A book was recently published in "Laguna". Surgically precise Marco Mazzetti. In it, this American journalist, "New York Times" correspondent and winner of the Pulitzer Prize, writes about the new type of war that the United States of America launched after September 11th against Islamic extremism in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, as well as its consequences. Based on documents and testimony of participants and witnesses, Mazzetti talks about the role of the Pentagon, the CIA and the White House in this secret war, about the engagement of private security companies and armies, as well as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, drones that carry out murders "by remote control" on command. With the publisher's permission, we reproduce part of a chapter from this book
One morning in the late summer of 2011, days before he was to take over as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General David Petraeus visited Michael Hayden, the third and last director of the CIA in the Bush administration. The two of them worked their way to higher military ranks at the same time, but each went his own way and was not particularly close to the other. Hayden was a military intelligence expert and, in the years before he became head of Langley, he ran the ultra-secret National Security Agency. Petraeus spent his career in combat units, fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and leading the US Central Command. He went on to become one of the most celebrated military leaders in American history.
As they ate breakfast in the intimate atmosphere of Hayden's house, the host advised Petraeus on how to deal with the clans in Langley. Hayden has long since become convinced that competent officials and analysts can be loyal but headstrong, that they do not know how to salute humanly and that they are not always patient with the chain of command. Halfway through breakfast, the conversation turned serious, and Hayden gave Petraeus a warning.
He told him how the CIA had changed, perhaps forever, and how there was a real danger that it would turn into a smaller, more closed version of the Pentagon.
"The CIA never looked more like the OSS of old," Hayden continued. "It has grown into the global intelligence service of our country." If you want to do something other than the fight against terrorism, you have to fight disciplinedly to find time for it."
Hayden, of course, contributed to the acceleration of this transformation. The spy agency that on September 2011, XNUMX was denigrated as sloppy and risk-averse, under the watchful eye of four successive directors, went full force on the killing spree. During the long hot summer in Pakistan, in the months that followed the death of Osama bin Laden, the CIA killed a number of al Qaeda operatives, including Atiya Abdelrahman, bin Laden's liaison to the outside world while hiding in Abbottabad. There were those in Washington who compared President Obama to Michael Corleone when in the final minutes of the film Kum he cold-bloodedly orders his lieutenants to destroy the enemy in one precisely designed wave of violence.
WHITE HOUSE, CIA, PENTAGON: General David Peters and John Allen with CIA Director Leon Panetta, during his appointment as Secretary of Defense in April 2011.
Thirty-five years earlier, as toxic details of the CIA's efforts to assassinate foreign leaders leaked, President Gerald Ford proclaimed a ban on assassinations in the hopes that it would prevent future presidents from taking lightly the seductive ideas of carrying out dark endeavors. In the decade after the 9/11 attacks, however, an army of US government lawyers wrote detailed explanations of how targeted killing operations, conducted by the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command far from declared war zones, did not conflict with President Ford's ban. Just as President Bush's lawyers redefined torture in order to authorize extreme interrogations by the CIA and the military, so President Obama's lawyers created an opportunity for the US Secret Service to carry out its murderous operations on a large scale.
One of those lawyers was Harold Coe, who moved to Washington from Yale University, where he was dean of the law school until then. At one time, as a leftist, he strongly criticized the Bush administration's war on terrorism and exposed CIA interrogation methods, including simulated strangulation, as illegal torture of prisoners. However, when he himself joined the government as the State Department's top lawyer, he became bogged down in hours of reading volumes of secret intelligence files to make a life-or-death judgment. In speeches, he vigorously defended the Obama administration's targeted killing operations, explaining that in times of war, the US government is under no obligation to give suspects the opportunity to go through the usual process of law before placing them on the kill list.
And yet, when he looked back on his work in public, he would talk about the mental effort it took to read the biographies of young people whom the United States was debating whether to kill or not. "As dean of Yale Law School, I spent many, many hours sifting through the resumes of 20-year-old students to decide who to admit," he said in a speech.
