Minutes of the interrogation of Milan Nedić, ex. army general and president of the "Serbian Government", born in 1877. in Grocka, father Đorđe and mother Pelagia née Vasiljević, married, father of three children, Serbian by nationality, Orthodox faith, allegedly previously unconvicted.
*Where did the occupation of Yugoslavia by Germany find you?
- In Pale, near Sarajevo, in the capacity of commander of the southern army group.
* From whom did you learn about the capitulation of Yugoslavia?
- From the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, Army General Danilo Kalafatović.
* What did Kalafatović tell you about the capitulation, how did it come about and what tasks did he set before you as the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command?
- Kalafatović showed me an order signed by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, Army General Dušan Simović, stating that they could capitulate unconditionally.
The capitulation was due to the desertion of Croatian soldiers and officers of our army, the sudden penetration of the Germans and the disorganization that occurred in our army.
Kalafatović set me the task of going immediately to Belgrade and putting myself in the mood of Cincar Marković, as a military advisor, so that I would try in every way with Cincar Marković to get the Germans to agree that our army and its officers should not be taken into captivity in Germany, but should remain in the camps in the country.
* Who signed the act of capitulation?
– Cincar Marković and divisional general Mihailo Bodin.
* Did Cincar Marković and Mihailo Bodin, as signatories of the capitulation, be foreseen in the order sent to Kalafatović by Simović?
– They are not.
* Then how did it happen and under whose authority did the two of them sign the act of capitulation?
– It's unknown to me.
* Do you remember whose signatures were on the capitulation order addressed to Kalafatović, apart from Simović's?
- That order was signed by Simović on the left side, as Prime Minister and Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, and on the right side there was an illegible signature, under the word Commander-in-Chief, from which I conclude that it was the signature of King Peter the Second.
* Do you remember when that order was issued and what date it was?
- I don't remember when the order was issued and on what date, but Kalafatović told me that he received the order before the government left Sarajevo for Nikšić.
* How do you interpret this order that capitulation "may" be made?
Why was it said like that, that maybe there was no prospect of a fight yet?
- In my memory, it was stated in the order that unconditional capitulation could be carried out, and why it was said this way, and not that capitulation should be carried out, is unknown to me. It looks like struggle and success, in my opinion there was none at all.
* How many days before, before your arrival, did Cincar Marković leave for Belgrade at Kalafatović's place in Pale?
– One day earlier.
Before that, Cincar Marković had already been in Belgrade and signed the act of capitulation with Bodi, so he returned from Belgrade to Pale on a German plane, probably to inform Kalafatović about the signing of the act of capitulation.
At the invitation of Kalafatović from Prijepolje, I set out for Pale, but, as I said, I did not find Cincar Marković in Pale, since he left for Belgrade the day before my arrival.
* When, with whom and how did you leave Pale for Belgrade?
- I don't remember the exact date, but I think it was April 20, when I left for Belgrade by car accompanied by the assistant chief of staff of the army group, Colonel General Žarko Verić.
* Were you stopped on the way from Pale to Belgrade?
– I'm nowhere.
* How do you explain that?
- I don't know how to explain it, but I really wasn't stopped anywhere on the way, except before entering Belgrade, so when we showed our pass, then we were released.
* Who issued you a travel pass from Pale to Belgrade?
- The commander of the German troops in Sarajevo issued me an Ausweiss pass through the High Command of our army.
* How do you interpret the fact that the German commander in Sarajevo issued you an Ausweiss, when it is known that there was an order that the soldiers and officers of our army must not move anywhere from the place where they were at the moment of capitulation?
- It is true that such an order existed, but at the request of our supreme command, which was in contact with the German command in Sarajevo through an officer, I was issued a pass in order to go to Belgrade and put Cincar Marković in a good mood.
* What did you do when you arrived in Belgrade?
- As soon as I arrived at my brother Milutin's apartment, I sent a letter to one of the soldiers who came with me from Pale, to Cincar Marković, in which I begged him to make an appointment for me, either he comes to my place or I go to his.
In that letter, I also stated that I had been instructed by Kalafatović to put myself in his mood as a military advisor and that we should resolve certain issues with the Germans.
I did not receive an answer to this letter, and the soldier informed me that it was delivered to Cincar Marković.
During the same day I was interned by the Germans.
* Why and how did your internment come about and where did you have to endure it?
- Two officers of the German Feldgendarmerie, sent by the head of the Gestapo, Dr. Kraus, came to my apartment and told me to sign an act stating that I was not allowed to leave the house anywhere, otherwise the guards guarding the house would use weapons.
I was further told to put myself in the mood of General Wykes, the commander of all German troops in the Balkans.
They did not tell me the reason for the internment, but I believe that it was, as I found out later, because of the memorandum sent to Prince Pavlo when I was the Minister of the Army and Navy in the Cvetković-Maček government.
* How and from whom did you find out about the reason for your internment and what is the content of that memorandum, for whom do you say you were put in internment?
- At the time of Italy's attack on Greece, I was the Minister of the Army and Navy in the government of the Cvetković-Maček agreement.
One day Prince Pavle called me, I was with him for a briefing, and he told me that eight divisions should be sent to Macedonia, so that the Italian forces in the northern part of Albania would be tied to that area due to the presence of our forces in Macedonia.
Likewise, our divisions would have the task of preventing the bypassing of the Greek front from the right wing, if the Italians tried to do so through our territory.
Prince Pavle mentioned that in the eventual suppression of the Greeks by the Italians, i.e., the occupation of Greece, the Bulgarians could use that opportunity to realize their pretensions to Thessaloniki, and in that case the presence of our divisions down there could dissuade the Bulgarians from this intention.
Prince Pavle believed that sending these divisions to Macedonia would confirm our neutrality.
I pointed out to the prince the consequences of sending these divisions and said that it would in fact be a violation of neutrality.
The prince did not want to accept my reason, but told me to issue an order to send divisions to Macedonia.
Unable to carry out Prince Pavle's request, I drafted a memorandum, where I pointed out the reasons that the execution of this order, that is, the sending of divisions, would have serious consequences for our country.
Among other things, I mentioned Yugoslavia's unpreparedness for war and that for a long time.
I further stated that Germany is the winner in Europe, that it is strong and that it should turn in the direction of Germany and work on an agreement with it. I stated this in the memorandum in order to prove the need to maintain neutrality.
During the submission of this memorandum to Prince Pavle, there were sharper words between the two of us, so that Prince Pavle said that he could not work with me, to which I bowed and left.
One to two hours later, General Petar Pešić came to my office and read me the decree, by which I am relieved of my duties as Minister of the Army and Navy, and he takes my place.
I found out about the reason for my internment in the way that sometime in May, a German officer from the intelligence department came to me, i.e. with Prince Pavlo, about the resignation of Cvetković-Maček from the government and other matters related to it.
Sometime later, as I recall, in the month of June, two senior officers came, one a general and the other a colonel from Berlin with another Gestapo officer from Belgrade, and they also interrogated me about the memorandum, about how it came about and whether my signature was correct on that memorandum, which they showed me.
They further interrogated me about March 27 and how the coup happened.
Both that first officer from the intelligence department of the Weikes headquarters, as well as these other officers from Berlin, informed him that I had been interned for writing that memorandum.
That's how I learned from them about the reason for my internment.
* In your opinion, did this memorandum go against the interests of Germany?
- He did not go against the interests of the Germans, because he spoke in favor of neutrality, and that is what Germany wanted.
* Then how can you claim that that memorandum, which was not against the interests of Germany, but on the contrary spoke in favor of Germany, was the reason for your internment?
- The memorandum as a whole did not speak in support of Germany's interests, but there were certain parts of it that were directed against Germany.
They printed that memorandum to the German in the prisoners' newspaper, which was distributed among our prisoners, but only those parts that spoke favorably of Germany, while other parts were left out.
* Name those "parts" of your memorandum, where you spoke unfavorably about the Germans?
– I can't remember.
* Earlier, in response to the question from whom and how did you learn about the reason for the internment, you stated that the officers who interrogated you about the memorandum told you personally.
Do you still maintain that the reason for your house internment is the memorandum and was that expressly communicated to you by the officers who interrogated you?
- I retract my earlier claim that the German officers, who interrogated me about the memorandum, gave me the memorandum as the reason for my internment.
I came to this conclusion myself because they were interrogating me about the memorandum, so I believed that was the reason I was put under house arrest.
*How could you draw such a conclusion considering that the memorandum basically speaks in favor of Germany, or, as you put it, that in it you sought and advocated the neutrality of Yugoslavia, which the Germans themselves were in favor of?
- Given that I was correct both as an officer and as a citizen, I could not draw another conclusion for placing him in house internment, except for the one with the memorandum, since, as I mentioned above, I was interrogated about him.
* What happened to the army that you commanded?
- She was captured and sent to Germany.
* What happened to the officers of the southern army group that you commanded?
- They were captured and sent to Germany.
* So, your army and your officers were captured and sent to Germany; is that so?
– Yes.
* Then how did you, as the highest commander of the southern army group, stay in the country, while your soldiers and officers were driven into captivity?
- I cannot explain why I was not sent to Germany.
I think this is a simple coincidence, and I expected the whole time I was in house internment that I would be sent to Germany.
* Earlier you stated that when you were informed about the house internment, you were told not to try anything and that otherwise weapons would be used.
Explain who was guarding you while you were in house arrest and was there any kind of guard?
- There was no guard, but German patrols came from time to time and visited my house.
* So who would use a weapon in that case when there was no guard to protect you.
It appears that you were able to escape from the house where you are allegedly confined?
- As the guard of the house - housemaster, there was a Slovenian, Martin, who carried a gun and I believe that when the Germans told me not to try to escape, because weapons would be used, that they were thinking of him
- Martin, who I later found out was in the service of the Gestapo.
* How much time did you spend in house arrest?
– Until the end of July 1941.
* Who did you keep in touch with during that time and who came to you, either Germans or Serbs and for what reasons?
- In addition to the German officers, who interrogated me about the memorandum and the pact, as well as the German patrol, who visited me in three to four rounds, at the end of July, Milan Acimović and German Major Dr. Kraus, the head of the Gestapo, came to see me.
* Considering the content of your memorandum, it appears that you approved the Cvetković-Maček government pact.
You also declared yourself in front of the German officers - a general and a colonel - who came from Berlin and listened to you about the memorandum and the pact. Is that right?
- It is true that I approved the pact concluded by the Cvetković-Maček government with Germany, which I also stated in front of German officers, but this is because I considered that the pact was based on the basis of neutrality, in which Yugoslavia was supposed to remain at that time.
* Why did Aćimović and Dr. Kraus come to you?
