arrive in Pristina, well ahead of the agreed deadline. Pristina's announcements emphasize that part of the operators have already undergone training and that the systems are being put into use. This is the moment when the "soft" channels that Ankara has built over the years through trade, infrastructure projects and cultural ties become umbrellas under which operational policy is implemented. There is no longer any doubt that Turkey acts in the Balkans as an independent actor that actively shapes the security and political landscape.
This timing is part of the message. In one move, Ankara combines three spheres of action: economic presence in Serbia, commanding a mission that maintains the security framework, and concrete support for Pristina in an area that is changing the terrain. However, the question of KFOR's neutrality also arises. The formal framework implies that KFOR is the backbone of security in Kosovo, assuming the demilitarization of the KLA and other armed groups. However, today there are Kosovo security structures and that is precisely why the moment in which Turkey simultaneously commands the mission and delivers the FPV package to Pristina turns into a political signal in itself. Belgrade sees in this an argument for the claim that the security balance is tipping, while Pristina reads in the same move a confirmation that it has a partner that delivers on time. Both of them know that the price of a mistake after such a delivery is higher than the day before.
WHAT IS PRISTINA GETTING?, AND WHAT IS ANKARA BUILDING?
For Pristina, the signal is clear and direct. The early acquisition of FPV drones gives the Kosovo authorities the feeling that they have concrete and visible support from Ankara. This does not mean only a new technique, but also a signal of political support: the fact that the delivery arrived earlier than planned can be interpreted as a confirmation that Ankara wants to strengthen its role in Kosovo. This raises the confidence of the Kosovo leadership and lowers the threshold for escalation. In practice, Pristina gains a tangible deterrent capacity, reinforced by a political signal from Ankara.
For Brussels and Washington, this development of the situation opens up a new dilemma. Should they tolerate the growth of Turkish influence as a factor that can contribute to stability or try to set stricter standards that would limit Ankara? Erdogan sees an opportunity here: the fact that Turkey, according to the rotational principle, is just taking over the command of KFOR and at the same time supporting Pristina, gives it additional importance and a negotiating card towards the EU and the USA.
The bigger picture shows that Ankara combines three elements: arms exports, political presence and institutional role. In this way, it supports its narrative of concern for Muslim communities in the Balkans, but also confirms itself as an indispensable actor in the regional security architecture.
In this framework, Belgrade remains an important partner when it comes to economy and investments, but it is not the axis around which Ankara will sacrifice its strategic influence in Pristina. In other words, Serbia is seen in Turkish politics as a field for business cooperation, while Kosovo is a field for strategic influence.
BELGRADE BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY
Belgrade reacted according to the tried and tested pattern. In the first days, harsh statements from the top of the state followed, Vučić interpreted Ankara's move as a desire to destabilize the region and evidence of "Ottoman ambitions", while calling for a violation of international law. A few days later, however, the tone was toned down. The president said that his job is to build relations and that he will try to solve the problem by talking directly with Erdogan, recalling that he had discussed this topic with him before.
Behind the correction of the rhetoric, there is also a political cost on the domestic front. For years, Vučić built the narrative that Serbia can "sit on more chairs", that it is just as good with Moscow and Beijing as it is with Brussels, Washington and Ankara. The key to that balance, as he presented it, was allegedly his personal contacts, charm and ability to resolve matters through direct conversation. In reality, that model was usually driven by bare trade and a pragmatic exchange of interests rather than diplomatic skill.
In recent weeks, we see how one by one the "chair" from that balancing story is slowly slipping away. The arrival of drones in Pristina completely shattered that myth. Decisions are not made because of friendly words or alleged personal sympathies, but if and when interests coincide. At such a moment, relying on private channels becomes an anecdote and not a realistic political option.
As a result, Vučić found himself in a double trap. If he gets tougher on Erdogan, he risks a drop in Turkish investments, job losses, and an additional and deeper approach of Pristina to Ankara. If he remains silent and asks for a "conversation between friends", he sends a message of impotence to the electorate for whom Kosovo is a red line, a sensitive topic and proof of the state's strength.
For now, President Vučić has opted for a balancing tactic: loud enough messages to show a reaction, followed by easing tensions so as not to provoke a reaction. But this raises the question of the sustainability of his foreign policy - how long can the story of "fraternal ties" last when practice shows that friendships do not stop arms deliveries, nor change the course of strategic decisions?
THE END OF A FOREIGN POLITICAL ILLUSION
The region is entering a period in which escalation is faster and de-escalation is more expensive. KFOR is still the key security valve, but Turkey, as the commander and at the same time the supplier of weapons to Pristina, is changing the perception of neutrality and the situation on the ground.
The end of an illusion, however, does not necessarily mean the end of rational politics. Serbia still has room to do what it usually avoids: to acknowledge reality, translate it into a plan and renounce the fog. Instead of looking for a "great friend" who will save Belgrade's interests with one phone call, we should invest in diplomatic discipline that does not threaten what it cannot fulfill, and in a European course that, however slow, remains the only framework that narrows the space for solo games of regional powers.
In other words: singing time Osman age is finished. In October 2025, Turkish drones landed in Pristina, and with them the realization that the "brotherly tone" does not count when strategic interests come into play. Ankara has clearly shown that it will be an ally of Pristina and at the same time an economic partner of Belgrade. Serbia now has to choose - whether it will continue to live in empty narratives or whether it will finally enter politics based on plans, procedures and capacities.
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