"Now I spend about the same amount of time studying biographies of terrorists of the same age." I read how they were recruited, what was their first task, second task. I often get to know their background as closely as I once knew the background of my students."
In the midst of the strongest drone strikes, President Obama has ordered a realignment of the national security team. The outcome was somewhat of a culmination of a decade in which the jobs of soldiers and spies were almost indistinguishable. Leon Panetta, who as director of the CIA made the spy agency look more like the military, took over the Pentagon. David Petraeus, a four-star general who signed secret orders in 2009 to expand military espionage across the Middle East, will lead the Central Intelligence Agency.
In the fourteen months he spent at Langley, before his infamous retirement due to an extramarital affair with his biographer, Petraeus accelerated the very tendencies Hayden had warned him about. He pressed the White House to provide money to increase the drone squadron, and told members of Congress that the CIA, under his watch, was conducting more covert operations than at any time in its history. Just a few weeks after arriving in Langley, Petraeus ordered an operation the likes of which, up to that point, no CIA director had ever undertaken: the targeted assassination of an American citizen.
Before Petraeus took over the CIA, an owl-like preacher with a bushy beard and bespectacled voice and a message full of rage had made it to the very top of the kill list, a list drawn up in the basement office of John Brennan, the White House adviser on fight against terrorism. After bin Laden's death, at a time when drone strikes were steadily thinning al Qaeda's ranks in Pakistan, counterterrorism officials in Washington began paying more attention to threats from Yemen and from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This included the capture and liquidation of Anwar el-Awlaki.
Awlaki's path to being declared an enemy of the United States was not ordinary. Born in New Mexico in 1971, he spent his early childhood in America while his father Nasser el Awlaki, a respected citizen of Yemen who would later become President Saleh's Minister of Agriculture, studied agricultural economics at New Mexico State University. Nasser moved the family back to Yemen seven years later, and Anwar lived there until he left for college in the early XNUMXs.
At Colorado State University, Anwar was elected president of the Muslim Student Association, but he was not comfortable with the rigidly conservative line of Islam, with prohibitions on sex and alcohol, that some of his colleagues adhered to. After graduating, he stayed in Colorado and, to his father's disappointment, began preaching at a mosque in Fort Collins. Nasser wanted his son to pursue a more profitable profession, but after a few years, Anwar moved to San Diego, where he took up the position of imam at a mosque on the outskirts of the city.
TARGET: Anwarel al-Awlaki, killed in September 2011 in Yemen in a Predator drone attack
Gradually, his views became more and more conservative, so he preached about leading a clean life. But in his personal life he was also able to deviate from the path he taught others. He was brought to the police station several times for looking for prostitutes. More importantly, in 1999 the FBI launched an investigation into Awlaki's ties to suspected militant activists in the San Diego area, based on suspicions fueled in part by his work for a small Muslim charity. He will even come into contact with the two hijackers of the plane on September 2001, XNUMX, Khalid el Mindar and Nawaf el Hazmi, because they prayed in his mosque and attended his meetings.
But as the FBI's investigation revealed no criminal activity, Awlaki moved to the northern part of Virginia, where he preached in a large mosque in the very suburbs of the capital city of Washington until the September 11 attacks. In his sermons, he would refer to pop culture and American history, so he was soon given the opportunity to taste some of the media attention when he began receiving invitations from newspaper reporters to present the basics of Islam to American readers. At that time, he was even considered a moderate, so he participated in an Internet chat for the "Washington Post" about Ramadan, and was also a guest at a prayer breakfast at the Pentagon. "We came here to build, not to tear down," he said in one sermon, when he called himself and other imams in America "a bridge between Americans and a billion Muslims around the world."