- They came first to inform me about the situation in Serbia, then Mr. Acimović said that the commissar's administration is not capable of overcoming the civil war in Serbia and expressed the need for a greater authority to come and take the situation into its own hands.
According to him and everyone with whom Aćimović spoke, it should have been me.
I categorically refused this, saying that I was sick, one thing, and the other, that I was never interested in politics, but spent my whole life as a soldier.
In addition, I explained to them how badly I was affected by the death of my son, daughter-in-law and grandson from the bombing in Smederevo.
At this Dr. Kraus intervened, saying that if the Serbian people did not calm down, they would pay heavy casualties, advising me that I should take the situation into my own hands and place myself at the head of the Serbian people.
I rejected his proposal with the same motivation as Acimovic's.
* When were you released from house internment and who told you that?
- On the same day when Aćimović and Dr. Kraus visited me, I was released from house arrest.
Dr. Kraus told me that.
* How do you interpret the fact that you "vigorously rejected" the proposal of Aćimović and Dr. Kraus to take "the situation into your own hands as a higher authority", and Dr. Kraus released you from internment after that refusal.
That maybe Dr. Kraus didn't tell you that you were being released from house internment before the situation in Serbia was discussed and the proposal that you take that situation into your own hands?
- Kraus informed me that house internment is being lifted from me, i.e. that I am free, after all the talks and my refusal to put myself at the head of the Serbian people.
This came from the fact that Aćimović begged Dr. Kraus to lift the internment, so that I could come to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Commissariat Administration with Aćimović, so that he could familiarize me with the situation in Serbia in more detail and convince me of the need to be accepted, that is, to be placed at the head of the Serbian people.
* And do you know where the best patriots of the Serbian people were at that time?
- With Kosta Pećanac and Draža Mihailović, the patriots-Chetniks, who were with Kosta Pećanac, moved freely, and their commander himself - duke Pećanac lived in Belgrade, had just been in Belgrade, and his place of residence was somewhere in Toplica.
While the patriots-Chetniks of Draža Mihailović were in the forest.
For the first time in the preserved records, Milan Nedic is mentioned as a candidate for the president of the Serbian government of Quisling, in a report dated July 14, 1941. Einsatzkommando Sipo and SD submitted in Belgrade by one of the most informed German agents in Belgrade from that period, journalist Miodrag Savković. Among other things, he wrote: "The article by Đorđe Perić, deputy commissioner of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, about the case of Milan Nedić, met with a great sensation. That article was published in New Time* and contains claims that Nedic was for peace with Germany, and not for war, as the warmongers claimed...
** In the mentioned article by Đorđe Perić, it was said, among other things: "General Milan Nedić, the Minister of Defense at the time, did not want to agree with this attitude of anticipation." Starting from the point of view that Yugoslavia must actively protect the peace of the Balkans, he proposed to the government that the Yugoslav army occupy Thessaloniki and thus prevent the English from landing at this important strategic point of the Balkan Peninsula...
At the same time, General Nedić proposed a complete agreement between Yugoslavia and Germany, since both countries had the same interest, namely, to preserve the Balkan peace from English disturbances and military undertakings.
But the solution that General Nedić proposed to the Yugoslav government fundamentally undermined English plans and calculations. It was in the interest of the English to form a front against Germany in the Balkans, in order to facilitate their position on the English Channel. That is why the members of the Anglophile and Masonic circle in the then Yugoslav government: Budisavljević, Čubrilović, Konstantinović and Šutej - stood up most decisively against the proposal of General Nedić and demanded that he be removed from the government. Their anger against General Nedić was all the greater because the public believed, although completely unfounded, that General Nedić was a supporter of England and the war" (Novo vreme, July 13, 1941).
... Since Nedic has a great influence among the people, this article is very useful, to show the people what delusions foreign propaganda leads them into. The article should be completed by the author and printed in hundreds of thousands of copies, so that it should be distributed among the people through the municipalities and interpreted to the people through the people, how and why Nedic was expelled from the government of Dragiša Cvetković. On the occasion of the publication of this article, it is believed that work is already underway to entrust Nedić with some important position when he is released from slavery, so either he will be the president of the Serbian government, or he will receive the portfolio of the Serbian national army, which would be trained and guard the security of Serbia. Nedić would be able to liquidate the outlaw issue, so the calling of all taxpayers in Belgrade for the purpose of control is linked to the action of Milan Nedić...
* Archive of the Supreme Administrative Court of Serbia, BDS, no. 27527/48.
dr. Milan Borković: THE QUISLIN ADMINISTRATION IN SERBIA 1941 – 1944 CHAPTER I The formation of Nedić's "government of national salvation" and its operation until the administrative division of Serbia (December 26, 1941)
* What do you mean by patriots and on what basis do you think that the Chetniks Kosta Pećanac and Draža Mihailović were patriots?
- By "patriots" I mean those who love and protect their people, and I considered the Chetniks Kosta Pećanac and Draža Mihailović to be patriots because they appeased the Serbian people and prevented the fratricidal struggle.
* Between whom was this fratricidal struggle in the Serbian people and who caused it?
- This fratricidal struggle was between the communists and the people and was caused by the communists in order to draw the Germans to revenge against the Serbian people and in this way to force the Serbian people to flee to the forests.
In order to do this, the communists attacked the Germans and massacred them, cutting off their noses, ears, and gouging out their eyes, then they attacked the government and prominent citizens.
All of this contributed to the Germans punishing the Serbian people.
* Have you personally verified the above statements regarding communists or have you heard it from someone?
- Those were the official reports of our authorities.
* Which authorities are you referring to?
– Police authorities that remained from before.
* Did you believe those "official" reports?
- I believed and I had no reason not to believe.
* How did you know about all this, given that you stayed in house internment until the end of July, and this happened before that?
- I was informed about all this in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Commissariat Administration by Aćimović, and I personally saw and read documents about all of the above.
* When did you go after your release from house internment to the Ministry of Internal Affairs com. Administration near Aćimović and for what?
- At Aćimović's invitation, I went in the first days of August.
* Why did Aćimović invite you?
- Because of the notification about the political situation and the offer or proposal to form the Serbian government, whose representative I would be.
* What were the reasons for creating a Serbian government despite the existence of the Commissioner's Administration?
- The commissar administration had let the situation out of their hands, so that the civil war was raging on all sides, so it was believed that with the formation and arrival of a Serbian government, under the leadership of a strong authority, it would be possible to bring calm in the country and stop mutual slaughter.
* Under whose suggestions did Aćimović make the proposal for the formation of the Serbian government under a "stronger authority", which in fact were you supposed to represent?
- As he himself told me, Aćimović consulted with a large number of prominent political figures, who agreed that such a government should be formed under my leadership.
* And with whom did Aćimović consult on behalf of the German representatives and according to whose directives did Aćimović act when he proposed to you to form the Serbian government?
- With a representative of the Wehrmacht, whose name I do not remember at the moment, a representative of the board of directors of Dr. Turner and his assistant Kisl, and a representative of the Gestapo, Dr. Taus, according to whose directives he worked.
* Did you personally conduct negotiations with the above-mentioned representatives, on what occasion, where, and how many times?
- I conducted negotiations with the German representatives mentioned above only after the conference held, at which I was elected as a representative of the Serbian government, in which I was given the mandate to form that government.
* It means that Aćimović was conducting the negotiations with you himself, and received instructions for this from German representatives.
Is that right?
– That's right.
* Before the conference, where you received the mandate for government education, who among the political leaders came to you?
- Dimitrije Ljotić, Ilija Mihailović, I mean Cincar Marković and some other people, better known as respectable citizens than politicians, whose names I have forgotten.
* Did they come all together, or individually?
- They usually came individually, with the exception of Ljotić, who came together with Kronholce in several batches.
* Why did they come to you?
- To convince me that I should form the government and that they will help me in these efforts.
* Did Dr. Laza Marković come to you regarding this matter?
- He did not come to my house, but on one occasion when I was leaving the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Commissariat Administration, he approached me on the street and followed me all the way home.
On that occasion, he told me that I should educate the Serbian government, and when I remarked to him that it would be better if one of the political people did it, he explained to me that it would be better if it were a neutral person, since he would have more authority.
He also explained his opinion that I, as a non-political person
- I should form a neutral government, because if a political figure were to be taken, then there would be disagreements.
Who all the representatives of public life participated in the conference where Nedic "received the mandate" for the composition of the government during the occupation
* When was the conference held where you received the mandate for government education?
- I don't remember the date, but I think it was somewhere around the middle of August.
* At whose request did this conference come and who organized it?
- I don't know at whose request that conference came, but I think it was organized by Aćimović.
* Did Aćimović inform you that you will be nominated for Prime Minister at that conference?
- He did not inform me about this, but only sent me an invitation, that is, a letter, where it was stated that a conference of all representatives of public life would be held in the presidency of the commissioner's administration, where the situation would be discussed and that I should attend.
* Who among the representatives of public life participated in that conference?
- Representatives of chambers of commerce and industry, public workers, representatives of various political parties, representatives of the Academy of Sciences, etc.
* Who was at the conference from the representatives of the chambers of commerce and industry?
- In front of the chamber of crafts was the president of the chamber Savić, in front of the chamber of industry was Vlada Ilić, in front of the chamber of commerce I think it was Mitic, in front of the medical chamber was Dr. Mijušković.
It was also in front of other chambers of representatives, but I forgot.
I still remember that besides Mitić, there was also Aca Jovanović, a merchant, in front of the chamber of commerce.
* Who among the public workers participated in the conference?
– Miloš Trifunac, professor, Ilija Pržić, professor, Velibor Jokić, professor, Dr. Laza Kostić, professor, Dr. Aleksandar Belić, president of the Academy of Sciences.
Among the officers were: Petar Kosić, general, Panta Draškić, general, and Tasa Dinić, colonel.
* Who was the representative of the political parties?
– Kosta Kumanudi, Risto Jojić, Đuro Kotur, Dr. Miloš Radosavljević, Dr. Lazica Marković, Dr. Momčilo Janković, Dr. Milan Aćimović, Dr. Cincar Marković, Dr. Spalajković, Dr. Stevan Ivanić, Dr. Mihailo Olćan and Ilija Mihailović.
* Who was at the conference in front of the socialists?
- I don't remember if anyone was in front of them, but I know and I personally saw Živko Topalović several times at Aćimović's office.
* Who opened this conference and with what words?
- The conference was opened by Aćimović, pointing out the difficult situation and the fact that the commissioner's administration could not fulfill its duties, which is why it submitted its resignation, which was accepted and that a ministerial government with strong authority should be formed.
He put the issue of the election of the president up for discussion.
* Who all took part in the discussion and what proposals were made?
