Al Qaeda today is no longer the organization it was on September 11, 2001, but it has not disappeared either. Its branches are still strong in unstable parts of Africa and Asia
Abdullah al-Muhayshini no longer has to worry about US sanctions. At the end of August 2026, the Ministry of Finance SAD it removed the former jihadist preacher from the SDN list. That list includes individuals and organizations whose assets in the US are frozen and with whom American persons may not, in principle, do business.
During the civil war in Syria, Abdullah al-Muhayshini was, among other things, a religious adviser to the al-Nusra Front, which emerged from al-Qaeda, recruited fighters and participated in the construction of a government structure under the influence of the al-Nusra Front. His removal from the list is connected with the new policy of the US government towards Syria. At the same time, Washington revoked the terrorist organization designation of Front al-Nusra, i.e. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and removed HTล from the SDN list.
Twenty-five years after the terrorist attacks 11. September, it represents an interesting cross-section of the current state. Because, Al Qaeda it has not disappeared, but it is no longer the same organization as it was then. Its core is weak, while its regional branches remain operationally strong in parts of Africa and Asia. Central management and branches are increasingly distant from each other.
"Basically we have to abandon the Eurocentric view," says retired Islamologist Ridiger Loelker. He adds that al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations outside of Europe and the US have always been much more present than it seemed from a Western perspective.
This is especially true for Africa today: in the Sahel, a powerful alliance of al-Qaeda, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Community for the Support of Islam and Muslims, JNIM), has emerged, in Somalia there is a strong group of al-Shabaab, closely linked to al-Qaeda, while in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is maintained. And Afghanistan remains the refuge of that organization.
Al Qaeda itself appears less and less frequently under its own name. This is largely due to the successful fight against terrorism after 2001, says Lars Berger, professor of terrorism studies at the German Federal University. Military operations in Afghanistan, as well as cooperation between the intelligence services and the police, have significantly weakened that group. "In that sense, the 9/11 attacks were a major strategic failure for Al Qaeda," says Berger. The expected radicalization of the Arab world and the fall of the regimes there did not happen. About ten years after the attacks in New York and Washington, in May 2011, the most famous representative of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, was killed.
Al Qaeda then reorganized. "The militias were looking for areas where they could establish permanent roots - for example in parts of Africa or in Yemen," says Berger. States with weak institutions, overburdened security forces, and unresolved local conflicts have particularly favored it.
This applies, for example, to the Sahel area. Jihadi groups were able to expand their strongholds there. The Critical Threats Project's analysis of Niger shows how JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) compete for territory, fighters and resources. In June 2026, JNIM attacked Niamey International Airport.
Those successes cannot be explained only by jihadist ideology, Lolker says. They, he adds, often coincide with a kind of economy of violence. "Violence has long since become an economic factor in terrorism." Kidnappings, smuggling and robbery form a kind of "robbery economy" or "smuggling economy". There are entire "markets of violence," says Lolker. Where violence can be used to make money, jihadist organizations can win and retain people.
We should also add the weakness of the state. "If there is a relatively weak state authority or the state practically does not exist, then of course these are favorable conditions for action," says Lolker. Al Qaeda can survive where it encounters local conflicts and power vacuums.
Over the years, its strategy has also changed. Berger observes a "strategic turn": from an immediate attack on a "distant enemy" to building local structures. "Now we see an attempt to act alternatively and gradually: instead of spectacular acts of violence ordered from the highest level, smaller actions are resorted to, which are primarily initiated from below."
In the Sahel, this means forging local alliances, gaining influence in communities and controlling territory. The Critical Threats Project describes this development as "local adaptation".
Al Qaeda thus survives precisely because of its differentiation. JNIM exploits ethnic and social conflicts in the Sahel, while al-Shabaab exploits conflicts within Somalia's clan structures. The global jihadist goal remains an ideological framework, but the concrete struggle is fought at the local level.
In the battle for Al Qaeda's attention, however, it has a more powerful competitor - the Islamic State. "In the end, it all boils down to the fact that younger jihadists are more attracted to the Islamic State," says terrorism expert Benam Heidenreuther-Zaid of the Police Academy in Hamburg.
The Islamic State has carried out more "spectacular" and media-successful terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda, however, had a longer-term plan, according to Heidenreuther-Zaid, who published a comprehensive history of al Qaeda several years ago: "The Islamic State wanted to present itself and show results as soon as possible in order to grow explosively." After the expansion of the Islamic State, however, its collapse followed. Al Qaeda, by contrast, still exists โ albeit under changed circumstances.
However, for that group today, the question is whether it can replace the older generation. That is, of course, possible, says Heidenreuther-Zaid, but he warns that the Al Qaeda brand is losing its appeal more and more. It is in Europe that militant jihadism has become less attractive. This, however, does not mean that jihadist ideas have disappeared - Al Qaeda has only lost its former ability to mobilize young people in large numbers.
Al Qaeda's core is weak, but its regional branches are not. JNIM, Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in particular can gain significant influence in unstable states.
Therefore, it is difficult to answer how dangerous that organization is today. Benam Heidenreuther-Zaid points to one key blind spot: "Everyone is unanimous that there is virtually no information on Al Qaeda right now. You just don't know what they are doing right now."
Since the Hamas attack in Israel on October 7, 2023, it has also been striking how little Al Qaeda has featured in major regional conflicts. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran dominated the political and military scene.
Twenty-five years after 9/11, Al Qaeda has not disappeared, but it is not the same organization it was then. It has largely lost its global stage. That's why she learned to survive at the local level. It is not excluded that they take root in weak states so firmly and for so long that they become a permanent political and military force from a terrorist organization.
Source: DW
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