Brussels has never been further from Belgrade

Attitude towards to the European Union it was always a question of value determination of society. From the very beginnings of the establishment of ties between the then still European Community and the SFRY, those relations spoke volumes about the course that Yugoslavia took, not only in foreign policy. Close connections and, later, the beginning European integration they meant that the prevailing current in the country is more democratic, more liberal, more dedicated to the classic values ​​of liberal democracy, such as freedom or the rule of law.

On the contrary, moving away from European integration meant looking for political models in other parts of the world, where some different values ​​were and remain dominant. Marko Nikezić, one of the greatest Serbian politicians, said back in the early seventies that Serbian nationalists were "naturally directed towards the Russians, not because of Slavism" but because they would like this country to be "governed in the Russian way", i.e. autocratic. Every story about Serbia and the European Union is inextricably linked to the value determination of Serbian society.

WESTERN COURSE

The European Union was part of the inspiration for the generations that overthrew Milosevic. A community of states where the government is elected in free elections, where the media is free and professional, where the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary are respected, where differences are accepted and hatred is sanctioned, all of this seemed like an ideal to someone who had to face Milosevic's criminal regime, which sowed the dead from Vukovar to Fruška Gora. The European Union also represented a strong ally. Not always and not without the usual foreign policy and geostrategic compromises, but the EU was clearly on the side of the opponents of the Milosevic regime. Both sides in that alliance - both the Serbian opposition and critical public and EU leaders - recognized the common political values ​​they shared, and therefore found their own interests to enter into a stable partnership.

All governments after 2000 until this one, vampirized radicals, were pro-European. Even Koštunica, who discovered Euroscepticism in his later years, did not for a single moment stop the process of joining the European Union. Moreover. Democratic options in Serbia, be they liberal, social democratic or conservative, recognized in the EU at least a useful ally, if not the natural environment to which Serbia belongs.

Boris Tadić won in 2008 with a clear pro-European and value story. It was the central theme of the campaign and enabled the formation of the Democratic Party government after Kostunica's conservatives, who opposed Europe with the highly electorally potent issue of Kosovo. The process of formal negotiations began, and words such as cluster, benchmark, joint asset or screening came into vogue. The whole process took on a terrifying bureaucratic dimension, which, due to the fault of the Serbian authorities and civil society, as well as the fault of the EU itself, overshadowed any meaningful explanation and reason for accession.

AND THEN THEY CAME

However, despite this bureaucratization and the huge gap that has been created for years between citizens and European integration, Vučić's disguised radicals still came to power on a pro-European agenda. Moreover, they claimed that they can do it faster and better, that they will deal with corruption, which is one of the key obstacles to the reforms necessary for building the rule of law, and therefore for joining the club of European states.

Citizens are not the only ones who have swallowed this rhetoric. Grassroots populism based on media arrests of previously demonized individuals - which always destroys the rule of law and never builds it - has met with approval even in the EU structures and in part of the member states. It should already have been a signal that many in the EU, if they managed to mix the witch hunt and the institutional fight against corruption, have moved quite far from their own values.

As in the story of the scorpion and the frog, Vučić's government quickly showed its nature. Building an autocratic state in itself is the complete opposite of the values ​​on which the European Union was founded. A democratic state system, which implies at least relatively free and fair elections and media pluralism, is the absolute minimum for the state to be able to think about meeting the political criteria for EU accession. And of course, it is not enough either, because it is only the basis on which independent institutions are later built, the separation of powers, the protection of marginalized groups, the rule of law, the fight against crime and corruption, good neighborly relations...

Even such an absolute minimum was not satisfied by Vučić's government, because all elections after 2012 were burdened with irregularities, which increased as time went on. Calls to the authorities to continue with reforms or to improve legislation were meaningless in themselves. Autocratic government is not reformed, it is destroyed, because as soon as the ruler has autocratic tendencies, it means that he has no intention of establishing democracy.

Today, Serbia and the European Union are further apart than ever after 2000. The process of European integration has long been stopped. There are no new chapters, not even their opening, let alone the closing. When compared with neighboring countries that are on this path, primarily with Montenegro, but increasingly with Albania, Serbia is significantly lagging behind. The National Convention for the EU, a wide network of civil society to which the Serbian parliament and the government formally assigned a place in the entire process of EU integration, froze cooperation with the authorities in Serbia due to actions during student and civil demonstrations. At the same time, the program council of the Convention is largely composed of sector representatives known for their close cooperation and numerous partnership projects with institutions, and not humanitarians from whom a more radical response to autocratic tendencies in Serbia would be expected. All these are indicators that the Serbian government is no longer on the road to European integration.

CROSSING THE POLITICAL BORDER

Despite all this, the integration process still formally exists on paper. The leaders of the European institutions are still trying to squeeze out the old stuff when it comes to that process and to emphasize their support for Serbia's European path, even though it is clearly clear to them that Serbia has long since deviated from that path. Diplomatic statements, and even those that go beyond the framework of formal diplomacy, are heard from Brussels officials even today when the regime of Aleksandar Vučić uses naked force against its opponents and when the last remnants of the rule of law in Serbia have been trampled.

Many attribute this behavior to simple interests and the alliance between Brussels and Vučić, which has its weight and is measured in lithium or similar strategic raw materials. However, this is a simplified view of European and world politics, which is more suitable for conspiracy theories than for serious analysis. The reasons are much more complex and there are certainly at least three types.

For one, it is certainly partly the desire to keep a country on the path of European integration, no matter how purely formal it may be. This, at least according to those who believe in such a strategy, keeps Serbia out of the influence of Putin's regime, prevents its complete slippage into the pro-Russian camp, and thereby prevents the possible consequences of such an act for peace and stability in the Western Balkans.