But his message will soon turn darker. After police cracked down on Muslim charities and other Muslim institutions in 2002, Awlaki publicly denounced the Bush administration's war on terror as, in his view, turning into a war on Muslims. Not long after, he moved to London, where he delighted young Muslims who came to hear his fiery sermons, as well as those who bought CD sets of his lectures. But although his fame grew, it was not easy for him to support himself in Great Britain, so in 2004 he returned to Yemen, from where he continued to preach to the whole world through Internet chat rooms, and finally through YouTube.
Since he preached in English, his influence on the Muslim world was limited, but his infectious anti-American rhetoric stirred his scattered followers to action. One of those was Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a young student from Nigeria who tried to detonate a bomb hidden under his clothes on a plane that landed in Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. A few months before that, Abdulmutallab had written an article about his own reasons for waging jihad and sent it to Awlaki. As American investigative authorities began to piece together all the pieces related to the failed Christmas attempt, they began to better understand the role Awlaki played for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The XNUMX-year-old American, who once presented himself as America's "bridge" to the Muslim world, was not just one of the inspired prophets of the digital age who spread hatred through the Internet. Now he moved from words to actions and began to provide assistance to terrorist groups that were preparing a wave of terrorist attacks against the United States.
John Brennan, who maintained close ties to Saudi intelligence officials and had already largely directed much of America's covert war in Yemen from the White House, believed that Awlaki was primarily responsible for the shift in strategy by al-Qaeda affiliates. The organization has long thought globally and acted locally, focusing all its attention on targets in Saudi Arabia. But when Bin Laden and his followers in Pakistan found themselves under siege, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula saw it as an opportunity to don the guise of America's chief torturer. Brennan believed that it was Awlaki who pushed the group more and more in that direction.
Whether he was right or wrong, it wasn't until the National Security Council that officials began debating an extraordinary matter: whether to authorize the secret killing of Awlaki, an American citizen, without capture and without trial. Harold Coe and other government lawyers began poring over raw intelligence about Awlaki's role within the Yemeni militant group. Within months of Abdulmutallab's attempt to shoot down the airliner, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel released a classified memo giving Obama the right to kill America's renegade imam. In the memo, it was pointed out that Awlaki, because he held a position at the top of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and declared war on the United States, no longer has a constitutional right to legal proceedings.
Then again, the United States government had no idea where Awlaki and the other top members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula were hiding. The Joint Special Operations Command was just beginning to ramp up its intelligence-gathering efforts inside Yemen, so the Obama administration remained almost entirely dependent on the spies planted in the country by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Saudi intelligence. After the failed US attack in May 2010, in which the deputy governor of Yemen was killed by mistake, Saleh further tightened the restrictions on US action there, so the covert war had to be postponed for a while.
Little by little, however, the Yemeni ruler began to relent. President Saleh managed to hang on to power for decades by deftly manipulating the country's various factions, often pitting them against each other in a manner that one Bush administration official said was like "dancing in a pit full of snakes." But at the beginning of 2011, Yemen was also affected by street protests that spread throughout the Arab world, so the government, which until then barely managed to maintain order in the territory around the capital, was no longer able to do so either. Then in June, during the attack on the presidential palace, a rocket hit the room where President Saleh was hiding and knocked him to the floor. He suffered internal bleeding on the brain and burns on about forty percent of his body. The wounded Saleh was put on an emergency flight to Saudi Arabia by his bodyguards, where he was operated on for several hours. He survived, but his presidential days were over. But Abdullah Saleh was no longer there to dictate to the United States what they could and could not do in his country.
The CIA and JSOC used the year-long lull in the air war in Yemen following the death of Deputy Governor Jaber al-Shabwani to build both a spy network and a network of electronic listening devices across Yemen. At the National Security Agency in Fort Meade, Maryland, scores of analysts have been hired to monitor cell phone conversations in Yemen and hack into computer systems in hopes of intercepting e-mail. At the same time, the report says, the CIA has begun building a drone base in the desert in southern Saudi Arabia, from which it will conduct the hunt for Al Qaeda in Yemen. Saudi Arabia approved the construction of the base on the condition that its role remain hidden. One of the US officials involved in the decision to build the base said: "The Saudis did not want their name on the operation."