- The first to speak was Vlada Ilić, who pointed out the difficult situation and the need to form a strong government and proposed that I should form that government.
Speakers Savić, Dr. Laza Marković, Dr. Cincar Marković, General Kostić Spalajković, Momčilo Janković and Dr. Aleksandar Belić followed him.
They all agreed that such a government should be formed, at the head of which I would come. Dr. Spalajković, at my refusal, got angry and asked if I was a Serb and a soldier.
He gave such a speech that everyone approved him, and some even applauded him, so he ended it with the words that only I am able to lead the country out of the revolution.
Dr. Lazar Marković was also in favor of forming a homogeneous government made up of people with a firm hand, and later that government would be expanded and representatives of various political parties would enter it.
* How did this conference end and what conclusions were reached?
- The conference ended with Aćimović drawing a conclusion about the need to create a Serbian government, headed by me, as president.
This conclusion was adopted by all present.
* Was there any discussion at the conference about who would enter that government?
- There was no mention of people who would enter the government by name, but there was only agreement in principle that they should be strong people.
I am left with free hands as to who I will take into the government.
* Did you adopt the conclusion of the conference and accept that decision, that as the president, you will educate the Serbian government?
- I accepted that decision, with the note that I will form a government, if the Germans agree to the conditions that I will set.
* With whom of the German representatives did you conduct "negotiations" for the education of the government?
- With the delegates of the commander-in-chief of Serbia, Air Force General Dunkelman, Dr. Turner, the Chief of Administrative Staff and his assistant, Dr. Kislo.
* Describe the course of those, as you call them, "negotiations"?
- I went with Aćimović to the administrative headquarters near Turner and Kislo, and at the meeting with them, Aćimović explained that a conference was held of distinguished people, politicians and public workers, and that at that conference a unanimous decision was made to form a Serbian government headed by me, so please confirm that choice.
Turner and Kisl, after listening to Aćimović, said that they had nothing against this choice and that they were adopting it, but that they had to inform Dunkelman about it and that they would try to have Dunkelman adopt it as well.
When Dr. Turner and Kissel asked me if I was accepted to educate the government, I answered in the affirmative, with the exception that I could do so only under the following conditions.
I wrote those conditions, as far as I remember there were 16 points.
Dr. Turner told me that he would inform Dunkelman about it, that is, deliver those conditions.
I note that Dr. Turner and Dr. Kisl insisted that the government be formed as soon as possible, because otherwise Serbia will be divided into three parts and that one part will be given to the Hungarians, the other to the Bulgarians, and the third to the Croats, and that they will invade Serbia and pacify it.
* At that first meeting with Dr. Turner and Kisla, did you submit the list of ministers and the conditions under which you are accepted to form the government?
- I submitted both the conditions and the list of ministers only the next day at the second meeting with Dr. Turner and Kisla.
* At which meeting did Dr. Turner tell you, or rather insist, that a government be formed as soon as possible, because otherwise "Serbia will be divided into three parts"?
- On the first day at the first meeting.
* You previously stated that Dr. Turner and Kissl said they would deliver your "conditions" to Dunkelman, and now you claim that Turner insisted that a government be formed as soon as possible.
It means that he asks you for it, even though he doesn't know if Dunkelman will "accept" your "conditions".
Explain that?
- It is a general conversation where Turner pointed out the danger of Hungarians, Bulgarians and Croats invading Serbia, and in principle he stated that the government should be educated as soon as possible.
* When did you receive a response from Dunkelman to your set conditions and a response regarding the proposed ministers?
- Two to three days after submitting the conditions and the list of ministers.
* Who told you that the conditions were accepted, that is, did they adopt your conditions and the list of ministers?
- They adopted the list of ministers, and they mostly adopted the conditions, except for a few points.
This was communicated to me by Dr. Turner and he told me that on August 29 I have to meet with all the ministers at Dunkelman's in the National Assembly.
* Did you consult with all the ministers about joining your government?
- I am with everyone, except Aćimović, whom I knew would be accepted, so I had no need to ask him about joining my government.
* You said that you received the answer to the set conditions and the list of ministers two to three days after submission; tell me, firstly, did you consult with the ministers within that period of two to three days, and secondly, how could you consult with them about joining your government when you did not know if Dunkelman would adopt your list of ministers?
- I did the consultations within that period.
It went quickly because some ministers immediately gave their consent, as was the case with Mijušković, Trivunec, Radosavljević, Đuro Dokić, General Kostić and almost all the others.
During the consultation with them, I told them that I had proposed that they be ministers, which they will remain, if it is adopted.
That's why I was able to consult with them, making that fence.
* State the conditions you "set" for Turner, that is, Dunkelman, for the education of the Serbian government under your leadership?
- The first point of my conditions was that Serbia gets complete autonomy, that is. that the government governs the country according to our laws, both military, economic and political, and that the Germans exercise only supervisory authority.
The second point was that the government should create an armed force, i.e. manpower, and the Germans should provide weapons, in order to maintain peace and public order in the country, as well as to secure the border.
The third point called for a strict determination of how much in kind and cash donations Serbia should give to Germany.
That it should be determined exactly and adhered to, since until then the Germans were looting Serbia and taking what they wanted.
Those taxes would be personally collected by the government through its regional bodies and handed over to the Germans.
The fourth point demanded the cessation of killings of Serbs outside the borders of Serbia, and on the territory of the former of Yugoslavia.
This primarily meant the Serbs in Croatia, who were persecuted and killed by the Croats.
The fifth point demanded that the Germans do not prevent the arrival of Serbs - refugees in Serbia.
The sixth point requested the establishment of a connection between the prisoners and their families in the country, as well as to allow the sending of packages.
That the sick prisoners be released to their homes.
The seventh point of the condition was to abandon the implementation of the order issued by the German high command to shoot 100 Serbs for one killed German, and 50 for a wounded one, but to bring the culprits to court.
I don't remember the other conditions I set.
* Which of the listed conditions did the Germans accept and which did they reject?
- Of the points listed above, all were accepted, except for the last (seventh).
They refused some more minor conditions, which I don't remember at the moment.
Present the list of ministers with an indication of their department, which you proposed for your government?
— Minister President, I — MILAN NEDIĆ
Minister of the Interior of business — MILAN AĆIMOVIĆ
Minister of Construction. Eng. OGNEN KUZMANOVIC
Minister of Transport. — ĐURA DOKIĆ
Minister of Post and Telegraph. — JOSIF KOSTIĆ
Minister of Labor - PANTA DRAŠKIĆ
Minister without portfolio — MOMČILO JANKOVIĆ
Minister of Finance — Dr. LJUBIŠA MIKIĆ
Minister of Justice — Dr. CEDOMIR MARJANOVIĆ
Minister Sgt. Ex. and field — Dr. MILOŠ RADOSAVLJEVIĆ
Minister of Trade - MIHAILO OLCAN
Minister of Education - Dr. MILOŠ TRIVUNAC
Minister of Social Affairs gender and Sgt. zdr. — Dr. JOVAN MIJUŠKOVIĆ
I would like to mention that in the list of ministers, which I submitted to Dr. Turner, I put Danilo Kalafatović as the Minister of Transport, but Turner told me to change it, since prisoners from Germany, where Kalafatović was then, cannot be taken as ministers, so I put General Đura Dokić instead of Kalafatović.
Was your list adopted by the Germans - Dunkelman in the above composition?
- It is. I correct myself to the extent that I did not immediately designate Đura Dokić as Minister of Transport, but, as far as I remember, the proposal went to Kalafatović, and the Germans did not adopt it, so Josif Kostić was acting Minister of Transport until Đura Dokić joined the government.
Why did you claim that you worked on the creation of a Serbian government, consulted with ministers, submitted a list of ministers, etc. when, in fact, you received an order from the Commander-in-Chief of Serbia, Air Force General Dunkelman, to form a government with the ministers he indicated to you in his act no. 3348/41?
— I do not deny that the order was shown to me, but I declare that the order came on the basis of my proposals on the formation of the government and ministers, which I submitted to Dunkelman through Dr. Turner. Everything I said before about the formation of the government is true and I have nothing to add or change.
When and how was the Serbian government formed by the aforementioned ministers and what was its name?
— As I stated earlier, Dr. Turner told me that on August 29 I must be with all the ministers in the Assembly at Dunkelman's, so I did so and went with the other ministers to Dunkelman's on the appointed day.
Dr. Dankelman read us the declaration according to which the Serbian government is formed, with me as president and the aforementioned ministers. Dr. Dunkelman, after this announcement, i.e. reading the declaration, congratulated me first, then all the ministers in turn and wished us success in our work.
The Serbian government received the name "Serbian government of national salvation" As far as I remember, I called it that in my first speech addressed to the Serbian people after the formation of the government.
What tasks did your government set and what plan did it come up with for the "management" of the country?
— The government has set itself the following tasks:
First, to calm the country,
secondly, to form an armed force as soon as possible to support peace and order in the country, then to organize the country administratively;
to repair broken communications and to establish traffic and save the country from starvation.
Did your government manage to achieve the above tasks and in what way?
— She succeeded and pacified the country by using volunteer detachments against the communists, first in the vicinity of Belgrade, then moving towards Šumadija, and the communists invaded the Užice region from all sides and went towards Gornji Milanovac. At Gornji Milanovac, communist units and government units collided and the communists retreated in the direction of Užice in order to defend Užice, or as they called the "Soviet Republic of Užice". Then the government units, supported by German artillery and motorized vehicles, surrounded Užice in three columns and expelled the communists from the Užice district, occupying the Serbian border.
The second task of achieving order and peace in the country was achieved by the government in this way, which it formed from former non-commissioned officers and officers of the South. army volunteer detachments. The government managed to form twenty-three volunteer detachments.
The government successfully carried out the third task of administrative service, so that already on January 1, 1942, the whole country had district and county principalities and within them district and county committees. District and county chiefdoms had administrative-administrative power, while committees had self-governing power.
We carried out the fourth task of restoring traffic and saving the country from famine in such a way that, with the help of paid labor, we erected destroyed bridges and other structures on land roads, and repaired stations and torn railway network on the railway networks, so that the trains could run. We saved the people from starvation in the way that we carried out a proper distribution of grain, moving it from fertile regions to passive regions, especially in the Studenič and Užice regions, where the people were starving.
You mention "government squads", explain who did everything, that is, was part of those squads?
— Volunteer detachments under the command of General Stevan Radovanović, Ljotićevci and Chetniks of Kosta Pećanac.
What was the relationship between your government, on the one hand, and the German representative offices: the Administrative Headquarters, the military commander, the General Plenipotentiary for the Economy, BDS, BDO and the German Embassy, on the other hand?
