Montenegro is already on the highway to to the European Union, but nobody presses the gas all the way in that drive. Not because the road is impassable, but because speed is no longer just a technical issue, but a matter of political calculations and decisions. In the Balkans, hardly anyone openly opposes Europe, but from the domestic political aspect, the pace at which it is moving towards it is much more important. That is why it is sometimes more important than the one who presses the gas pedal, the one who keeps his foot on the brake and for what reasons. Montenegro's entry into the EU is not only a matter of internal changes in this country, but also an event that greatly changes the image of the Western Balkans.
Therefore, if Montenegro's European path is viewed today without political romance, the key dilemma is no longer whether the country will enter the European Union, but when and under what conditions. The formal plans – closing the negotiation chapters by the end of 2026 and potential membership around 2028 – are still current. But they are not technical deadlines, but political goals. And politics, unlike negotiation hodograms, does not work linearly.
STRETCHABLE CONSENSIS
Essentially, in Montenegro, the European path is not disputed, but it is being slowed down, redirected or stretched more and more often. Not by direct opposition of political actors, but by a series of seemingly unrelated moves that together produce the same effect - loss of momentum.
As a rule, the broad consensus on EU integration disappears or becomes much narrower the moment one moves from the field of political declarations to the field of concrete demands. European integration, especially in the final phase in which Montenegro is in, is essentially no longer a matter of harmonizing laws but of redistributing power. This is the framework in which the real problems arise. This is most clearly seen in Chapter 23, which refers to the judiciary and fundamental rights. Here, the European Union is not looking for declarations, but results: an independent judiciary, effective judgments in cases of high corruption, control of the financing of political parties and a stable institutional framework. Each of these points directly affects the political system.
That is why it is not surprising that the most visible delays are in that area. Months of blockades and political trading around the election of judges of the Constitutional Court of Montenegro, disputes over their mandates, and even rare situations in which legal dilemmas are resolved by political domination, and not by the institutions that should decide on it. It is not about isolated incidents, but about a pattern that shows the extent to which the judiciary is still a political space.
Similar logic applies to other segments of this chapter. The law on the financing of political subjects and campaigns has been the subject of discussion for years, but without any substantial progress. Control of money flows in politics remains limited, sanctions are weak, and supervision is insufficiently effective. The European Commission persistently warns about this, but without a visible political consensus to really solve the problem.
The media space is not exempt from that pattern either. Controversies surrounding the management of RTCG and regulatory bodies show how the control of public discourse remains an important political issue. In a system where the media is part of the political arena and not its corrective, European standards become a requirement.
POLITICAL CALENDAR AND REFORM PROCESSES
If Chapter 23 is the space where politics defends itself, then Chapter 24 is the space where security and geopolitical interests are broken. This includes issues of visa policy, migration, the fight against organized crime and the functioning of the security sector. Seemingly technical, these issues are primarily political in the Montenegrin context.
The inconsistency of the visa regime with EU standards, the slow pace of reforms of security institutions and occasional political discussions about the role and control of those structures point to the fact that the state has not yet completely closed the space for political influence where the EU expects institutional autonomy. European partners do not see it as a technical shortcoming, but as an indicator of the resilience of the system.
In addition, there are other chapters that, although less politically visible, can become a problem if the political context weakens administrative capacity. Chapter 27, which relates to the environment, is already lagging behind in the implementation of its obligations. Its specificity lies in the fact that it depends on local self-governments, which will be additionally burdened with political struggle in the period before the unified elections in 2027. In such an environment, technically demanding reforms easily fall into the background.
The same applies to the field of public procurement. Although formally closed, any political decision that deviates from European standards of transparency can reopen the question of trust. In the pre-election context, when the pressure for quick investments and visible projects grows, the risk of such moves becomes greater.
All this is happening at a time when the political calendar is starting to take control of the reform process. The unified elections of 2027 are already shaping political behavior. European integrations are long-term, complex and often abstract, while identity themes are immediate, emotional and mobilizing.
