For the first time after coming to power, progressives enter election process with an uncertain outcome. Despite various attempts to shake it, the student list not only stabilized but also increased its support. The main problem of the regime is not the loss of its own voters, but the mobilization of the anti-regime bloc, which the students managed to unite around one political idea and thus change the balance of power on the political scene.
By challenging public opinion polls that are not in its favor and by insisting on a narrative of invincibility, the regime is trying to consolidate its electorate and demobilize the opposition. This shows how important it is for the regime to control the public's perception of the electoral prospects. Although the political struggle is currently focused on the elections, the key task after the eventual change of government will be a deep institutional reform, in order to establish the conditions for a functional democracy, the rule of law and fair elections.
These are the highlights of the conversation with Vuj Ilic, a research associate at the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade, who has extensive experience in various political researches, including public opinion polls.
The results of several surveys of the political preferences of Serbian citizens, which were published in the past month or so, despite certain differences, they speak one thing: the regime in Serbia has big problems, he seems to have run out of time. What trends?, in your opinion, we can recognize when we compare the results of these polls in relation to those published at the beginning of this year and during the previous year?
Compared to last year, when we saw the majority of citizens supporting the student demands, as well as the movement itself, this year's surveys clearly outline support for the electoral list proposed by the students. The main finding of the last few researches is that there are two clear poles according to which citizens are determined, namely the Serbian Progressive Party and the announced student list, whose support seems stable. If similar results continue and are confirmed by other surveys, it will be the first time since the SNS became the dominant party 12 years ago that the general elections are contested with an uncertain outcome. But this expected level of electoral mobilization is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for an electoral reversal. Much will depend on the election conditions before the election and on the day of the vote, on how the votes for the lists will be translated into parliamentary mandates and on whether the results will be recognized by all participants.
To what extent do these results indicate that the regime has lost the support of part of the citizens, and to what extent the students are like new, an extremely powerful political phenomenon, managed to attract abstainers and undecideds? In that regard, who has more potential for growth?
In my opinion, it's about the latter - the regime parties didn't lose support so much as the students gathered anti-regime-oriented citizens, and those who were previously for opposition parties, as well as former abstainers and undecideds. I do not see a significant potential for an authentic growth of support for the authorities, their additional electoral advantage would rather be achieved through electoral engineering, clientelism and propaganda. I assume, on the other hand, that there will be a reorganization within the anti-regime bloc rather than some breakthroughs towards the electorate of the progressives. Society is almost completely polarized into the regime and anti-regime bloc, and I don't believe that there are many who will switch to the other side at the last moment. Rather, it is about how much the parties in power can maintain control over their electorate and how many undecideds and abstainers can be reached by the student list.
Does this mean that the analysts who say that the regime is not trying to win over new voters are right?, but only to strengthen his own electorate? And does it succeed in that?? That is, is it so homogeneous that there is no possibility of further crowning of the SNS rating a?
I share that opinion. The political messages and measures that are adopted are mainly aimed at preserving the existing support, rather than at winning over new voters. Also, I think that the convictions of the citizens who still support the government are firm. There are, however, lines of division within that body that could be activated, primarily related to the relationship towards Kosovo and Russia. Those potential problems are properly repaired, after the demolition of the buildings at Gazivode, a message is sent about diverting the flow of the Ibar, and after Zelenski's visit, Vučić emphasizes that we have not imposed sanctions on Russia.
But even if there are SNS voters who would like a clearer anti-Western policy and a more energetic attitude towards Kosovo, the question is whether this dissatisfaction can have consequences for the support of the government. The sentiments of voters are one thing, and the behavior of political actors is another. When two poles are formed, as now, smaller actors within the blocs gain importance, so it is necessary to monitor how the functionaries of the parties that make up the ruling coalition will behave, including the parties of national minorities, which have a special weight because the three percent census does not apply to them.
photo: marija janković...
We see that the regime is investing a lot of energy in denying the results of the research we are talking about. Can this be interpreted as a fear that their electorate will be shaken if the myth of Vučić's invincibility is destroyed??
Maintaining the belief in invincibility in elections serves to deter one's own voters from changing sides, and to demobilize opposition voters. That is why an extraordinary effort was made to discredit the research presented by Crta. Most of the attacks did not even deal with the content, but were directed at Crta as an organization, and part at the methodology. In both cases, it was persistent repetition of easily verifiable falsehoods, for example, the claim that the sample was 558, not 2.324 respondents. All this shows how much they cared about covering up the finding that had the most resonance with the public with false narratives.
As the elections approach, we can expect the gap between the survey results to widen, as was recently the case in Hungary, where after the elections it was shown that agencies close to the government continuously underestimated Tisa and overestimated Fidesz. It is important that we understand this already: on the one hand, there will be organizations that conduct methodologically based research and act in the public interest, such as Crta, and on the other hand, there will be percentages that will serve as an instrument of the campaign.
What is specific about these researches and the entire political scene is the fact that citizens do not yet know the names of those who will be on the student list., and not even who and how makes the decision about who will be on it. Will releasing names help or hurt the student list?, given two expected circumstances: it is certain that there will be many distinguished names on the list, but also that the regime will lead a very dirty campaign against the people who will be there?
The process of compiling the student list is specific, it is a long and complex pre-selection process carried out by a social movement that is not public. All these elements are a consequence of the specificity of the political situation in Serbia. In this sense, every statement by citizens about a list that has not yet been formed or publicly presented should be understood as support for the idea of a student list, rather than as a projection of its result in hypothetical elections.