While the CIA was still building the base, the war in Yemen was still the responsibility of JSOC. In May 2011, the Pentagon began sending armed drones over Yemen from Camp Lemonnier, an old thankless base in Djibouti, Ethiopia, where a small group of US Marines and special operations forces had operated since 2002. The buzzing of drones has become an everyday occurrence in some of the most remote parts of the Yemeni desert, marking the beginning of a cat-and-mouse game between jihadists and mechanical killers.
After a two-week stay among the leaders of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, a Yemeni journalist described the security procedures implemented to avoid airstrikes. When a Yemeni fighter approached them, they would all stay in their places because, according to the rebels, "the Yemeni planes always miss the target." But if an American drone buzzed overhead, they would do the exact opposite. They would turn off their cell phones, jump into their trucks and start moving because drones "can't bomb a moving target." Fighters have discovered one of the weaknesses of unmanned aerial vehicles, a problem caused by the fact that they are operated via satellite. Since the pilots are sitting thousands of kilometers away from the aircraft they are piloting, what they see on the screen in America is sometimes several seconds behind what the aircraft recorded. That problem is called latency, and for years it has made it difficult for CIA and Pentagon officials to aim, and it explains a certain number of civilian casualties and failures in drone warfare.
It was being in a moving truck that allowed Awlaki to narrowly escape death in May 2011, just days after the commando raid in Pakistan that killed Bin Laden. A man who was spying for the Americans provided information that Awlaki was driving a truck in Shabwa province, so JSOC sent drones and the Navy sent Harrier jets to the area. The first American attack missed Awlaki's truck, and when the clouds rolled in, obscuring the planes' view, Awlaki jumped into another truck and headed in the opposite direction. The planes continued to follow that first truck and their missile killed two local Al Qaeda operatives inside the vehicle. Awlaki found shelter in a cave. According to Gregory Johnsen, an expert on the situation in Yemen, Awlaki later told his friends that the event strengthened his belief that "no man dies until he reaches the full measure of life and his own judgment hour."
During this time, in the White House, President Obama and John Brennan were becoming increasingly nervous that JSOC was constantly missing Awlaki and other top leaders. In the year and a half since Obama expanded US covert operations in Yemen, not one of Al Qaeda's senior leaders in the Arabian Peninsula has been killed, and many of the attacks have been carried out based on faulty intelligence. More civilians were killed than enemy leaders. Although armed drone overflights were better than guided missiles, the Djibouti government would not allow the United States to launch any lethal strikes from Camp Lemonnier without its approval first. The JSOC leadership resented these restrictions.
The CIA had no similar restrictions because by September 2011, a drone base in the Saudi desert was complete and ready for use. David Petraeus, who has since become director of the CIA, ordered the transfer of a number of Predator and Ripper aircraft from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. Spy agencies have also moved satellites and adjusted computer systems to allow communication between drones and pilots in the United States. They also completed all other technical preparations necessary to open a new front in the war with unmanned aerial vehicles.
The CIA had something else beyond the drone parked not far from the Yemeni border: a source of information within the ranks of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who regularly reported on Awlaki's movements. The CIA has already obtained intelligence on the structure of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and has managed to get timely warning about every subsequent issue of its glossy online magazine Inspire. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula used that English-language magazine for its own promotion, but also to attract potential jihad fighters in the United States and Great Britain to the war on the enemy's turf. One of the articles published in the magazine, written by the American Pakistani editor Samir Khan, was titled How to make a bomb in mom's kitchen.