— There were five tracks, that is, five German institutions, which maintained the connection with the Serbian government. Thus, our Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Education, and Justice belonged to the Administrative Staff, and the Ministry of Forests and Mines, Commerce, and Agriculture belonged to Wirthshaft—the economy and exploitation of Serbia; the Wehrmacht — the German military force — included the armed forces of the government; under the Eisenbanfirung — the railway administration — was the Ministry of Transport; floor Post and telegraph — included the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs. Namely, in all the aforementioned German institutions there was one German officer, who maintained connections with the aforementioned ministries of the Serbian government.
For the control of the ministries of health (social policy and public health), — finance and — construction, there were officers responsible for the control of those ministries in the Administrative Headquarters.
I, personally, was in direct contact with the Plenipotentiary of Foreign Affairs, who was in direct contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin.
Why did the Germans subject your government, that is, the ministries of your government, to the control of the aforementioned German institutions?
— For cooperation and control of our government.
Did the listed German institutions, that is, the officers in those institutions, in charge of cooperation and control, issue orders to individual ministers of your government?
— They did not issue orders directly to the ministers, but to the Presidency of the Serbian government, which then transmitted those orders through the Ministerial Council to individual ministers.
What was the relationship between the German authorities and the regional bodies of the Serbian government in the interior of Serbia?
— According to the German institutions in the interior, namely the Field Commands, Orts Commands, and later the Gestapo and Feldgendarmerie, there were bodies that were the link, or maintained the link, between our administrative and self-governing authorities, on the one hand, and the Administrative Headquarters, on the other. These German authorities actually controlled the service and work of our administrative and self-governing authorities, so there was full cooperation. This lasted until the arrival of General Meisner, the commander of security in Serbia — a direct authority of Himmler's, when the Security Department of our Ministry of the Interior, by order of Himmler, completely passed into Meisner's hands, so that Meisner became the absolute master of the Security Department and all regional authorities (Administration of the City of Belgrade, Department of the Special Police, Serbian State Guard, Border Guard, district and interior chiefdoms of Serbia).
When did Meisner come to Serbia and how long did he stay in the position of security commander?
— I don't remember the exact date, but I know that he came in the first half of 1942. and remained in the position of security commander until two or three months before the retreat — the Germans leaving Serbia, when he was replaced by Dr. Šefer.
So, through Meisner, as a direct organ of Himmler's, the Germans took under their full command and control both the armed forces — the force of the Serbian government — and the administrative and self-governing bodies of the government. Is that so?
— This was the case with the armed government force, and as far as the administrative and self-governing bodies are concerned, the Germans became the masters and commanders of those bodies only in terms of the security service.
It comes out, in view of the previously stated relationship between the German institutions: Administrative Headquarters, Wehrmacht, Wirtschaft, etc. on the one hand and your government on the other, where those German institutions exercised control over some of your ministries, and even issued orders through the presidency of your government, and considering what you have now said that Meissner became the absolute master of the government's armed forces — it follows, therefore, that your government neither received the autonomy of the country, nor its own and independent armed forces. Therefore, the Germans did not fulfill their promises regarding those two conditions, which you set for them during the formation of the "Serbian government of national salvation". Is that right, Mr. I won't?
— It is true that the government neither received the autonomy of the country, nor its armed forces. The government itself came to the conclusion that the Germans had deceived it.
When did your government see that the Germans "deceived" it, not respecting the promised "autonomy of the country" and the right to its own armed forces?
— With the arrival of Meissner and Himmler issuing a decree that Meissner would become the master of the government's armed forces.
After that, why did you still remain the president of such a government from which the Germans are taking away the main promised prerogatives?
— I stayed to fight with Meissner and replace him.
Did you succeed in that?
- I did, it was just the dock.
Earlier you stated that Meissner left for two to three months before the withdrawal of the Germans from Serbia. It means that the situation remained unchanged for the entire time of the occupation and that you were the president of the Serbian government during that time. It appears that you consciously served the occupier in the fight against the Serbian people and to their detriment. Do you admit it?
— I admit that I cooperated with the Germans and benefited them with my work, but I did this to help my people.
Since Nedic gave the German responsible authorities of the occupation administration in Serbia consent in principle to form a new Quislin administration, he tried to have his arrival as the president of the "government of national salvation" interpreted as a request of a representative of public life, a representative of the people.
In this connection, and on the initiative of Milan Aćimović*** and Dimitrije Ljotić, several meetings of Serbian politicians were held.
Certain "well-known personalities", for example: Ilija Mihailović, Milan Aćimović, Dimitrije Ljotić and many others, went to Milan Nedić's apartment and "convinced" him to accept the position of Prime Minister of Serbia.
The first major meeting on this issue was held around August 10, 1941 in the building of the Ministry of the Interior for Nedic to see "what is the mood of public opinion".*
Just a few days later (in mid-August), a wider gathering of Belgrade politicians, representatives of all parties, chambers, associations, universities, and organizations was held, at which Milan Nedic was formally given the mandate to form the "government of national salvation".
Milan Aćimović informs that the commissioner's administration has resigned and says that he and Ljotić are authorized to inform the German authorities about it, as well as that meeting. Presenting the difficult situation, M. Aćimović declares that he and Ljotić are of the opinion that a much more authoritative body should be created, whose task would be to continue with the rescue of the Serbian people. Some were of the opinion that D. Ljotić should receive these duties. However, he refuses this, because he believes that the head of the new government or administration should be a person who does not belong to any political group, and at the same time enjoys the highest authority in the country.
He thinks that this duty could be performed with the most authority by Army General Milan D. Nedic, former Minister of the Army and Navy, who is interned in Belgrade. However, Aleksandar Cincar-Marković, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and M. Aćimović suggest that Army General Danilo Kalafatović, who was in German captivity, be invited to that position.
Ljotić explained that he was proposing Nedić since he is in Belgrade, so it would be possible to get in touch with him, while General D. Kalafatović is in captivity in Germany, and it would take a long time before his possible arrival, and the Serbian people need quick help...
Among the 70-80 people present, there were the following personalities, distinguished representatives of bourgeois circles, who advocated cooperation with the German occupiers by all means: professors Miloš Trivunac, Ilija Pržić, Velibor Jonić, Dr. Laza Kostić, Dr. Mirko Kostić; generals: Josip Kostić, Panta Draškić, Stevan Radovanović, Dušan Pešić, Colonel Tanasije Dinić; industrialists: Vlada Ilić and Ilija Mihailović; representatives of political parties: Košta Kumanudi, Risto Jojić, Đuro Kotur, Dr. Miloš Radosavljević, Dr. Laza Marković, Dr. Momčilo Janković, Milan Aćimović, Aleksandar Cincar-Marković, Miloš Spalajković, Dimitrije Ljotić, Milosav Vasiljević, Stevan Ivonić, Mihailo Oljćan and many others who were in favor of the closest cooperation with the occupier...
Then several speeches were held, all of which boiled down to the fact that I should take over the organization of order and peace in the country and pacify the uprising that was already raging. This is especially because the Germans started threatening reprisals against the entire nation; that otherwise they will bring order and peace with the help of Hungarian, Bulgarian and Croatian troops...
At the meeting of prominent Belgrade citizens, M. Nedic was also present. When he heard what was being asked of him, he pointed out that such a position requires tremendous responsibility, and therefore he cannot accept the offered position. All those present started begging and begging Nedić to accept the position...
Behind Belic's words (we are talking about Dr. Aleksandar Belic — MB), Nedic said in an excited voice that he agreed to put himself at the head of a Serbian government, which, based on international conventions, would receive the responsibility of administering the country under German occupation, resolutely rejecting any policy that would be against the interests of the Serbian people."
The conference ended with Aćimović drawing a conclusion about the need to create a Serbian government, headed by me, as president. This conclusion was adopted by all present...
I accepted that decision, with the note that I will form a government if the Germans agree to the conditions I set."
Dragi Jovanović***, the administrator of the city of Belgrade, who was well informed about all the developments in the relationship between the German occupation administration in Serbia — the Council of Commissioners and bourgeois Serbian circles, in his hearing before the investigative bodies after the war, also gives details about the appointment of Milan Nedić as the president of the Serbian Quisling government. In one part of his hearing, he declares: "Nedić wanted to give form to his arrival as prime minister, as if he accepted that position at the request and request of a representative of public life, as a representative of the people." In order to see how much Nedić was bluffing in this, I will present a conversation between me and Nedić after the conference, when I went to him to invite him as the president of the Belgrade municipality and on behalf of Belgrade to accept the position.
I mostly said: "Yes, in the most difficult moments of our tragedy, the people called him the duke, expecting relief in that way." As then, so today, the people, and especially Belgrade, look with full confidence that he accepts the duties of the Prime Minister and fulfills the expectations and hopes placed in him. I promise him on behalf of myself and Belgrade that we will help him wholeheartedly.'
To that, Nedić replied: "Thank you, Mr. President." A heavy duty is expected of me. A ruined country, an army in slavery, these reds raise an uprising; all that needs to be overcome, and I'm already old. But I expect the people's help and yours, I am convinced that we will win and that Serbia will live.''
In connection with this, D. Jovanović adds the following: "In addition to the public consultations and discussions, which were discussed earlier, the fact is that although it seemed to the eye that Nedic was the candidate of Aćimović, that is, of that conference (he means the conference from mid-August — MB), which was held, in fact, he was a man previously predisposed by the Germans for that role...
Aćimović himself once told me that we were very stupid and naive when we begged Nedić so much, because even before the war, Nedić was prepared by the Germans to play a role in Yugoslavia, so when he failed then, at least now he came to the fore...
*Archives of the Supreme Court of Serbia, unregistered, Minutes of the interrogation of Milan Nedić from January 9, 1946.
*** AVII, no. la/7, k. 1, p. 30. Minutes of the interrogation of Drago Jovanović, the manager of the city of Belgrade; Archives of the Supreme Court of Serbia, unregistered, Minutes of the interrogation of M. Nedić dated January 30, 1946.
Archives of the Supreme Court of Serbia, Minutes of the interrogation of M. Nedić dated January 30, 1946.
More about it: dr. Milan Borković: THE QUISLIN ADMINISTRATION IN SERBIA 1941 – 1944 CHAPTER I The formation of Nedić's "government of national salvation" and its operation until the administrative division of Serbia (December 26, 1941)
Earlier, speaking about the relationship between your government and the German representative offices, you said that in certain German representative offices, certain Germans were in charge as referents in order to maintain the connection with the ministries of your government. Explain to us how that relationship was maintained and whether there was personal contact between the referees and your ministers?
— The connection was maintained both in writing and verbally, whether it was about certain instructions or orders from the representatives of certain German representative offices, or whether it was about certain questions that the representatives raised and resolved with the ministers of my government. Therefore, between the ministers of my government and the German representative offices, there was a personal connection, that is, contact regarding cooperation.