But as time goes by, my impression is that for a growing part of those citizens, that support is an expression of trust in the student movement and in the way it compiles the list. Both of the components you mention may affect support for the actual list in the actual election, but I think the changes will be marginal. Those who support the student list do not care what the pro-government media say. On the other hand, support has not been conditional on specific names so far, so it would be surprising if it became crucial now. If there is a change, it will be a consequence of the political attitude towards the composition of the list rather than a dirty campaign.
photo: marija janković...
Can research give us an answer to a question that is often asked right now?, which has already become boring, but still important what is the best recipe for victory against the regime? Would the referendum atmosphere, that is, one list was the only solution, or more columns can bring victory, in the sense that I can "to seize" a larger number of citizens?
This is where research on support for political options comes into contact with the issue of the electoral system, that is, the way in which votes are translated into mandates. In Serbia, with a proportional system and one electoral unit, the disparity between votes and mandates is mostly influenced by the electoral threshold. That is why every actor from the anti-regime bloc should ask themselves how to ensure that every vote is given to an authentic opposition list that will pass the census and participate in the distribution of mandates. By authentic, I mean lists whose MPs would form a majority in which SNS would not participate.
It is true that a larger number of opposition lists can increase the number of voters, and it should also be borne in mind that it brings a larger number of members of electoral committees. But the greater the number of such lists, the greater the possibility that opposition votes will fall apart under the census. That's why I'm not in favor of deciding in advance whether the solution is in one, two or three lists; there simply isn't enough reliable data yet on what would be optimal. It is a question of coordination and expectations that will be answered more precisely when we get closer to the elections, maybe only when they are announced. The point is that, when you come to the conclusion of what the solution is, act in that direction. Action at that moment will be the most important for the further perception of the majority of opposition parties.
We still do not know when the parliamentary elections will be announced, so we can hardly say with certainty that they will be premature at all, despite Vučić's numerous announcements. In this regard, I have two questions: first, did Vučić achieve the desired effect with the announcements of the elections and reconciled the students civil protests; else, from the regime's perspective, when it is best for them to call elections? Is time his ally, is it better for him to call parliamentary and presidential elections at the same time, or in any order?
Until now, special elections have been called when they carried little risk and brought some profit. We could break down that profit into spending the limited opposition resources in grueling serial elections, postponing commitments and expectations on the external front and, in my opinion, the most important thing for maintaining the regime, postponing the date of regular elections, which must be held on a certain date, regardless of the situation in the country.
Bearing in mind everything we have talked about, first of all that special elections would now carry a great risk without a pronounced profit, there is no clear incentive to call them. This means that at this moment, regular elections are the best solution for the government, but the delay also has its price, because the deadline for the regular elections has not been moved either. I do not believe that the non-announcement so far has significantly harmed the support for the student movement, it is more stable than anyone could have expected at the beginning of last year. Constantly repeating that there will be early elections is part of the tactics used by Vučić to address his base, not the opposition, assuring them that the challenge is not as big as it really is. As for the order, I don't think any option should be ruled out. Although it currently seems that extraordinary parliamentary elections followed by presidential ones are the most likely, it is also possible to change that calculation.
Given that the mode is in the campaign, Vladimir Zelenski's visit to Serbia is very interesting, which you mentioned. She definitely did not please the electorate of progressives. How can it be assessed?? Was it forced?, in the sense that Vučić is trying to regain the shaken Western support, or it can be read from other angles as well?
The way the visit was treated in the pro-government media clearly shows that its purpose was foreign policy and that it should have been isolated as much as possible from domestic political dynamics. The fact that it was announced in the first half of the year, when the government was actively working on fulfilling the conditions and gaining support for the opening of Cluster 3, speaks in favor of the fact that it was somewhat late. But Zelenski's explicit support for Serbia's European integration will certainly be used in the next attempt to open the cluster, in persuading the EU members who objected to Serbia the most because of their relations with Russia to change their position.
So, rather than trying to influence general relations with the West, I think the visit had a very specific role. However, even a change in the attitude of the strongly pro-Ukrainian members would not solve the objections regarding the rule of law. In addition, Zelensky confirmed Ukraine's position on non-recognition of Kosovo, which is a foreign policy plus for Vučić. That is why it is justified to ask why Zelensky agrees to it - I think that military cooperation is crucial here. The fact that it is publicly denied brings us back to the internal political aspect and to the problem that its scope can represent for the majority pro-Russian electorate of progressives.
At the end, the question of all questions What after Vučić?? The new government will inherit a completely messed up state institutional and economic system, deeply corrupt and criminalized state, damaged regional and inter-national relations, unclear relations with the EU and other centers of world power...
It is realistic to expect a long period of transition, the first government after SNS will be able to start, but not implement democratic consolidation. That will probably have to wait for the next government. Of all the tasks, it seems to me that institutional reform is the most important in the long term. It is clear that today, when the political struggle is conducted in unequal conditions, the focus must be on the campaign and election day, and that it is difficult to allocate capacities for designing the phases that will follow in predictable order after the elections. But that very experience must be a guide in how to transform institutions so that such conditions do not repeat themselves. Even if there is fragmentation within the new parliamentary majority, the priority should be to establish new foundations for the functioning of democratic institutions: from electoral laws, through the media environment and the rule of law, to accountability mechanisms for human rights violations. This could then have a beneficial effect on the other inherited ones as well
problem.
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