The war in Ukraine, which Moscow started four years ago with the ambition to consolidate its sphere of influence, prevent further rapprochement with Kiev NATO- and confirm the status of a great power, it turns into a process that has a very opposite effect. Instead of consolidating power, Russia today is facing a gradual but striking weakening of its geopolitical reach - both in its immediate neighborhood and at distant points on the global map.
In the shadow of the conflict with its neighbor, Russian foreign policy increasingly acts reactively and less as an initiator of international processes - which opens up space for changes in the distribution of power in the post-Soviet space, in Latin America and the Middle East. Regardless of the fact that day after day retired military personnel and other general practice experts, with a stick in front of the map, compete in forecasts of Russian "certain victories" on the Ukrainian front and grandiose geopolitical upheavals, the reality on the ground turns out to be significantly more complex - and, for Moscow, far less favorable.
After all, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia is today much more surrounded by NATO members than it was before February 24, 2022, since Finland and Sweden have meanwhile become members of the North Atlantic Alliance. As "The Economist" noted in one of its analyses, "the war that was supposed to confirm Russia's strength is increasingly exposing its structural weaknesses - military, economic and diplomatic." It is precisely these weaknesses that come to the fore today in a series of crises in which Moscow is either unwilling or simply unable to react.
Photo: AP Photo/Vahid SalemiWomen in Tehran
Caracas and Tehran: Hello, Moscow?
The last example is Venezuela and Iran. After US forces detained Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro in an unprecedented military operation at the beginning of 2026, Moscow limited itself to harsh rhetoric - without any concrete reaction. According to "Bloomberg", the security elites in Venezuela experienced this moment as a "cold shower", and described the long-standing security partnership with Russia as a "paper tiger". The same source states that Russian air defense systems and intelligence cooperation "existed more on paper than in practice."
A similar sense of insecurity is present in Havana today. The "South China Morning Post" writes that Cuba and other leftist governments in Latin America are "increasingly confronting the fact that Moscow is too busy with Ukraine to play the role of global protector."
And then there is Iran. Although militarily and technically connected to Russia, it is also aware of the limitations of that alliance. Tehran, which in the previous period provided concrete military support to Moscow by delivering Shahid drones, did not derive any real security guarantees from that partnership. Recent US strikes on Iran's nuclear infrastructure have exposed the weaknesses of the regime in Tehran, further coinciding with the latest wave of internal protests that are increasingly openly questioning the authority of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Photo: Tanjug / AP Photo/Jose Luis MaganaSupport for protesters in Iran
Avoiding confrontation
Analysts point out that more serious Russian aid to Tehran would mean a direct confrontation with the US and Israel, and this is a risk that the Kremlin, under the current circumstances, is clearly not ready to take. Moscow has also largely tolerated the destruction of Iranian proxy groups in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the Houthis in Yemen, not wanting to escalate the conflict with official Tel Aviv and the West. The BBC stated that "it is clear that Moscow is not prepared to do more than make political statements condemning Israel, nor is it prepared to provide Iran with military assistance."
Russia has also been noticeably quiet about Donald Trump's ambitions to take over Greenland and his threat to, if necessary, use American military forces to occupy the Arctic island. Apart from the sarcastic comments of the Deputy President of the Security Council of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, official Moscow did not make any significant statements regarding this issue.
South Caucasus: The end of Russian arbitration
One of the most visible signs of the weakening of Moscow's influence in the "Soviet geopolitical space" is the quiet but long-term deterioration of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan - relations that have been a pillar of Russian influence in the South Caucasus for decades. The crisis escalated in the summer of 2025, following the arrest of dozens of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia and the death of two in custody. President Ilham Ali called the incident a "barbaric attack," while Baku responded with harsh diplomatic and political measures.
Al Jazeera then assessed that this conflict "is not just a diplomatic incident, but a potential turning point in the balance of power in the South Caucasus." Following the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno-Karabakh marked the end of Russia's decade-long military presence in the region and a significant decline in its military influence, while Azerbaijan took full control of the disputed territories.
Even Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that the move "corresponds to the realities on the ground," wording that was interpreted in regional capitals as a tacit acknowledgment of a loss of influence. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has accelerated its strategic rapprochement with Turkey, the West and Israel, and the deterioration of relations between the two countries was also visible last May, when Aliyev refused to attend the Victory Parade in Moscow.
Photo: Vugar Amrullaev / Azerbaijan State News Agency Azertiac / APPresident of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev
Post-Soviet space: Allies seek alternatives
Azerbaijan is no exception. Armenia, traditionally one of Russia's closest allies, is increasingly openly expressing its dissatisfaction with what it says is "Russian passivity at key security moments." The "Moscow Times" writes that Yerevan "no longer sees Moscow as a reliable guarantor of security, but as a partner whose attention is permanently captured by the war in Ukraine."
A similar dynamic is also present in Central Asia, where Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan consciously diversify their foreign political and economic ties, strengthening cooperation with China, Turkey and the European Union. Somewhat closer to Europe, in Moldova and Georgia, under the influence of numerous Western narratives and political support, Russia's role is increasingly perceived as a factor of destabilization. This, in turn, explains the nervous reactions of the Russian security services, as well as their warnings about the alleged open "NATO threats" to these countries.
At the same time, there are signs of internal instability in the fragile and dangerous region of the North Caucasus. Speculations about Ramzan Kadyrov's worsening health condition have reopened the question of the political future of Chechnya, while Islamist and separatist tendencies are growing in Dagestan, and there is even mention of the possibility of transforming this republic into a Sharia state. Analysts warn that a more serious destabilization of the North Caucasus would represent an additional burden for Moscow, already exhausted by the multi-year war in Ukraine and Western sanctions.
Middle East: The end of Russia's "Syrian phase"
In the Middle East, Russian influence is also fading. The fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime at the end of 2024 marked the end of an era of Russian foreign policy. For years, Syria has been a symbol of Moscow's return to the world stage; bases in Tartus and Hmeimim, direct access to the Mediterranean and support for the Syrian government in the fight against the Islamic State, were proof that the Kremlin can project power beyond its immediate environment. After Assad's ouster and his escape to Moscow, Russia was forced to evacuate troops and largely withdraw from Syria.
At the same time, Russian soft power has been weakening in recent years. Media outlets like RT and Sputnik are almost completely marginalized in the West, while their platforms are restricted or removed from key digital networks. This has seriously undermined the Kremlin's ability to shape international public opinion – even in regions where it once had strong informational influence.
Photo: AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed, FileMilitary parade in Damascus
The new reality: The decline of Moscow's influence
All these episodes - from the post-Soviet space, through the Middle East, to Latin America - point to the same message: although Russia remains an important international actor, it is no longer the indispensable center of political gravity. As the "Financial Times" wrote, it turns out that the "cost of the war in Ukraine" for Russia today is reflected in the deep "long-term economic and reputational consequences" resulting from sanctions and Moscow's international isolation.
A number of other factors also contributed to the decline of global Russian influence. For years, the United States of America and other Western powers have used a range of political, economic, diplomatic, military and intelligence tools to undermine Russian interests in the post-Soviet space, Latin America and the Middle East. For years, the West provided political, financial and institutional support to pro-Western and anti-Russian movements in the countries of the former USSR, expanded NATO to the east and strengthened military and political ties with those countries.
Today, as the Kremlin tries to recoup its losses by strengthening its role in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the geopolitical map of Eurasia and the Global South is rapidly changing. In this new reality, the war in Ukraine, the longer it lasts, will not act as a source of Russian power - but more as a catalyst for its gradual global "freezing".