What did your government do in terms of the economic development of the country as it set the tasks?
— In order to regulate economic life, the government created a plan on a managed economy, that is, it made a decision to concentrate the entire economy and economic plans in one center, namely the Ministry of Economy.
Which of the ministers was entrusted with the duty of passing the plan on the managed economy?
— The plan on managed economy was only adopted after the reconstruction of my first government. This plan was prepared by Dr. Nedeljković, Minister of Economy, Forests and Mines in my second government, that is, in the reconstructed government. The plan on managed agriculture was prepared by Minister Veselinović, an agronomy engineer, and that plan was included in the general plan on managed economy.
On whose initiative was the managed economy introduced in Serbia?
— At the initiative of the Germans.
Why do you think the Germans gave the initiative for a controlled economy?
— So that they could use our land as much as possible.
Why then, when you knew the intentions of the Germans, did you approach the implementation of a controlled economy in our country, if you wanted, as you stated earlier, to help your people?
— I approached firstly because the Germans asked for it, and secondly, I believed that a managed economy would enable the people themselves to be fed.
Was the government independent in setting up the plan on the controlled economy and in its implementation?
— Completely independent.
What did the Germans export from Serbia
Did the Germans ask that the plan on controlled agriculture include the culture of some new plants, which were not cultivated in our country until then?
— I remember that the Germans even gave seeds, for soybeans, sunflowers and canola.
What was obtained from those plants?
- Olive oil was obtained from sunflower and rapeseed, and milk, flour and several different dishes were obtained from soybeans, and even some medicines could be obtained from it.
Did the Germans export to Germany olive oil, obtained from sunflowers and canola, and milk and flour, as well as medicines, obtained from soybeans?
- The Germans did not export anything from that to Germany, all of it remained for the use of our people.
And did the Germans export fat and real grain, or flour, from our country?
— Yes.
Did the Germans use soy milk or real cow's milk?
— They used real milk.
Do you understand why the Germans demanded the cultivation of the above crops?
— I understand.
And what is clear to you?
— It is clear to me that the Germans took what was better and left the people to meet their needs with surrogates.
You have previously stated that as the third point of your terms you submitted to Dr. Turner to determine how much dacias in kind your government should issue to Germany. Tell us the size of those taxes in certain products — products?
— Although the third point of the conditions was accepted, the Germans never wanted to determine the amount of taxes in kind in individual products. As far as I can remember, the Germans exported from Serbia an average of about 15.000 wagons of corn, 4-6.000 wagons of wheat, about 1.000 wagons of oats, as well as rye and barley. As for the other products, such as beans, potatoes, poultry, eggs, and everything else, I could not say in what quantities they were exported, nor was there any specific measure for it. They exported meat in particularly large quantities.
Did the Germans make any payment for these products?
— The Germans made compensation by making payments at the maximum prices and in our money, which they themselves determined.
What kind of donations did the Germans take from other branches of our economy?
— Through the Ministry of Forestry, the Germans took, actually exported to Germany, both wood for firewood and for construction, and in particular they exported some wood, I think from spruce for airplanes. Through the same ministry they also exported lead, copper, antimony, pyrite and gold.
Were the quantities of wood and ore that the Germans could export from the country predicted?
— The Germans exploited the forest and mining industry according to their needs and exported in the quantities they needed. I would like to mention that the copper mines in Bor and the lead mines in Trepča were especially developed.
What were the financial contributions that your government had to pay to Germany. Were they strictly fixed according to the third point of the conditions submitted to Dr. Turner, which point, as you say, was accepted?
— At first, when I formed the government, we paid 120 million dinars a month to Germany, so that figure later steadily increased and in 1944 it reached one billion dinars a month. This shows that the Germans did not keep their promise to fix a specific sum. In 1944, the Germans even demanded larger sums, almost approaching two billion, but the government could not find cover for such sums.
Did the Germans export the money they received on the basis of "real contributions", that is, take it to Germany?
— That money was only partially taken to Germany, and mostly it stayed in the country and the Germans used that money to pay for our products at maximum prices.
So, with the same money they received from your government, the Germans "repaid" everything they exported from the country to Germany, so they even had time to take part of the money back to Germany, as you said. Is that right?
— That's right.
Through which institutions did those transactions regarding the war contribution go?
— Through the National Bank.
Did the Germans have a representative in the National Bank and, if so, what were his rights?
— The National Bank was autonomous, and the Germans, through their representative, exercised supervisory authority over all the operations and staff of the bank. This German representative issued instructions and orders to the bank for operations.
So how can you then say that the bank was autonomous?
— The National Bank had autonomy only formally and in appearance, due to the fact that there was a governor of the bank, a director, etc., while in fact the bank was under the control and management of the Germans.
Who exercised supervisory authority over financial institutions and economic enterprises?
—Supervisory power was exercised by the Germans.
What was the role of GBV at the General Commissioner for the Economy?
— Total control of our economic life.
Who was at the head of GBV?
— Neuhausen, as the general representative for the economy of Serbia.
How did GBV regulate the economic life of Serbia and through which of its organs?
— As I said earlier, with the chief representative for the economy, i.e. GBV had officers who were in contact with the Ministry of Economy and Agriculture, represented their supervisory authority and gave them instructions for work. This duty was performed by Neuhausen's first assistant Bettner. Under him were centers for textiles, spirits, sugar, wood, coal, metal, chemical products.
Another assistant of Neuhausen was the Kaiser and he held the mines and economic enterprises.
So, the Germans gave you, as can be seen from everything that has been said so far, the initiative to run a controlled economy, so that they could systematically rob our country. According to what, then, did you prevent the Germans from looting Serbia and taking as much as they wanted, as you stated in the third point of the set conditions, which the Germans "received"?
— I do not deny that the Germans looted the country, which is natural in the relationship between the victor and the vanquished, but I tried to prevent that looting as much as I could.
During the formation of the government, did you issue any proclamation or declaration to inform the people about the creation of the government?
— On the first of September, I announced to the people that the government had been formed over the radio in the form of a declaration. That declaration was printed, as far as I remember, in "Novi Verema". ..Official Gazette", and it was published both in Belgrade and in many places in the interior.
What did you highlight as the main point in that declaration?
— Calming the country, preventing civil war and stabilizing order.
Did you say in that declaration that "the winner of the war did not destroy our country nor does he intend to destroy it;" that "our people appreciated the chivalrous demeanor of the German soldier and will respond to friendship with friendship;" "that the people should be grateful to the great German Reich, its representatives in Serbia for the great political discernment with which the German Reich correctly assesses the spirit and needs of the Serbian people" and finally...that the German Reich, although the winner of the war, will not be the enemy of the Serbian people"?
— I am.
In a speech you gave later, did you say literally: "You are being lied to by informants who constantly whisper to you that the Germans are our greatest enemies and that they want to exterminate, displace and destroy us." I tell you that their sense of fairness is very close to ours. Germany was not our enemy. It is not even today and it depends on us that it will not be tomorrow"?
— I am.
In the speech given to the prisoners, did you say the following, among other things: "I am asking you to be grateful to the Germans everywhere and in every place, who, according to you, were always people, not opponents." Likewise, you should always be grateful to the leadership of the German Reich, because you came to freedom through his generosity"?
— I am.
Why did you send Aćimović to Germany at the end of 1941?
— For the purpose of visiting soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers who were in prison camps.
What kind of directive did you issue to Aćimović on that occasion?
— To visit the camps and see the mood of the prisoners towards my government, as well as whether they want to return to the country and make themselves available to me, that is, to my government.
What were the results of that mission, which Aćimović had to carry out?
— The results were good, because almost all the prisoners declared and approved the policy of the Government of National Salvation and made a statement that they wanted to return to the country and put themselves at my disposal. I correct myself as the word "almost all" is strongly expressed, so I replace it with the word "most all", which really corresponded to the actual situation.
What did you do after Aćimović returned and submitted a report on the results of his mission?
— A list of prisoners was drawn up that we counted on to return to the country and be used as experts in certain branches of economic life, and for some prisoners we had the intention of joining the government squads. In the same way, we included in the list sick prisoners, as well as those for whom social needs dictated that they should be returned (families without financial support, without labor force, etc.).
How many prisoners did that list include?
— I can't remember now.
Did the prisoners from that list return to the country?
— The list was sent to the Administrative Headquarters for approval, so the Germans made changes there. Ljotić included some of his own people, and there were also cases where the families of individual prisoners worked through the Germans to have those prisoners added to the list.
The list went to the POW department in Berlin, so there were also changes and reductions.
How many prisoners came into the country then?
- I don't remember the number, but I can say that the government was surprised when it saw among the prisoners a lot of those it did not look for.
Was that transport of prisoners made available to the government and what arrangement did you make with them?
- He was put in and the government, as I recall, assigned forty or fifty prisoners as officials in the ministries of agriculture and finance, and probably the same number in government detachments.
Were there any among the prisoners who entered your government as ministers?
— There were, Dr. Nedeljković and Bogoljub Kujundžić.
When did the next transport of prisoners arrive and at whose request?
— I don't remember when the next transport of prisoners arrived, but in that transport, I know very well, there were sick prisoners. They came at the request of the government.
How did the Nuremberg Declaration come about and who was its initiator?
— When sending Aćimović to Germany to visit the prison camps, I issued a directive to Aćimović to address Kalafatović and my brother Milutin in Nuremberg, to give them my greetings and to inform them through them about the mood of the prisoners towards my government and their readiness to return to the country for cooperation.
After Aćimović's return, the Nuremberg Declaration was made.
I cannot say exactly who drafted that statement, but I believe that Kalafatović and my brother Milutin were the initiators of it.
Did you set Acimović the task of examining the mood of the prisoners in such a way that a survey would be conducted, where the prisoners would declare themselves "for and against" your government?
— I did not specifically tell Aćimović to examine the mood of the prisoners in such a way that they would declare "for and against", but I do not deny that the Nuremberg declaration came as a consequence of Aćimović's mission in Germany.
How many transports of prisoners arrived in the country after the Nuremberg Declaration and how was it distributed?
— As far as I can remember, I think that transport numbered around 1.200 prisoners. Former officials returned to their posts, and officers joined SDS and SGS. Among the prisoners who arrived were a large number of border guards and gendarmes.
Was there a body under the government or in Germany that dealt specifically with the issue of prisoners, that is, recruiting them and returning them to the country?
— Such a body did not exist, but an official was assigned to the Presidency of the Government, who kept statistics on prisoners, and there was an officer at the Administrative Headquarters of the Germans, who considered requests from both the government and private individuals for the return of prisoners to the country.