This is an old tactic that has been used for a long time in the foreign policy relations of Europe and the West in general with other countries. Keeping a country in its own orbit, i.e. tying it to itself, which to a large extent implies subservience to its leadership and encouraging small steps forward, all with the aim of preventing that country from completely turning to a geopolitical adversary, is a legitimate and often applied tactic.

However, this tactic has its clear limitations. First, it cannot be applied at every historical moment, ie. requires historical circumstances that favor this tactic. It can never be based only on the encouragement of the state to stay in someone's orbit, but other conditions must also be met - for example, that the orbit is sufficiently strong and stable, and that the transition to other orbits contains a serious dose of risk that must be reckoned with.

In today's multipolar world, these are conditions that, while they still exist, are nowhere near as clear as they were 15 or 20 years ago. Second, such a tactic only makes sense if it does not jeopardize the essential values ​​on which the alliance should rest. When that limit is crossed, it no longer makes sense to hope that with a simple pat on the shoulder you will convince the government to remain loyal to you, and not to autocratic regimes with which you get along much better.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN ATM

The second body of reasons is much more prosaic and, unfortunately, more disastrous in the long run. And many in the EU institutions are not very clear why this community was created and what are its key advantages. Instead of the largest peace project in the world and a community based on the ideas of freedom, justice and democracy, they offer some kind of trade alliance, a simple economic union where measures are used exclusively in pre-accession funds. This reduces the EU to an ATM, which serves only to take money and thereby the joining country has a tangible financial interest.

Although countries that accede to the EU undoubtedly benefit enormously, which has long been an empirically proven fact because no one has become poorer for joining the EU, this has never been a key reason for the attractiveness of EU integration. Other powers in the world, for example China, have money, which is even more available because it is not subject to strict anti-corruption restrictions as in the case of EU funds.

The European Union has always had something else - a specific value base that it offers to its citizens. Citizens whose countries are in the EU enjoy the highest possible legal and any other protection in the world, thanks to the supranational creation that is able to guarantee the protection of fundamental rights or at least force member states to behave within acceptable frameworks when it comes to these rights. Of course, this does not mean that there are not serious problems in almost all member states, but these problems are incomparable to any other part of the world, including recently the USA.

Europe is the part of the world where you will most likely encounter illegal arrests, police torture, institutionalized discrimination, toxic chemicals in food, water or toys, polluted air or simply a neighbor who breaks the rules with impunity and threatens your peaceful life. No doubt one can be richer in a Middle Eastern semi-slave state, but it pretty much depends on what gender, nationality, religion, skin color you are, or who you know in the caste system of social power. Countries where there are still re-education camps for the unfit, where you get locked up if you type the wrong word on a social network, or where people disappear for holding a white paper are not even worth mentioning in this context.

photo: fonet/instagram of the president of Serbia

NEGATIVE SELECTION

The third group of reasons for this behavior of the EU towards the Serbian authorities is even more prosaic. It contains several related elements. For one thing, the quality of the people who govern the states has obviously declined all over the world, including in Europe. Fewer and fewer capable and educated people want to engage in public affairs, which inevitably affects negative selection and the quality of decisions. This is especially visible when making strategic, long-term decisions, which in themselves require an analytical mind, the ability to predict events, but also clear value convictions. Negative selection descends vertically, so here too we often have the opportunity to watch third-rate bureaucrats from member states make important decisions in the EU delegation in Belgrade.

This is especially noticeable when they are compared to their incomparably more capable colleagues - local citizens, who, unfortunately, due to their citizenship, have a limit to the extent to which they can influence the policy of the delegation in which they work. Undoubtedly, this group of reasons also includes the simple economic interest of individual governments and even individuals in European countries. Sometimes it is about the purchase of expensive weapons or the guarantee of access to rare resources, which the Serbian government at least partially pays for a lenient treatment in important European capitals, and again, sometimes it is about the most ordinary corruption, when the government in Serbia directly bribes important European officials to work in its favor. Although, of course, we have no evidence of a specific case of corruption, it would be unacceptably naive to think that of all the politicians in the world, only those in European institutions are immune to such practices.

RESENTMENT AND DISAPPOINTMENT

All these reasons together lead to the actions of the EU, which causes a wave of indignation and disappointment among a large part of the public in Serbia. This very fact confirms the thesis that the EU was never just a simple trade union. If they did not expect her to support values ​​such as freedom and justice, citizens would not be so angry.

There has not yet been a recorded case of anyone being surprised that the authorities in China, Russia or Israel did not support the democratic forces in Serbia. The expectation threshold, established in the last century, is drastically different when it comes to the EU. She is expected not to turn a blind eye to the abuse of institutions, to the thugs who, under the direction of the authorities, break the jaws of female students, to political prisoners, of which there are too many in Serbia today, starting with six people in Novi Sad who have been in prison for the second month as hostages of a crazed regime. This disappointment also manifests itself on the streets, where there are no European flags. Although I would prefer them to be there, I not only understand why they are not there, but I think that their absence can be beneficial for the EU as well.

Every flag, including the European one, must deserve to be respected and loved by citizens. In Georgia, she obviously deserved it, as well as in Serbia at the beginning of the 2000s. But in Serbia today it is a source of disappointment. When it starts to be worn again on the streets of Belgrade and other Serbian cities, it will be a sign that the EU has come back to itself, that it has realized what is its key comparative advantage in the multipolar world and why people in the 1980s jumped over barbed wire under machine guns to come to Western Europe. There was also bread in Eastern Europe. But there is no freedom. Gentlemen, European officials, put freedom back on the star-spangled flag, and we will see it again on the streets of Serbia.