Whenever they learned of the next issue of Inspire magazine, Obama officials debated whether to sabotage it before it came out or insert messages that would displease Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and alert the group to its lines drawn by a Saudi or American "mole". However, they would give up on it every time, among other things, because they were worried that whoever was suspected could be executed. But there was another reason. Since Inspire was available in the United States, any attempt by the Agency to manipulate the magazine's content could be seen as a violation of the law that prohibits it from engaging in propaganda activity against American citizens. These same concerns have led the CIA to largely abandon propaganda operations since the launch of the Internet, given that Americans sitting at their laptops can read news and information written thousands of miles away. The vacuum created by the CIA's reticence allowed the Pentagon and people like Michael Furlong to jump in with a new kind of information warfare tailored for the digital age.
Buoyed by the CIA's success in targeted killing in Pakistan, White House officials are turning their backs on the Pentagon and leaving the hunt for Anwar al-Awlaki entirely to the Agency.
On the last day of September, a fleet of American drones took off from a base in Saudi Arabia, flew into Yemen and began tracking a group of people in a convoy in the middle of Al Jouf province, an extension of the desert near the Saudi border, once known for breeding the famous Arabian horses. People stopped to have breakfast when, according to witnesses, they spotted drones and quickly jumped back into their vehicles. But the aircraft had already marked themselves as targets, so a carefully orchestrated symphony of destruction followed. Two Predator-type aircraft aimed laser beams at the vehicles, a tactic intended to increase the accuracy of the attack, and the Ripper fired missiles that hit the target. All but one of the convoy died on the spot, among them American citizens Anwar el-Awlaki and Samir Khan, the infernal master of propaganda whose creative power was behind the magazine "Inspire".
(...)
Spy in the nursing home
Dewey Clardig is down. A year after the Pentagon destroyed his private spy operation, Claridge tripped in a house near San Diego and broke several bones. Because of that unfortunate accident, he ended up in the hospital, where he was more groggy than usual, and then he was forced to move to the East Coast to be closer to his family. The 79-year-old former CIA officer - founder of the Agency's Counter-Terrorism Center, one of the main public villains of the "Irangate" scandal and the man who once bragged about drinking gin when he came up with the idea to mine ports in Nicaragua - has moved to Idle world.
He rented an apartment in a high-rise building overlooking a green plot of land Idle world, a retirement village forty kilometers from Washington. The establishment tried to attract the baby boomer generation by marketing itself as "Destination for the Timeless Generation". A Yankee and Republican born in the Depression, Claridge wasn't exactly a baby boomer and generally despised what that generation eventually came to represent.
In June 2012, I drove to see him, unsure of the reception I would receive. I've written a lot about Claridge, and I know he didn't like most of it. Still, he greeted me warmly when I pulled up outside an Italian restaurant in a retirement village, a restaurant where Claridge seemed to be the only guest enjoying the late afternoon sun. He looked like any other pensioner. He was wearing a salmon-colored shirt, which he unbuttoned around his neck to reveal a gold chain underneath. He had sneakers and white socks, and was more tanned than when he lived in San Diego. He told me how he adapted to the new environment, but complained that his cats were not entirely happy. "Everybody has dogs here." The small ones."
It was somewhat ironic that Claridge now lived a stone's throw from the CIA, an agency he mostly looked down upon, but he didn't seem to miss California much or regret being back on the East Coast again.
"This is where business gets done," he said.
By "jobs" he meant private intelligence. And he was right. A short drive from Washington, D.C., on the road between the gleaming glass buildings and big business buildings of northern Virginia, is a thriving suburban retirement community that has grown from almost nothing in the last ten years. America's defense and intelligence industries, once spread across the country in Southern California and the Midwest, have gradually consolidated and moved closer to Washington. Those companies decided to move closer to what they considered the "customer": the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies. The government's large and small subcontractors now form a ring around the capital like an army besieging a medieval city.