After Aćimović, did the government send anyone else to Germany for our prisoners?
— In 1943, the government sent the engineer Milosav Vasiljević with an officer of the SDK to the prison camps with the same task, which Aćimović also went with.
— She did not take any measures.
And did you send a document to the commander of Serbia, Bader, in which you inform him that there are about 340 Jews in the camp in Osnabrik and a certain number of active reserve officers, who are communist-minded, by which you requested that these Jews and officers be separated from the other prisoners, in order to avoid their influence?
- I am. I directed that act.
Did General Bader comply with your request?
— I sent him the document, but I don't know if he did anything about it.
In addition to the fight that your units waged against the partisans, did you call on the people to capture the partisans and hand them over either to your units or to the Germans?
— I don't remember that I and my government made an appeal to the people.
Did you make certain promises to those who would catch or denounce a partisan?
— I am.
What promises did you make for captured or denounced partisans?
— I don't remember what kind of promises they were, but I probably promised a reward.
What kind of reward would it be and how much would it be that you promised?
- I said in general that the one who catches or denounces a partisan will be rewarded, without saying what and how.
And don't you remember a leaflet that was distributed widely and with which you call on the people to destroy the partisans, because that is their only salvation. "Therefore report them immediately to the Serbian armed forces, who will deal with them to save you, your children, your glory and property." Every Serb or Serbian woman who denounces the water or the communist gang and thereby contributes to their destruction, in addition to great national merits and recognition of the homeland, will also be rewarded with a monetary reward of 50-100.000 dinars." Do you remember now, Mr. Nedić, and do you admit that this is your leaflet?
— I remember and admit that I wrote that leaflet, which was distributed among the people.
And how much of a reward did you announce for anyone who captures an ordinary partisan or exposes him to the Serbian armed forces?
— I had announced the prize for three thousand dinars.
How many prizes have you awarded and in what amount?
— I do not deny that prizes were awarded, but how many were awarded, and in what amount, I do not remember.
Who passed the decree on the creation of the "Serbian Labor Union" and at whose suggestion?
— "Serbian Government of National Salvation" at the proposal of the Minister of Social Policy and Public Health Dr. Jovan Mijušković.
Who initiated the creation of the "Serbian Labor Union"?
— Germans.
Who made the rules of the "Serbian Labor Union" and who was on the board of the "Serbian Labor Union" as its leader?
— I issued an order for the implementation of the work and disciplinary regulations of the "Serbian Labor Union". I was the head of the "Serbian Labor Union".
When were the government units reformed into the "Serbian State Guard"?
— By chance, in March 1942.
Who passed the decree and when on the organization of the "Serbian State Guard"
— The decree was passed by my government and, as far as I remember, in February 1942.
What reasons led the government to reform the units into SDS?
— The reasons for the government's decision to reform its former units into the SDS were that Serbia was cleared of communists at the end of 1942, so now it was necessary to create an armed force to maintain public order and security in the country. This led to the re-formation of the government detachments in the SDS.
Well, couldn't the previous government units take on the role of "guardians" of the security order in the country. Why was it necessary that, in fact, those same units that will be the "guardians" of that order now rechristen themselves SDS?
— The previous government detachments were more operational units, which is why the Germans shied away from them.
So, it was the Germans who demanded the education of the SDS. Is that so?
— It is true that, as I said, the Germans were wary of the government squads and considered that since the communists had been expelled and the situation had stabilized, the role of the former government squads to change and become security guards. As for the very name "SDS", that name originated in the government itself.
I note that the Germans rejected our proposal to create a gendarmerie with the motivation that if we introduce a gendarmerie, it would mean that we would have our own state.
How strong was the SDS when it was formed?
— About 15.000 soldiers.
Who was the SDS commander during its formation?
— General Steva Radovanović. Later, at the request of the Germans, he was removed and replaced by General Borivoje Jović.
The SGS commander was Colonel Pogačar.
Was SGS part of SDS?
— No.
Whose employees were the SDS members considered to be?
— To the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Who was the Minister of the Interior at that time?
— Me.
Does that mean that the SDS was directly subordinated to you?
— To the Government and to me as the President of the Ministerial Council and the Minister of Internal Affairs.
Who received officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the SDS?
— The Ministry of Internal Affairs received the SDS commander's proposal.
It turns out that you, since you were the Minister of the Interior at the time, were the supreme commander of the SDS?
— Yes.
How long did the SDS remain under your command?
— Until the formation of the Directorate of Security for Serbia under General Meissner.
What happened to the SDS then?
— It was placed under the command of the Serbian State Security, i.e. under the command of the head of the SDB, Drago Jovanović, and this Jovanović came directly under Meisner's command.
Did the SDS change its name after coming under the command of Drago Jovanović, that is, General Meisner?
— No.
Who issued the order for the education of the Banjica camp?
When was the Banjica camp established?
— In 1942, I don't remember the month.
Who issued the order for the education of the camp?
— Me.
Who passed the decree on the categorization of camp inmates at Banjica?
— Me.
Who issued the order on the formation of the commission for the categorization of camp inmates?
— I mean, Dear Jovanović, on the basis of this regulation that I passed.
Did the decree that you passed provide for that commission?
— Yes.
It means that Dragi Jovanović only appointed the people who will educate that commission, that is, enter it. Is that right?
— Yes.
According to that regulation, the camp inmates are divided into how many categories?
— Into four categories.
Did you sometime later issue an order confining politically suspicious persons and taking hostages?
— I am.
When did you issue that order?
— On the fifteenth of August 1944.
Did the order foresee the categorization of suspicious persons and hostages?
— She predicted it.
How many categories were there?
— Six.
Did that order refer to "suspicious persons" in connection with the DM organization and were sympathizers or relatives of members of the DM organization taken as hostages?
— It did not refer to those who belong to or support the DM organization, but only to communists, their relatives and those who support communists.
The order also applied to negative persons, non-workers, alcoholics and suspected criminal types, so they were also confined in the camp.
When was the "Education Institute" created in Smederevska Palanka and on whose initiative was it done?
— In 1943, at the suggestion of the Minister of Education and Religion, Velibor Jonić.
Was any decree passed on the establishment of that "Institute", who worked on it and at whose request was it passed?
— The Ministerial Council issued such a decree, which was made in the Ministry of Education and Religion. I could not say exactly who worked on this decree, but I know that it was passed, that is, issued, at the request of Velibor Jonić.
Did you, as Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs, in connection with the escape of some cadets from the "Zavod" issue an order to assign a police commissioner to work at the "Zavod", who will serve there according to the intentions of Min. university jobs?
— That's right, I issued such an order, but I did it at Jonić's request.
Earlier you stated that in the conditions set for the Germans for the formation of the government under your leadership, you requested, among other things, that the Germans abandon the implementation of the order issued to shoot a hundred Serbs for one killed German, and fifty for a wounded one, but that the Germans did not accept your request. Tell me how long this order remained in force?
— Until September 1943.
How did the Germans "give up" on "implementing" this order?
— During my visit to Hitler in September 1943. I managed to do that personally with Hitler.
When the decree on direct courts was passed, who passed it and what were the motivations for passing it?
— I don't remember the exact date, but I know it was in the fall of 1941. The decree was passed by the Council of Ministers on the proposal of the Minister of the Interior. The motivations for passing the decree were that at that time the civil war was at its height.
Who was the Minister of the Interior at the time?
— It was me, since Aćimović was on the road, I replaced him.
So, the decree on direct courts was adopted at your request, that is, at your suggestion. Is that right?
— That's right.
Has another decree been passed on direct courts?
— The Decree on direct courts of the armed forces and the Decree on supplementing the decree on direct courts were adopted.
It turns out that your statement is meaningless, as you allegedly asked the Germans not to carry out any more executions of a hundred for one, which is evident from the fact that you yourself passed the Decree on direct trials. You must have thought that the German order was not enough, so you wanted to help them destroy the Serbian people. Is that so Mr. I won't?
— With the decree on direct courts, I was really trying to prevent the arbitrariness of the Germans, but not to help them. The Germans executed without a trial, and the decree on direct trials provides for taking them to court.
Tell us, Mr. Nedić, when that regulation provides for a court, does it provide for penalties and what were those penalties?
— It foresees only one punishment.
And what is that punishment?
— Mortal.
Well, is there then Mr. I will not ask what are the differences between the German order to shoot a hundred for one and your Ordinance on summary trials?
- The difference is that the Germans carry out their order without any mercy, and our people, who have feelings for their people, sit and judge in direct courts.
Can your people, who sit in the superior courts, express their "feelings towards the people", when everyone who is brought before the superior court must be sentenced to death by the very letter of the decree?
- That's why our people didn't even want to take him to court, because they were aware that if they take someone to court, then they have to sentence him to death.
And why the hell did you pass the decree on the establishment of ancestral courts, when you didn't "want" to bring people before those ancestral courts?
- We created the ancestral courts for the purpose of punishing by death those who are known as criminals.
And who are these criminals?
— Communists, who are caught in the act of sabotage or arson, as well as those who commit a crime: murder, etc.
How did you view the successes of the Special Police Department? Were you satisfied with the results of their work?
— Considering the results that the Special Police showed in 1941 when cleaning the area around Belgrade from communists, I, as the Minister of Internal Affairs, was satisfied with the results of the work of the Special Police.
Later, when Meisner came and the Special Police came under his control, I was dissatisfied with the actions of the Special Police, which I told the manager of the city of Belgrade and the head of the SDB, Drago Jovanović.
Did you praise the Special Police, either verbally or in writing, for the demonstrated results of the Special Police in cleaning up the area around Belgrade by the police?
— I have written to praise the Special Police for its contribution to improving the situation in Belgrade and its surroundings.
Do you remember, Mr. Nedić, when did you issue that praise to the Special Police?
— I think I issued that letter of commendation in the first half of 1942.
Did you issue another letter of commendation to the Special Police, when, and why?
— In 1944, after the discovery of warehouses with weapons, archives, a radio station, a printing press, etc., which all belonged to the communists, I praised the work of the Special Police in a written order and pointed out some of its organs, of which I remember Drago Jovanović, Paranos, Bećarević and some other agents.
At the time when you made this praise, was Meisner still the head of the Directorate of Security of Serbia?
- He wasn't. At that time, Dr. Schaefer, head of the Gestapo, was at the head of the Directorate, who replaced Meisner as the head of the Directorate.
The statement is incorrect, Mr. I will not say that you issued a commendatory order to the Special Police in the first half of 1942, and that, as you say, when the Special Police was under your control as the Minister of the Interior. It is even less true that after putting the Special Police under Meisner's control, you were dissatisfied with its work. You issued that commendable order on March 5, 1943, that is, at the time when the Special Police was under Meissner. Do you admit it?