The experience of previous years shows that political crises in Montenegro rarely arise because of the economy or European chapters. Much more often, they are related to issues of identity, history or relations with, say, the Serbian Orthodox Church or religious communities in general. From the Fundamental Treaty that led to the fall of Dritan Abazović's government to the occasional political conditioning related to resolutions and identity themes - the pattern is clear: political energy is directed to issues that bring political points, but not European progress.
In such an environment, the interest of some political actors becomes logical. It is not about opposition to the European path, but about its control. Reforms are acceptable as long as they do not threaten existing power relations. A European course is desirable as long as it does not require too much political sacrifice. Anything beyond that enters the risk zone.
photo: fonet/ndssJarinje, March 2026.
"SERBIAN WORLD" AND THE EUROPEAN PATH
This internal dynamic takes on an additional dimension when viewed from a regional perspective. Very often in the political discourse of Montenegro, there is the claim that Serbia, through its "political satellites", is trying to slow down Podgorica's European path. The role of Serbia and the politics of Aleksandar Vučić, above all of what is defined as the "Serbian world", cannot be reduced to simplified assessments, but certain interests are hard to dispute.
The status of Kosovo remains a central issue for Serbia. In such a context, the dynamics of the European integration of neighboring countries acquires special importance. The rapid integration of Montenegro would mean an additional separation of political flows in the region and a reduction of Belgrade's room for maneuver in its relations with the European Union.
At the same time, Montenegro is an area where Serbia has a deep political, media and social influence. By joining the EU, that space would narrow institutionally, and external influence would become more difficult to sustain. This does not necessarily mean active obstruction, but it does mean a rational interest in the process not proceeding too quickly.
In addition, Aleksandar Vučić's policy is largely based on the position of regional stability factor. That position has weight only if stability is not complete and thus requires constant political management. Fast and successful integration of Montenegro into the European Union would reduce the need for such a role.
In this sense, the interests of domestic political actors and regional politics are not identical, but overlap. Some want slower reforms to preserve internal control, others want a slower pace to preserve regional influence and negotiating position. No formal coordination is required for the result to be the same. It is enough that the political system continuously produces topics that are not European.
INVESTMENTS AND POLITICAL PROFIT
The structure of investments in Montenegro is rarely seen as a political issue, but in the context of European integration it undoubtedly becomes one - not because of the size of the capital itself, but because of the way in which the economy, rules and influence are intertwined.
Today, a significant part of investments comes from countries that are not part of the European Union, among which Turkey is particularly visible, but also from Serbia, which has a specific position in the Montenegrin economy. These investments are mainly in sectors that give quick results - such as real estate, tourism and trade - but also media, and often operate in a space that is both market and political.
With the entry of Montenegro into the EU, the space for political arrangements, privileged investors or informal agreements would be significantly narrowed. Investments from Serbia, which today often have an advantage, would lose that specific status. The fact is that investments from Serbia are particularly sensitive in this sense, because they are often intertwined with broader social and political ties. They are not only an economic category, but also a channel of influence.
By entering the European Union, that space would be narrowed, not because such influence would be prohibited, but because it would be more strictly regulated. Ownership transparency, market control and unique business rules make it difficult to turn economic influence into political influence. Therefore, the question of investment in this context is not reduced to where the capital comes from, but to how it affects political decisions. Precisely because of this, the way in which these investments are politically defended and fit into the existing system has a real intention to slow down the European processes in Montenegro, regardless of how the capital is politically colored.
ACCESSION MOMENTUM
Therefore, in the next two years, Montenegro faces not only the question of reforms, but also the question of priorities. Whether the European agenda will remain central or will be relegated to the background will depend above all on internal political decisions.
At this stage of negotiations, the key resource is no longer political support, which undoubtedly exists, but time. Montenegro has advanced the farthest in the region, but that is precisely why there is no room for stagnation. If it loses its momentum, it will not lose its European perspective, but it may lose its chance to enter the European Union at a time when the Union is ready for enlargement.
And such moments do not come often.