Private military and intelligence businesses flourished. By 2012, the global battlefield had stretched America's secret military beyond measure. The CIA and other intelligence agencies have outsourced some of their core missions to private contractors, who are hired for espionage missions and intelligence analysis. They are hired to support the Agency's drone operations: from sitting at stations in Nevada, from where the drones are operated from the ground, to loading missiles and bombs onto those drones at secret bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Jeffrey Smith, former general counsel of the CIA and now a partner in a prominent Washington law firm, represents some companies that have received "black" contracts for military or intelligence work. Smith told me that it is astonishing how many basic espionage functions the US government has outsourced to proxies, to private contractors (many of these companies are run by ex-CIA officers and special operations soldiers), who assure that they will do a better job than federal officials. Eric Prince sold Blackwater and moved to the United Arab Emirates, but other companies have taken its place and are doing much better than Blackwater staying off the front pages. As the American way of warfare moved away from the clash of tank columns, outside of declared war zones and retreated into the shadows, it turned out that domestic craftsmanship became an inevitable part of the new military intelligence complex.
Smith sometimes chafes at the unrelenting negative portrayal of private subcontractors, but still sees potential trouble if mission needs conflict with the company's profit imperative. "There is an inevitable tension about where the loyalties of subcontractors lie," he said. "Is she with the flag?" Or is it in a ledger account?'
In mid-2012, Michelle Ballarin was still pushing hard to get another long-term government contract to work in Africa, and she saw her opportunity in the turmoil spreading across the continent's north. When radical Islamists took over much of the desert in northern Mali and it became clear that Washington was once again struggling to get intelligence on a country it had long neglected, Michelle Ballarin told me she was reaching out to Tuareg rebels in eastern Mali and plotting a plan to expel the Islamists from that country. She did not explain it further.
Her plans were not limited to Africa. It was looking for investors for a new project to build a fleet of seaplanes modeled after the original one Grumanov The G-21 "Gus", an aircraft she thought the US military could use to transport soldiers to remote locations that did not have a functioning landing pad. She even scouted job opportunities in Cuba, hoping to get rich when Fidel Castro finally dies and communism ends.
One summer day in 2012, it seemed highly unlikely that Dewey Claridge would ever again grab government money going to intelligence subcontractors. His operation with Michael Furlong ended humiliatingly and Furlong was quietly forced into retirement. Clerdig was still angry at the outcome. According to him, it was another example of the Washington bureaucracy protecting its domain at the expense of soldiers on the ground, in desperate need of intelligence that he could get them, just to avoid relying on the CIA. However, he said he was determined to stay in the game. He told me that he still maintains a network of intelligence agents in Afghanistan and Pakistan, some of whom may be kept on a shoestring budget. If Washington was too stupid to use his people, he said, perhaps some other friendly government would be smarter.
He lit a cigar and turned to philosophy.
"I think the Peace of Westphalia is over," he said. He was referring to the seventeenth-century peace treaty that ended Europe's Thirty Years' War, that is, three bloody decades of fighting between kings and emperors who sometimes used mercenaries as cannon fodder in major battles. Most historians agree that the Peace of Westphalia led to the creation of modern nations, standing armies, and national identity.
"National states no longer have a monopoly on military force," he said. Instead, the future of America's wars are corporations and private interests. "Just look at our own system." The only one who doesn't have a representative is the guy who shoots."
It was a rare moment when Dewey Claridge actually understood the situation. After the September 11th attacks, the United States sometimes used a mediator to withdraw weapons. They were Eric Prince, Enrique Prado and Blackwater hired by the CIA to hunt down terrorists or mercenaries like Raymond Davis driving through the streets of Lahore with a semi-automatic glock in his car cassette or private soldiers dodging mortars during an all-night firefight on the roof of the Agency's base in Benghazi in the chaotic early years of the US The secret war showed that the United States was willing to rent out the government's most basic function: the protection of the state.
It was already late, so I got up and went, and Claridge decided to stay and finish his cigar. We shook hands and I walked to my car. As I was leaving, I looked over at Dewey sitting alone at a table in an empty retirement village restaurant. A thin column of cigar smoke curled in the fading light.
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