— I couldn't remember and I believed it was 1942 before the police came under Mjasner's control.
Who and when passed the decree on the establishment of the institution "Land and Work"?
— My Ministerial Council in April 1942.
Who organized the departure of the delegation of peasants to Vinica and for what purpose?
— I educated at the suggestion of the head of propaganda, Đordo Perić. The purpose of sending this delegation to Vinica was to see the mass grave of Polish officers who were killed by the Bolsheviks.
What other decrees, in addition to the ones listed so far, did you make during your presidency under the Germans?
— I can't list them all, since there are a large number of them that would have been passed.
Would you mind if we helped you with that?
— Possibly so I could remember.
Did you pass a decree on the payment of supplements to the regular monthly gross allowances of the executive bodies used in the fight against the communists MS no. 1438 of 16 X 1941?
— I remember that decree and it is true that it was passed.
Do you remember the decree on monetary and material supplies of Chetnik and volunteer armed detachments and who passed it?
— I remember, that decree was passed by the Council of Ministers.
At whose suggestion was that decree adopted?
— At my suggestion, since I was the Minister of the Interior at the time.
Do you remember the following decrees and who passed them:
Decree on extraordinary powers to regulate services. relations in the department min. university of business from October 23, 1941. no. 1517
Decree on extraordinary powers for promotion, translation of periodical increase and addition to the service of officers in the gendarmerie dated October 30, 1941. no. 1633
Decree on postponement of execution against persons who are on duty in the gendarmerie, trained to fight against rebels or in detachments of the auxiliary gendarmerie or in prison camps, no. 270 of 22 I 1942.
Decree on the appointment of state and self-governing officials, who were in volunteer, i.e. Chetnik detachments of the Serbian government, no. 346 of 4. II 1942. g.
Regulations on compensation for damage caused by illegal action.
Decree on the formation of the entire service of the SDS dated August 10, 1942. no. 3143.
Decree on the government commissioner for the territory of the Belgrade City Administration and the counties of Vračarski, Gročan and Posavina on extraordinary powers of district heads no. 737 of April 19, 1944.
Decree on forced education of youth in the Institution in S. Palanka no. 2826 of July 15, 1942.
Regulation on compulsory work and restriction of freedom of employment no. 2324 of 14. XII 1941.
Regulation on the organization of the service for the reconstruction of Serbia no. 1062 of March 13, 1942. the so-called "National Service".
Decree on mandatory work and cutting, manufacturing and transportation of wood as a collaboration of the National Service for the Reconstruction of Serbia with these works no. 3079 of August 5, 1942.
Regulation on the payment of benefits to pensioners who voluntarily went to work in Germany, no. 1533 of June 11, 1943.
Regulation on the production and delivery of tow in the territory of Serbia, except Banat, no. 8533 from 19. IX 1941.
Regulation on the production and delivery of tow on the territory of Serbia with importance for the Banat.
Regulation on registration and purchase of sheep's wool in the occupied territory of Serbia no. 4187 of 3. IX 1941.
Regulation on collection and use of animal hair no. 542 of 2. IX 1941.
Decree on forced sale of pit wood no. 128 of 28. XI 941.
Regulation on mandatory supply and export of all types of feathers in Serbia Banat no. 2329 of December 15, 1941.
Regulations on handling the harvest of cereals, oilseeds and legumes, no. 2678 of December 6, 1942.
Regulation on regulation of alfalfa and red clover trade no. 3530 from September 10, 9.
Decree on the collection, seizure and handover of sheared and carded wool No. 795 of 18 March 1943 for Serbia and No. 846 of 26 March 1943 for Banat.
Decree on confiscation of property of persons convicted of crimes committed for the purpose of communism or anarchism no. 1063 of March 13, 1942.
Decree on the State War Surtax, no. 3097 of August 12, 1942.
Decree on expropriation of immovable property for the needs of enterprises of general economic importance, no. 3245 of August 19, 1942.
Decree on the Belonging of Jewish Property to Serbia, No. 3313 of August 26, 1942.
— All the aforementioned decrees were passed by my Council of Ministers, at which I was the president, and at the suggestion of individual line ministers.
Do you remember any other orders passed by you, in addition to the ones you mentioned earlier?
— There were a lot of those orders, but I wouldn't be able to remember now which ones they were and what kind of orders were passed.
Do you remember the order of the President of the Council of Ministers on the organization of work? unit for workers, working livestock and agricultural machinery in all rural and urban areas. general on the territory of the Banat district. principle. no. 1336 of March 30, 1942, and did you or the Council of Ministers pass this order and on whose proposal?
— I don't remember whether I personally passed this order or together with the Council of Ministers. I also do not remember on whose motion that order was passed.
Do you remember the following commands:
Orders on compulsory work and on the restriction of the employment of physical workers in companies for the production of paper.
Orders on compulsory work and restrictions on the freedom of employment of all mining and smelting companies, including their turnover.
Orders on compulsory work and restriction of freedom of employment of manual workers in coal mines.
Orders on mandatory registration of masonry, concrete, carpentry and carpentry workers.
Orders on the mandatory surrender of surplus wheat — and who passed all those orders and on whose proposal?
— I remember all those orders. I brought them and signed them, but only at the suggestion of the Ministry of Labour, Social Policy and Health.
Did the Ministry of Social Policy, Public Health and Labor propose to you an order on the mandatory surrender of surplus wheat?
— It's not that, but the Ministry of Agriculture
What do you think, Mr. Nedić, who benefited and on whose account were all the above-mentioned decrees and orders passed?
— They benefited the Germans. but they also benefited us.
How did your visit to Hitler come about and for what purpose and at whose invitation did you go to see Hitler?
— Due to the worsening conditions in Serbia, that is, due to the difficult situation of the Serbian people, which came about due to the arbitrariness of Meissner and Neuhausen, and other German officers, who escaped from the front and came to Serbia, I decided to visit Hitler and Ribbentrop, expose all the troubles of the Serbian people and ask that the occupation regime be eased.
At the thought of visiting Hitler and Ribbentrop, I came alone, so I turned to Dr. Benzler, the German representative and asked him to issue me permission for this visit, that is, to be received by Hitler and Ribbentrop.
In addition to what has been said, the main goal of my visit to Hitler and Ribbentrop was to ask them to suspend the further implementation of the order to shoot a hundred Serbs for one killed German, as well as to cancel the German punitive expeditions, namely their sending to Serbia.
Furthermore, I had the intention of asking Hitler and Ribbentrop to create a German center for Serbia, with which we would communicate, and not, as was the case until now, to issue orders from all German institutions, which caused disharmony between our authorities and the German ones. Namely, if an agreement were to be reached between our authorities and some German institution, some other German institution would interfere, thus creating confusion in those relations and connections.
Did you consult with any ministers about that visit to Hitler and Ribbentrop. or maybe with some other people, close to your government?
— At one session, I made a proposal for this visit to Hitler and Ribbentrop, so all the ministers agreed with it.
Outside the government, I consulted with Cincar-Marković and Spalajković about this visit. Ljotić, Ilija Mihailović. Vlad Ilić, and some others, with whom I stayed, and they all agreed with me making that visit.
Who officially informed you that you will be received by Hitler and Ribbentrop?
— Dr. Benzler, and before that Kranholz told me that there was a chance that I would be accepted by Hitler and Ribbentrop.
When and with whom did you go to Berlin to visit Hitler and Ribbentrop?
— I went on September 17, 1943, by plane, accompanied by Dr. Benzler and Kronholz, as an official interpreter.
Where did you and Hitler meet and in whose presence?
— We went to Berlin by plane. and from there all night between September 17 and 19 we traveled by train (D-Zug) to East Prussia to Eden railway station. From that station, we drove for ten minutes to a huge forest, where the German High Command was located.
On September 12, we arrived at the train station in Eden a little before 19 o'clock. Benzler had already told me earlier that we should wait for Ribbentrop at that station. About two hours after waiting at that station, Ribbentrop arrived in his special train accompanied by Neubacher and Fesselmeier. We all had lunch together in the restaurant-car of Ribbentrop's train, so Ribbentrop went with Neubacher and Fesselmeier to the Supreme Command at 16:XNUMX p.m., with the understanding that Hitler's adjutant would come to us at a quarter to six and receive us. I spent the rest of the time until the adjutant's arrival walking with Benzler and Kranholtz. Exactly at the appointed time, Hitler's adjutant with two cars arrived and received us.
As I mentioned earlier, we traveled ten minutes from the station to the headquarters of the supreme command, which was distributed among barracks in the forest.
In front of a barracks, Hitler's first aide-de-camp, the duty officer and Ribbentrop were waiting for me. Ribbentrop introduced me, Benzler and Kronholz to Hitler, who was alone.
How long did the conversation with Hitler last, what was the subject of that conversation and how did it end?
— The meeting lasted about twenty minutes. Hitler had already been informed by Ribbentrop why I had come, because I told Ribbentrop at the station in Eden. Hitler was dissatisfied with my demands, especially the request to cancel the order "for one hundred" and said: "You Serbs have bitten me twice in the heart and we need not a hundred for one, but a thousand for one." He went on to say: if we bite him in the heart one more time, he will flatten the whole of Serbia and that Serbia is ungrateful, as he saved it in 1933 when plutocratic countries wanted to ruin it economically, buying its products for nothing.
What did Hitler mean when he said that the Serbs "bitten his heart twice" until then?
— On the rejection of the pact and the attack by the Serbs on his units after the capitulation of Yugoslavia.
Well, what were the results of your visits to Hitler and Ribbentrop; was there any agreement between you and what decisions were made?
— Hitler said that he had given broad authority to Neubacher, who would come to Serbia and that all institutions would be concentrated in him, as a leadership center.
The German order to kill one hundred Serbs for one killed German, and fifty for a wounded one, was canceled.
Furthermore, Hitler promised that no more punished German divisions would come to Serbia. That Neubacher will investigate the cases of those German officers who came from the front and sneaked into Serbia through German institutions. And, finally, that Neuhausen and Meisner will be removed, precisely that Neubacher will investigate the guilt of Meisner and Neuhausen, so if he finds them guilty, they will be removed.
Did the Germans stop shooting Serbs after your return from Germany?
- Shootings were carried out, but not in the proportion that was before.
Well, you previously stated that Hitler said because "the Serbs bit him twice in the heart, he should be shot not a hundred for one, but a thousand for one." How could he be so willing to reduce that "proportion"?
— That proportion really decreased, but Neubacher attributed it to himself, since after my departure from Hitler, he himself begged Hitler not to shoot Serbs any more at that "hundred for one" rate.
So it is Neubacher's "merit" and not yours?
— Well, that's right, only I was the initiator.
When did you first get in touch with Draž Mihailović?
— At the beginning of September 1941.
How did this relationship come about and at whose request?
— Immediately after the formation of the government, as far as I remember, on September 4 or 5, a delegation from the DM headed by Mr. Colonel Đurić and Majors Aleksandar Mišice and Radosav Đurić.
What was the purpose of this delegation coming to you, what kind of discussions did you have with it and what conclusions did you reach?
— The goal of this delegation was to establish a relationship between me and Draža on the basis of the fight against the partisans. They showed me a power of attorney personally signed by Draža Mihailović, with the authority to conduct discussions with me and make the necessary decision.
The conversations proceeded by explaining to me how the Chetniks gathered under the leadership of Draža Mihailović, then that the Chetniks were concentrated in a rather narrow area, in the mountains south of Valjevo, and that they were starving due to the lack of food. They further explained that the communists started attacking the authorities, citizens and burning grain, which is why the Germans carried out reprisals against the population. They also stated that at a meeting between Draža Mihailović and Kosta Pećanac, as well as some officers of these two, there should have been cooperation between Draža Mihailović and Kosta Pećanac, but they could not agree on the issue of leadership, namely, at that meeting, Pećanac requested that he be the supreme commander of all Chetniks, and Draža Mihailović the chief of staff, while Draža proposed that he be given the role of supreme commander, and Pećanac be a kind of honorary commander of the staff, so they parted ways. The conclusion of that delegation's presentation was that my government and Draža Mihailović should create joint cooperation for the fight against the communists with the aim of their destruction.
I agreed to cooperate with Draž Mihailović and promised him help. That was the conclusion of the negotiations between me and that delegation.
Did you, on that occasion, make some kind of written cooperation agreement with the delegation, or did you just verbally agree on what that agreement or agreement was all about?
— A written contract between me and that delegation was not drawn up, considering that all three from that delegation were my officers and well known to me, so I considered that there was no need for a written contract, and they didn't even ask for it.
An agreement is made between us as follows:
1. About the cooperation between me, that is, my government, and Draža Mihailović for the fight against the communists with the aim of their destruction.
2. To give them immediate financial aid so that they could issue salaries to officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as to buy food for the army.
3. To immediately appoint a liaison officer who will be permanently attached to Draža Mihailović's headquarters.
4. That, through the Germans, I effect the legalization of Draža Mihailović and his Chetniks in that the Germans do not pursue them and that they can move freely.
5. That after the cleansing, that is, the destruction of the communists in Serbia, my government should provide the necessary assistance to Draža Mihailović in order to calm the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6. That after the formation of the government squads, with which we had started, an operational plan is drawn up between me and Draža for the cleansing of Serbia from communists.
These are mainly the provisions of the cooperation agreement between me and Draža Mihailović.
Has this agreement, made with that delegation, on cooperation between you and Draža Mihailović been realized and to what extent?
— From that cooperation agreement, the following points were immediately fulfilled:
1. I issued financial aid, I don't remember how much, and the delegation took that financial aid with them.
2. I immediately went to the commander of Serbia, General Dunkelman, and told him about the arrival of Draža Mihailović's delegation and the agreement made with it. I told Dunkelman that Draža is asking for the legalization of himself and his Chetniks, with the provision that they can move freely, without fear of being persecuted and killed by the Germans, so that they can lead the fight against the communists. Dunkelman immediately accepted the requested legalization and issued orders to that effect to the German units.
3. I appointed General Staff Major Marko Olujić to be the liaison between me and Draža Mihailović.
I would like to mention that Marko Olujić did not immediately go to Draža Mihailović's headquarters. I can't remember how much time has passed since he left for Draža Mihailović, when he was caught somewhere on the way to Suvobor, by the communists, with an operational plan of cooperation between government squads and Draža Mihailović's Chetniks for the cleansing of Serbia.
How did the cooperation between you and Draža Mihailović develop further?
— I was informed that Draža accepted the entire agreement, that is, the provisions of that agreement, made between me and his delegation.
I mentioned that I had sent the liaison officer Major Olujić to the headquarters near Draža. Soon after that, I don't know whether it was the end of September or the beginning of October, Dunkelman called me very angry and showed me the agreement made between Tito Draža. Dunkelman said that Draža deceived both him and me and asked me how I could guarantee that Draža was a nationalist and that he would fight against the communists, on the basis of which he legalized Draža Mihailović and his Chetniks, giving them full freedom of movement.
After Dunkelman's announcement that Tito and Draža had made an agreement, I severed all ties with Draža. It wasn't until sometime in 1944 that the relationship between me and Draža was re-established.
How and at what time did the relationship between you and Draža revive in 1944?
— Immediately after the congress held in the village of Ba, the delegate of Montenegro at the congress in Ba, Zuber, the owner of the navigation shipping company "Boka", came to me and told me that he was sent by Draža in order to create a platform for joint cooperation between me and him — Draža: Zuber pointed out that the people are divided and that this only benefits the Germans, so it is necessary for the people to unite through this agreement between me and Draža: I objected to Zuber on that message to Draža that Draža is a fickle man and that he is violent, to which Zuber replied that this will not happen now, since there are people around Draža such as Aca Akskentijević, Đura Đurović and others.
No conclusions were finally reached between me and Zuber, nor did I promise cooperation, only that I told Zuber when parting that I would think about all this.
Sometime in the summer of 1944, Aćimović informed me that I needed to appoint delegates to Draža and that Draža had stated that he would like my delegate to be Uncle Ilija, referring to Ilija Mihailović. An industrialist. I accepted this proposal and told Aćimović that Ilija Mihailović could be my representative at Draža. In addition to Ilija Mihailović, I appointed Dimitrije Ljotić as my representative. Draža Mihailović, on his part, appointed Vladimir Jovanović, a former police scribe, and later the county chief and Captain Raković, as delegates to me.
The connection between my delegates and those of Draža was carried out both in writing and through personal contact, namely, Ilija Mihailović personally went to Draža's headquarters, and he also received mail from Draža's delegate Vladimir Jovanović. Ilija Mihailović regularly delivered that mail to me. It was about various requests made by Draža, mostly regarding the appointment or replacement of certain district and county chiefs.
While Ilija Mihailović, as I said, went very often to Draža as my representative, until then Ljotić, and if he went to Draža's headquarters on several occasions, he was never received by Draža. The reason that Draža did not want to receive Ljotić lies in Draža's intolerance towards Ljotić, so whenever Ljotić asked for a meeting with Draža, Draža would justify himself under various excuses, saying that he could not receive him, and sending his subordinate commanders to him for a conversation. Raković came to Belgrade in the middle of the summer of 1944. He used to visit my office regularly. Otherwise, Raković moved freely through Belgrade, usually by car. At his request, I connected him in my office with Neubacher. After this, Raković asked me to connect him with the commander of Serbia, General Felber.
I asked Chief of Staff General Geithner if Felber would receive Raković, since I previously explained who Raković was and that he wanted that meeting, to which Geithner gave me an affirmative answer. Raković went to Geithner, and the latter then introduced him, that is, connected him with Felber. After this association of Raković with Neubacher and Felber, Raković came to my place less often.
Did you and Draža have personal contact, when, and at whose request?
— There was a personal contact, as far as I remember, in August 1944. This contact came about through Drago Jovanović, whom I approached to put me in touch with Draž.
What were the motivations for connecting with Draž?
- The very events that showed the downfall of Germany created an incentive for me to meet with Draž.
Where did you meet Draža, in whose presence and what was the first meeting like between you and Draža?
— At night around 11 o'clock I met with Draž in a small house in the village of Ražane.
There I found, in addition to Draža, Colonel Baletić, Lieutenant Colonel Lalatović, Major Račić and Major Kalabić. On my side, it was me and Dragi Jovanović.
The meeting, both between me and Draža, as well as the other officers we found there, was cordial and friendly. I remember that I kissed Kalabić and Kalabić said to me: "Protector of my poor father", putting his head on my chest.
How did the conversation between you and Draža go?
— Draža asked me to explain the general situation and the development of future events, to which I told him that the Germans were failing and that they would soon have to withdraw from the country. I presented him with the danger of the communists, who are attacking from all sides, and that it is therefore necessary to form a Serbian front from my detachments and the Chetniks, so that united in this way we can quickly and efficiently save Serbia and Serbia from the communist invasion.
Draža listened to me and accepted my presentation and proposal. For his part, he said that he had a connection directly with London and the English, and that he was receiving first-hand reports of the situation. He went on to say that the English will land on the Adriatic, where they will make contact with them, and that the English will come to our country to establish peace and order.
What kind of help did Draža ask you for and what kind of agreement did you make regarding that help?
— Weapons, ammunition, money, clothes, shoes and food. We agreed that I would deliver weapons and ammunition through the Germans, since Raković would also work on it, whom Draža said was in Belgrade and that he had informed him that he would give the Germans weapons and ammunition. However, I do not remember now what the quantities of weapons and ammunition were. I know that it involved large quantities of rifles, rifle and machine gun bullets, machine guns and launchers, grenades, all of which Draža gave me written on paper. In terms of money, it was decided that my government would issue one hundred million dinars per month to the non-commissioned officers and officers of Draža Mihailović, in the name of affiliation. We further agreed that all armed formations of the government would be placed under the command of Draža Mihailović for coordination in the fight against the communists.
For his part, Draža Mihailović guarantees that the obtained weapons and ammunition will not be used against the Germans.
To what extent and to what extent have you fulfilled these provisions of the contract between you and Draža Mihailović?
— The contract was only partially fulfilled by handing over one hundred million dinars, shoes and suits for ten thousand soldiers and a certain amount of food from SDS warehouses.
As for arms and ammunition, I turned to Neubacher and handed him the list I had received from Draža. Neubacher objected that this was excessive.
Colonel Boško Pavlović, who was employed in the Presidency of the Government, went together with Raković and picked up weapons and ammunition. I don't know how many weapons and ammunition the Germans gave out, I only know that Raković was dissatisfied with the received amounts. It seems to me that the Germans issued only about ten thousand rifles.
The minutes have been read to me and I recognize all the statements in it as mine. I gave them without any physical pressure.
| Investigator: Miloš Isaković
|
| Interviewed: Milan Đ. Nedić |
Minutes taker: Milica Radojicic
Beograd
5. II 1946.
Minutes of the interrogation of Milan Nedić, Done in the office of the UN for Serbia on February 29 and 30, as well as on February 1, 2 and 3, 1946, Views, November 25, 11.
See also: DOCUMENT: Record of the hearing of the prime minister of occupied Serbia: The last six days of Milan Nedić, Politics;
